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FOREWORD 
This is the final report of the subproject entitled "Wheat Price and Income 
Policy" of th<" research project, "Measuring and Appraising the Impact of Agri-
cultural Price and Income Policy on Producers, Distributors and Consumers," 
initiated by the North Central Regional Technical Committee. NCM-11. Both 
were begun in 1954, and grew partly out of studies and reports requested by the 
Secretary of Agriculture in connection with a review of national farm policies in 
1953. 
Research under the wheat sub-project was centered at the Kansas Agricul-
tural Experiment Station, and supplementary research was conducted at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska, North Dakota State Agricultural College, South Dakota 
State College, and Ohio State University. The original sub-project committee 
was: George Montgomery, Kansas (project leader); Clyde Mitchell, Nebraska; 
Rainer Schickele, North Dakota; M. G. Smith, Ohio ; and Max Myers, South 
Dakota. 
B.]. Bowlen began studies of wheat supply response in 1954-55, and pub-
lished his findings separately. , 
]. 0 . Bray coordinated a series of surveys of wheat farmers' views of farm 
programs in 1955-56 which resulted in publications at cooperating stations as 
listed below, and which were useful in all phases of the study. 
John A. Schnittker served as project leader from March 1957 to completion 
of the sub-project, except for leave of absence from K ansas State University in 
1958-59. Mrs. Jeanne E. Dost made an important contribution to the project 
from 1956 to 1958. Robert Rizek, Carroll Spencer, Patrick Smythe, and Lee Rug-
gels completed M.S. theses under project support at Kansas State University. 
Mrs. Lorena Burnette, Mrs. Ruh Clifton, and Leo Mayer were of much assistance, 
and Miss Margie Jaedicke was responsible for secretarial work. 
The following published and unpublished works, in addition to this report 
and unpublished studies contributing to this report, resulted primarily from the 
sub-project. 
Kansas 
1. B.]. Bowlen, "The wheat supply function," journal of Farm Economics, 
Dec<"mber, 1955. · 
2. Leo Cohen, A suggested reformulation of the objectives of agriwltural policy. 
Kansas agricultural experiment station, Agricultural economics report no. 81, 
1958. 
3. Mrs. Jeanne E. Dost, An interregional analysis of the three major wheat pro-
ducinf( regions in the United States, Unpublished Ph.D . thesis, Harvard Universiry, 
1958. 
4. John A. Schnittker, "Response of wheat production to price," journal 
of Farm Economics, December, 1958. 
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5. John A. Schnittker,]. 0. Bray, B.]. Bowlen, Kansas farmers' views on the 
wheat price support and acreage control program, Kansas agricultural experiment 
station, Agricultural economics report No. 77, 1957. 
6. John A. Schnittker and Patrick E. Smythe, An appraisal of the acreage re-
sen•e program for wheat, Kansas agricultural experiment station, Agricultural eco-
nomics n·port No. 79, 1958. 
7. John A. Schnittker and W. Lee Ruggels, Advertising and promotion of 
wheat and other foods, Kansas agricultural experiment station circular 353, 1958. 
8. Patrick E. Smythe, Alternative bases for aiiocation of wheat allotments, Un-
published M.S. thesis, Kansas State University, 1958. 
9. Carroll D. Spencer, Impact of acreage allotments and marketing quotas on 
central and western Kansas farms, Unpublished M.S. thesis, Kansas State Univer-
sity, 1957. 
Nebraska 
1. Ivan H. Auer, An analysis of the eject of price and other factors on acreages 
of winter wheat planted in Nebraska, 1931-55, Unpublished M.S. thesis, Univer-
sity of Nebraska, 1958. 
2. Donald L. Winkleman, Some factors aj'ecting the wheat supply in Nebraska, 
Unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Nebraska, 1957. 
North Dakota 
1. Perry V. Hemphill and Donald E. Anderson, The efficts of wheat support 
programs on North Dakota agriculture, N. D . Agricultural experiment station, 
1958. 
Ohio 
1. M. G. Smith, et al., An analysis of Ohio farmers' views and responses to the 
wheat price support and control program. Ohio mimeo bulletin, No. A. E. 258, 
1955. 
2. M. G. Smith, et al., An analysis of Ohio wheat growers' views and responses 
in 1956 to federal agricultural policies, Ohio mimeo bulletin No. A. E. 270, 1956. 
South Dakota 
1. Richard H. Kruse, Acreage r!'."sponse of South Dakota wheat producers 
to expected price changes, 1955. Unpublished M.S. thesis, South Dakota State 
College, 1958. 
2. Allen Severson, "South Dakota wheat farmers and the 1957 Acreage Re-
serve Program", South Dakota farm and home research. May, 1958. 
3. Allan M. Severson, Acreage reserve participation in South Dakota wheat 
areas. South Dakota State College Agricultural !'."conomics pamphlet No. 98, 
December, 1958. 
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Members of the NCM-11 Technical Committee listed below provided sug-
gestions useful in the study. 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
South Dakota 
Wisconsin 
Vincent West 
J. Carroll Bottum 
John Dunbar* 
Geoffrey Shepherd* 
C. P. Wilson, Adm. Adviser* 
George Montgomery 
John A. Schnittker* 
Dale riathaway 
William Cromarty* 
Willard W . Cochrane 
Elmer Learn* 
0. R. Johnson 
Elmer R. Kiehl 
Jerry West* 
C. Clyde Mitchell 
Don Kane! 
James riassler* 
Rainer Schickele 
Perry riemphill* 
Mervin G. Smith 
Dick Newberg* 
Max Myers 
Dick Newberg 
Philip W. VanVlack* 
riarlow rialvorson 
*Member of technical committee when manuscript was approved for publication. 
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Wheat Problems and Programs 
In the United States* 
1933-1960 
JOHN A. SCHNITTKER ** 
Over-production of many farm commodities, persistent downward pressure 
on farm prices, and high price support costs rank among the most difficult do-
mestic issues of the 1960's. How to dispose of surplus stocks of wheat and to re-
duce wheat marketings without seriously reducing farm incomes or increasing 
the production of other crops is one of the most serious aspects of the farm 
problem. 
Farm output in the U.S. is a small and decreasing share of total national 
output. Per capita consumption of cereals is low and declining; farm population 
is relatively small and decreasing. Productivity of farm resources continues to 
rise under the stimulus of research and development and the individual farmer's 
need to match lower prices with lower costs. 
That the economic structure of U. S. agriculture differs from that of much 
of the rest of the economy is no longer seriously debated. Chronic surpluses, and 
depressed prices and incomes follow from the small-unit organizational pattern 
of agriculture, from its modern technological framework, and from the nature 
of farm commodities. It is not surprising that the economic condition of agri-
culture should be a matter of public concern in the U. S. It is, in fact, only in 
such an economy that the public can afford to take a leisurely and costly ap-
proach to eventual solutions of such problems. 
Public patience with the wheat program may be far from exhausted in 1960, 
bur it is not inexhaustible. In a world where war and hunger are daily possibili-
ties, large stocks of wheat may once more be as valuable as they were a few 
years ago. But wheat is not the only product making claims on our productive 
resources and the public treasury, nor is agriculture in the atomic age so clearly 
a "defense industry" as it once was. Even in a rich country, we cannot have 
more of everything. People in the U.S. are increasingly aware that they have too 
much wheat. 
*Contribution No. 333, Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station, 
Manhattan. 
**Associate Agricultural Economist, Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station, Manhattan. 
Wheat is a global commodity; wheat problems and policies of the U.S. are 
of world concern, just as production goals and consumption trends in other 
countries are the concern of wheat producers in the U.S. While this study is 
focused on the domestic wheat situation, international implications of U.S. 
wheat programs and foreign farm policies are also discussed. 
The study is in four parts: ( 1) the goals, methods, and effects of past wheat 
policies and programs; (2) economic factors determining the production and 
consumption of wheat in the U.S.; (3) global economic factors affecting the U.S. 
wheat industry; ( 4) alternative public policies and programs. 
I. 
GOALS, METHODS, AND EFFECTS OF WHEAT 
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
Agricultural policy is inherently economic and social policy. Early agricul-
tural policies and programs in the U.S. promoted internal improvements, speed-
ed land distribution, and encouraged domestic and foreign trade. The establish-
ment of land-grant colleges and extension services made education and experi-
mentation important aspects of farm policy. 
These early policies promoted national economic growth as well as individ-
ual achievement. There was also a strong undertone of democratic idealism in 
the land distribution policies of the 19th century, foreshadowing the goals of 
parity prices and incomes, which in the 1930's became the intent of Congress 
according to law. 
Objectives of agricultural policy ought to be consistent with the objectives 
of general economic policy and of the political community. One such objective 
is order, established or harmonious relation, a universal but not exclusive goal 
of the state. In modern democracies, personal freedom is of nearly equal rank. 
Freedom and order are not mutually exclusive, however. Each may be substituted 
for, or may complement the other. The extent of order in a society is clearly 
greater when that pure freedom to do exactly as one wishes in all matters is 
denied. 
The major economic counterpart of order is stability. Relative stability of 
prices, of production, of employment at a high rate of the labor force, and of 
economic institutions (such as the family farm) are major economic goals of 
every developed democratic country in the world. No political organization 
which must answer to the people can profitably retreat from those goals. 
Economic stability conflicts with economic freedom in many ways. But the 
U.S. society has chosen the goal of relative stability, and has established institu-
tions to insure its pursuit if not its complete attainment. Thus it has implicitly 
rejected a measure of individual economic freedom in favor of limited control by 
government over individual affairs. 
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Only the means and extent of that control are open to question in a demo-
cratic society. If farmers or all voters jointly and freely choose a measure of order 
in their markers and reject a bit of managerial freedom, they may be criticized as 
unwise by dissenters who seem to see a better way, or who reject the pursuit of 
economic stability itself. Bur they should not be called undemocratic for such 
conventional democratic behavior. · 
Justice is a third major goal of democratic societies with economic content. 
The roots of economic justice in free societies are in . the concept of the worth of 
the individual person. Justice as an economic goal is neither clearly defined nor 
measurable. Yet society has continued to dispense pragmatic distributive justice, 
largely by enacting laws ro lessen the inequality of income distribution. The 
slogans of modern agrarian agitation-"equality for agriculture" and "parity" 
are rooted in the objective of economic justice, and cannot be lightly dismissed. 
Finally, people continue to be interested in their level of consumption. 
They want to produce as much as possible, subject to the limitations self-im-
posed by other goals. In short, we want to be reasonably efficient, but do not 
reject all other aspirations in favor of efficiency. 
OBJECTIVES AND MEANS 
There are countless lists of objectives of agricultural policy; there are many 
slogans stating specific goals of an era or a group. Yet only one objective of 
recent farm agitation and legislation stands out-to raise farm prices and in-
comes. The farm agitation of the 1920's which led to the agricultural policies 
and programs of the 1930's is almost fully explained by widespread dissatisfac-
tion with the results of the prevailing economic order in agriculture, especially 
with the price system, the mechanism for income distribution. 
Farm prices fell sharply after 1928 and aggregate net farm income was near-
ly zero by 1932 (11). With those developments, the immediate goals of farm 
people crystallized. To re-establish their income position by creating conditions 
in agricultural markets which would raise farm prices became almost an exclu-
sive goal of farm policy. If a bit of individual freedom was about to be lost, few 
took note in 1933; fewer still mourned its loss. Lack of income had imposed its 
own unique restraints on farmers for the preceding decade. 
1933-36: The Agricultural Adjustment Act 
The Agricultural Adjustment Accl was Title I of "An Act to relieve the 
existing national emergency by increasing agricultural purchasing power ... ," 
one of many emergency measures enacted to revive the U.S. economy. The idea 
that national recovery would come about largely through agricultural recovery, 
though widespread, was nor taken seriously by economists even then. 2 A report 
explaining the Act after its adoption stressed the interaction between farm and 
nonfarm sectors, but made only small claims for its effect on national recovery 
( 11). 
'Approved May 12, 1933, 48 Stat. 31. 
' Presidential candidate Roosevelt had said: "I believe that we can restore prosperity here in this country 
by re-establishing this gigantic purchasing power of half of the people ... " As quoted by Davis (7, p. 2). 
It was declared to be the policy of Congress to establish and maintain con-
ditions so that farm prices would be at levels at which agricultural commodities 
would have purchasing power equivalent to their purchasing power in the peri-
od August, 1909, to July, 1914. Reduced farm production was called an inter-
mediate objective of the Act but was properly a necessary condition for achieve-
ment of the real objectives, increased farm prices and incomes. 
It was also declared to be the policy of Congress to protect consumers de-
spite action to raise farm prices. Farm production was to be cut and prices raised 
only to such levels as would nor increase farmers' share of the consumers' re-
tail expenditures above the share the farmer got in the prewar base period. Con-
sumers were to expect food prices higher than in the years just prior to 1933, 
but not higher relative to other prices than they were from 1910-14, except 
where marketing charges had risen. 
Clearly, the architects of farm policies and programs in 1933 had in mind 
an economy with market characteristics and an income distribution different 
from what had been in existence. Farm prices, whose level and instability had 
been the major source of agrarian discontent since 1920, were the key issue (34, 
Ch. 13 ). Parity prices (meaning 100 percent of parity) were the main symbol, 
but they were not a serious objective in 1933 nor were they to become one. Un-
specified higher farm prices and higher farm incomes were the goals. 
The Agricultural Act of 1933 authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to re-
duce acreage, production, or both, of any basic agricultural commodity, to enter 
into agreements with and to license processors of agricultural commodities, and 
to obtain revenues by levying taxes to be paid by the processor. 
For wheat, the objectives of the law were to be pursued through the volun-
tary domestic allotment plan (52, pp. 48-49) : (1) payments were to be offered 
on the 1933, 1934, and 1935 wheat crops to producers entering into contracts to 
reduce acreage only 1934 and 1935 (since the 1933 crop was nearly ready for har-
vest when the Act was passed). (2) Payments were to be 30 cents per bushel on 
about 54 percent of the national production, (the proportion of the total crop 
which had been used as food in the U.S. in immediately preceding years), and 
the pro rata share of each contracting wheat producer. (3) Contracting producers 
were to reduce acreage by not more than 20 percent from plantings in 1930-32. 
(4) To provide funds for payments to producers, a processing tax was to be 
levied on the first domestic processing of wheat for domestic human consump-
tion. 
Output reduction was the heart of the program (11, pp. 21-62). Compara-
tively large price increases were expected to follow relatively small reductions in 
output, and farm income from wheat was expected to increase accordingly. 
The processing tax was to provide a fund from which to make payments 
to producers who had reduced acreage. It was feared that without such an in-
centive to reduce plantings, few producers would cooperate, and the potential 
price increase would either be dissipated by noncooperators who overplanted, or 
if it materialized, would benefit noncooperators more than others. In the first 
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_ year of the program (1933), the processing tax was set at 30 cents per bushel, 
about 40 percent of the average market price received by farmers that crop year, 
as shown in table Al of the Appendix. 
Consumers were theoretically, if not materially, protected under the 1933 
Act. Few doubted that the processing tax would raise prices paid by consumers 
for wheat products. To keep food prices from rising more than justified by the 
processing tax, the Secretary of Agriculture was to make public the relationship 
between the processing tax and the price paid tO producers, and the effect of the 
processing tax on prices to consumers. No penalties were provided to enforce 
the policy in respect to consumer prices. Instead, the Office of Consumers' 
Counsel was established in the Department of Agriculture to provide informa-
tion on prices and margins. Public opinion was counted on to do the rest. 
1936-38: The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act 
Superficially, the goals of agricultural policy changed when the AAA was 
declared unconstitutional (January 6, 1936) and was replaced by the Soil Con-
servation and Domestic Allotment Act.3 A USDA publication stated: "Whereas 
prior to the Supreme Court decision, adjustment of acreage and production had 
been the primary objective defined by law, and soil conservation and farm man-
agement had been by-products, after the decision, the latter became the primary 
function under the law, with production adjustments as the by-product" (53, p. 
11). 
The provisions of the Act do not support that statement. Cash payments 
were to be made directly to producers, as under the voided 1933 law. Major 
crops called "basic" in 1933 were designated "soil-depleting" in 1936. Producers 
could share in the receipts of the processing tax under the 1933 law only if they 
had reduced their acreage of basic crops; they were required to shift a designated 
acreage out of soil-depleting and into soil-conserving crops to become eligible 
for payments from general tax funds under the 1936 Act. 
The speed with which the 1936 Act was passed also contradicts the appar-
ent change in goals. Support for conservation is not likely to have produced the 
1936 Act in such a short time. The 1936 Act was a product of a depressed agri-
culture in a depressed economy-the same conditions which produced the 1933 
Act. Maintenance and improvement of farm prices and incomes were its main, 
though not its avowed, objectives. A renewed national concern with resource 
conservation, born of the "dust bowl" and related circumstances surrounding 
the adoption of the Soil Erosion Act of 1935, was an important and durable by-
product. 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 
No significant changes in farm policy objectives were made in the 1938 
Act;4 the "Declaration of Policy" specified both the end in view and the means 
by which it was to be pursued. 
"Approved February 29, 1936, 49 Srar. 1148. 
·'Approved February 16, 1938, 52 Srar. 31. 
"Sec. 2. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to continue the 
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, as amended, for the purpose of 
conserving national resources, preventing the wasteful use of soil fertility, and of 
preserving, maintaining, and rebuilding the farm and ranchland resources in the 
national public interest; to accomplish these purposes through the encouragement 
of soil-building and soil-conserving crops and practices; to assist in the marketing 
of agricultural commodities for domestic consumption and for export; and to 
regulate interstate and foreign commerce in cotton, wheat, corn, tobacco, and rice 
to the extent necessary to provide an orderly, adequate, and balanced flow of such 
commodities in interstate and foreign commerce through storage of reserve sup-
plies, loans, marketing quotas, assisting farmers to obtain, insofar as practicable, 
parity prices for such commodities and parity of income, and assisting consumers 
to obtain an adequate and steady supply of such commodities at fair prices." 
Pariry prices, in 1938 as in 1933, meant only higher prices in practice. Parity 
income was defined more idealistically: 
"'Parity,' as applied to income, shall be that per capita net income of in-
dividuals on farms from farming operations that bears to the per capita net in-
come of individuals not on farms the same relation as prevailed during the peri-
od from August, 1909, to July, 1914." (58, p. 25) 
Cash incomes for farmers as high relative to nonfarmers as in 1910-14 were 
the stated intent of Congress. But statements of policy do not generate pro-
grams spontaneously, nor were the programs adopted in 1938 tailored to in-
come parity as defined. Income parity was not, in fact, a serious goal of the 
1938 Act, bur a symbol of the period. The 1938 Act established means of pre-
venting prices of specified crops from falling to levels which would have pre-
vailed without the Act, but the price goal was modest, only 52 to 75 percent of 
parity. The parity income doctrine, the relationship between per capita net in-
come of persons on farms from farming operations to the per capita net income 
of persons not on farms, was left to take care of itsel£.5 
The basic mechanism for supporting the price of wheat and the incomes of 
wheat producers was established in 1938 and has nor changed materially to 1960. 
1. National and farm marketing quotas were to be announced and put into ef-
fect upon approval by producers whenever it was determined that the prospec-
tive total supply of wheat would exceed the normal supply by more than 20 
percent, or if, in the absence of such an excess, the price was depressed. 
Penalties were specified for failure to comply with acreage allotment and 
marketing quota provisions. 
2. National, state, and farm acreage allotments were defined, together with 
conditions under which they were to be in effect. 
3. The Commodity Credit Corporation was directed to make available nonre-
course price support loans on wheat for the first time, whereas such loans 
had previously been limited to cotton and corn. The level of loans ranged 
from 52 to 75 percent of parity (37, pp. 40-76). 
The method of operation was to divert enough wheat (and other commodi-
ties) from market channels to storage when necessary to keep prices at or near 
pre-announced levels. The acreage reduction was designed to minimize the 
' Per capita income of the farm population was slightly less than half the per capita income of the total 
population in the 1910-14 base period; about the same relationship prevailed in the 1950's (49, pp. 34-35). 
quantities rhus diverted. Grain was to be alternately removed from, and returned 
to market channels in a stabilizing operation, a hope which did not materialize 
fully . 
Wartime Amendments 
Three legislative acts passed during World War II had marked effects on 
the postwar wheat program. Previously, wheat prices could be supported only 
from 52 to 75 percent of parity, and had been supported at only 52 to 57 per-
cent of parity from 1938 to 1941 (table A1). The Agricultural Act of 1938 was 
amended to support the 1941 wheat crop (nearing harvest), at 85 percent of 
parity, more than 50 percent above the previous level. 6 
At the same time, producers with not more than 15 acres of wheat were 
exempted from marketing quota penalties, an amendment which was to be un-
important until 1954, but which has since been a key barrier to remedial wheat 
legislation. 
The Steagall Amendment Uuly 1, 1941) required price support at 85 per-
cent ofparity for all commodities for which the Secretary of Agriculture had 
asked for increased production. 7 
The Stabilization Act of October, 1942, provided price support at 90 per-
cent of parity for wheat and other basic commodities for at least two years after 
the official end of World War Il. 8 This price support level, subsequently ex-
tended through 1954, is often cited as a major cause of the wheat problems in 
the postwar period, a contention examined later. The objective of the increased 
support levels was closely related to the almost exclusive real goal of all basic 
farm legislation to date, to maintain (postwar) farm prices and incomes above 
levels which would otherwise have prevailed. A general expectation of unem-
ployment and depression after the war was later instrumental in the enactment 
of the Employment Act of 1946,9 and contributed to passage of the higher price 
support. 
The Agricultural Acts of 1948 and 1949 
No change in the objectives of wheat programs or of general farm policy 
was indicated in the 1948 and 1949 Acts, which were amendments to the 1938 
Act. Nor was the mechanism by which farm prices were to be maintained al-
tered significantly. The 1948 Act10 extended price supports at 90 percent of 
parity through June 30, 1950, established a new system of computing parity 
prices, and set up a schedule of price supports for basic crops (including wheat) 
related to the level of the total supply of the commodity. The "flexible" price 
support program, although adopted in principle in 1948, was repeatedly post-
poned, and has never been thoroughly tested, although with modifications it has 
been in effect since 1954. 
The key feature of the 1948 and 1949 Acts was the following schedule relat-
ing price supports to commodity supplies.n 
''May 26, 1941, 55 Stat. 205. 960 Stat. 23 . 
'55 Star. 498. 1062 Stat. 1248. 
8 56 Stat. 767. " 62 Stat. 1253. 
The level of support shall be not 
If the supply percentage is12 less than the following percentage 
of parity prices: 
1948 Act 1949 Act 
Not more than 70 90 
More than 78 but not more than 80 85 
More than 88 but not more than 90 80 
More than 98 but not more than 102 75 90 
More than 110 but not more than 112 70 85 
More than 120 but not more than 122 65 80 
More than 130 60 75 
The price support schedule of the 1949 Act13 raised the levels of support 
15 percent above those in the 1948 Act. However, the 1948 Act had also spe-
cified that if acreage allotments were in effect, or if producers had approved a 
marketing quota for wheat (and certain other crops), the price support would 
be 120 percent of the level provided in the schedule, but not more than 90 per-
cent of parity. The 1948 and 1949 Acts thus provided nearly identical price sup-
port schedules for wheat and other basic crops when acreage allotments and 
marketing quotas were in effect; neither became effective until 1955 . 
Agricultural Act of 1954 
This Act14 set into motion the price support program adopted in principle 
but not in fact in 1948. As shown in table A1, 90 percent of parity price sup-
ports for wheat ended with the 1955 crop. The statutory minimum support of 
75 percent of parity was reached in 1958, and was continued for the 1959 and 
1960 crops. 
Price supports falling as wheat scocks mounted were the only substantial 
change in the wheat program under the 1954 Act. Acreage allotments continued 
to be tied to a long planting history, a minimum national acreage allotment 
was again established, and producers continued to be eligible to harvest up to 
15 acres of wheat without penalty even though their acreage allotment was be-
low 15 acres. Diversion of wheat into government ownership continued to be 
the method of supporting wheat prices. 
The 1954" schedule of price supports was from the untried 1949 Act, but it 
was not permitted to become fully effective. The support price for wheat, which 
would have been 75 percent of parity for the 1955 crop apart from exceptions to 
the price support formula, did not fall that low until 1958 (table A1 ). 
EFFECTS OF WHEAT PROGRAMS 
Emergency Program: 1933-36 
The 1933 wheat program was based on almost universal agreement that the 
U.S. demand for wheat was inelastic (see page 43 ). That is, any decrease in wheat 
output was expected to be followed by a relatively greater price increase. Gross 
income from wheat would rise, therefore, and production outlays (on fewer 
" Supply percentage was the percenrag<: rmal supply was of rhe nurma l supply, rhe i:Hr<:r b<: ing dctined fo r 
wheat as the estimated domestic consumption plus exports plus 15 percent o f the su m of rhe rwo. 
1363 Stat. 1051. 
"68 Stat. 899. 
acres) would surely not increase. Net farm income was expected to be greater as 
a result. 
Contracts to reduce wheat acreage were not applicable to 1933 crop wheat, 
nearly ready for harvest when the 1933 Act was passed. Although wheat produc-
tion was down by 310 million bushels (36 percent) from 1930-32, it was the 
result of drought, not the wheat program. Incomes of cooperating producers 
from wheat production were directly increased during the 1933 crop year only 
by the "adjustment payment" of 30 cents per bushel (28 cents net) on 54 per-
cent of their base period production. 15 However, with the short crop, the price 
received by farmers for 1933 crop wheat was twice the 1932-33 level (table A1) . 
According to Johnson (52, p. 53) wheat planted for harvest in 1934 was re-
duced by 7.6 million acres, 12 percent of the base acreage. Davis (8, p. 350) esti-
mated later that wheat seeded for harvest in 1934 was reduced only 3.5 million 
acres, as noncomplying farmers increased plantings somewhat. The wheat price 
recovery was well under way by the time the 1933-34 wheat program was an-
nounced. The reduction in output attributable to the program, whether 30 mil-
lion (Davis) or 60 million bushels (USDA), contributed positively but modestly 
ro the price strength, and probably contributed little to the 1933-34 economic 
recovery. 
The acreage reduction required for 1935 crop wheat (to be eligible for in-
centive payments) was only 10 percent. As the drought continued, this restric-
tion was removed, and the 1934-35 program reduced production and increased 
price negligibly. Thus, in three years of the AAA, the major gains to wheat 
producers came from funds distributed out of proceeds of the processing tax. 
Drought decreased production and caused most of the price recovery. 
The processing tax paid to the CCC by millers of wheat for consumption 
in the U.S., increased the cost of wheat for milling by nearly $150 million in 
each of the crop-years in which the law was effective (1933-34, 1934-35, and half 
of 1935-36). Cereal consumption, then as now, did not decline measurably as a 
result of increased prices (see table A14). Millers and bakers had no fear then, 
and need have none in the 1960's, that flour or bread sales would fall if the in-
creased cost of wheat was passed on to consumers. In the first report on the 
1933 wheat program, it was stated without qualification that " . . . the wheat 
processing tax is not borne by the millers .. . It consequently appears that the 
entire processing tax has been passed on to the wholesale price of flour" (52, p. 
221). Davis (8, p. 365) estimated that the increase in the price of bread, result-
ing from the 1933-35 processing taxes, may have been slightly greater than justi-
fied by the processing tax. 
The experience of 1933 to 1935 is especially relevant to discussions of an 
appropriate administered price for wheat under future government programs. 
Thirty years ago, it was the consumer who paid directly for increased farm prices. 
This is still the case. Neither justification of higher farm prices on equity 
grounds, nor the possibility of ultimate public benefits, should cloud the issue 
of the short-run incidence of farm price increases. 
"Of 1.2 million producers, 550,000 wir]'l 77 percent of all wheat acreage signed contracts to reduce 1934 
acreage up to 20 percent, and received payments rotaling $95 million during the 1933 crop year (52 , pp. 52-53) . 
A Stop-Gap: 1936-38 
There was no identifiable wheat program in effect for the 1937 and 1938 
crops. No serious effort was made under the 1936 Soil Conservation and Domes-
tic Allotment Act to reduce wheat acreage and production, as soil conservation 
payments were not tied directly to wheat acreage reduction. Payments were 
made from federal funds to supplement farm incomes from 1936 to 1938, but 
wheat acreage increased sharply as higher prices followed the poor crops of 1933 
to 1936, and as the drought ended (53, pp. 253-301) . 
Permanent Legislation: 1938-60 
Higher farm prices were the major tangible objective of the 1938 Act. For 
wheat, price objectives were to be met both by reducing acreage and production , 
and by removing wheat from the market. 
Wheat prices and incomes of wbeat producers were higher from 1939 to 
1943 than tbey would have been without any wbeat program. U. S. farmers 
seeded nearly 80 million acres of wheat in 193 7 and 1938, the last two crops be-
fore enactment of basic wheat legislation in force through 1960. Under pressure 
of a 62 million acre allotment from 1939 to 1941, seeded acreage was reduced 
nearly 18 million acres each year. The average yield per seeded acre was near 12 
bushels in each of those years, so wheat production was reduced nearly 200 mil-
lion bushels each year by the wheat allotment program. In 1942, wheat acreage 
was cut even more by a national allotment of 55 million acres. 
Small increases in barley, sorghum grain, and hay acreages were recorded 
in major wheat areas in those years. But total land used for crops was reduced; 
not all land taken out of allotment crops was planted to an alternative crop. 
Reduced wheat output and higher wheat prices were not fully offset by greater 
output and lower prices for other farm products in that period. 
In the postwar era, this was not the case. The acreage allotment program 
reduced total farm output after 1954 only insofar as alternative crops planted on 
acreage taken out of wheat and other allotment crops were less productive than 
the preferred crop of the area. Most alternatives to wheat, corn and cotton (major 
allotment crops) were also supported, but at lower levels than the basic crops. 
Shifting acreage to other crops either pushed their prices toward support levels, 
or helped to keep them there, thus requiring the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion (CCC) to purchase additional quantities of minor commodities. The acreage 
allotment program of 1954-60 affected the composition of CCC stocks a great 
deal, but reduced their quantity very little. 
Reduced acreages of wheat were not enough to keep wheat prices at the 
modest goal levels of 1939 to 1941-52 to 57 percent of parity. Wheat prices 
were raised (or kept from declining) also by the second price support me-
chanisms of the 1938 Act-nonrecourse loans made commercially, but guaranteed 
by the CCC, and which could be paid by delivery of the commodity collateral 
to the CCC. 
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The method of operating the direct price support program for wheat since 
1938 has been an implicit offer by the CCC to buy all wheat produced in excess 
of the quantity that would sell during the marketing year at the established sup-
port price. Producers use that option when the market price falls far enough be-
low the support price to make the small inconvenience of the price-support loan 
transaction worthwhile. 
Any year in which substantial quantities of wheat were put under loan or 
purchase agreements / 6 prices must have been below the support level for a time 
or perhaps for the entire marketing period. Had producers offered additional 
wheat for sale instead of using the loan or purchase agreement, prices would 
have declined further. Large quantities of wheat pledged for CCC loans are, 
therefore, direct evidence that producers would have taken lower prices at some 
point in the year if the loan option had not been available. 
Large quantities delivered to CCC at the end of the marketing year show 
a substantial and sustained difference between the price support and the average 
prices which would have prevailed in the absence of a diversion program. 
As shown in table A1 more than 10 percent of the wheat crop was placed 
under loan in all but four years from 1938 to 1960, and more than 20 percent in 
all but seven years. In each year except 1946-47 and 1947-48, the wheat program 
caused wheat prices during a part of the year to be higher than they would have 
been. In some years (1950-51, for example) large quantities were placed under 
loan but little was delivered to CCC. In those years, large price gains from the 
loan program did not exist throughout the year, since producers were able to 
market their wheat and repay the loan. Since 1952, the average U.S. farm price 
has seldom been above the loan rate (table A2), and there were few opportuni-
ties to sell grain, pledged under a price support loan, at a profit in the market. 
About eighty-five percent of all wheat placed under loan or purchase agreement 
since 1952 has been delivered to the CCC (table A1). 
The wheat program has prevented not only price declines but also price in-
creases. Conditions for substantial price increases existed in two periods in the 
22-year history of the present wheat program, both in connection with war. CCC 
holdings were reduced from 320 million bushels to zero between 1942 and 1946, 
helping to restrain wartime price increase. This was repeated on a smaller scale 
during the Korean war when CCC stocks were reduced sharply even though 
prices received by farmers were seldom above support levels. 
Only the direction, not the size of the price effects can be accurately esti-
mated. From 1938 to 1942, when 14 percent of all wheat produced went into 
stocks, wheat prices would have been much lower, perhaps as much as 50 per-
cent below the actual price, had the loan and storage program not been in opera-
tion. Without either the loan program or acreage allotments, wheat prices 
would probably have been very low until 1942. 
From 1942 to 1948, effects of the wheat program on prices were either 
negative or negligible. Addition of wheat to CCC stocks in 1949 and 1950 again 
prevented price declines. 
16Since 1948, producers have been able to assure themselves of the support price without the inconvenience 
and cost of borrowing with a warehouse receipt as collateral-by entering into a purchase agreement in which 
the CCC offers to buy at a certain date, if the producer is willing to sell on that dare, a specified amount of 
wheat at the support price. 
From the great 1952 crop through 1959, when from 15 percent (1956-57) 
to 41 percent (1953-54) of production was delivered to CCC each year, wheat 
prices would have fallen sharply any time the program was ended. If the wheat 
program had been abandoned, or marketing quotas for wheat rejected in pro-
ducer referendums while the corn price support program was continued, wheat 
prices would have fallen to near the level of corn prices. 
This would not have forced an immediate drop in corn prices if the corn 
loan program had remained in operation. But with wheat added to feed sup-
plies, more corn would have been acquired by CCC as producers declined to 
take the lower corn prices dictated by the addition of large amounts of wheat to 
the feed supply.17 Given the historic level of support for U.S. corn, recent na-
tional average prices for wheat and corn if both were set chiefly by the corn 
program, would have been about as shown in Column 3 below. 
Actual Estimated Actual 
Year wheat price wheat price* corn price 
(dollars per bushel) 
1952-53 2.09 1.62 1.51 
1953-54 2.04 1.58 1.48 
1954-55 2.12 1.52 1.42 
1955-56 1.99 1.44 1.35 
1956-57 1.97 1.38 1.29 
1957-58 1.93 1.19 1.11 
1958-59 1. 72 1.19 1.11 
* Assuming equal feeding values per pound of wheat and corn, and no location 
differences. 
If wheat and corn price supports had both been terminated in any year, 
wheat price declines would have been immediate, sharp, and probably sustained, 
even with CCC inventories withheld. Foote and Weingarten (14, pp. 40-41) 
estimated that if both programs had been terminated in 1956 and surplus stocks 
impounded, the price of wheat for 1956 would have fallen from near $2 per 
bushel (table A2), to $1.65, while the price of corn would have fallen from $1.29 
to $1.19 per bushel in the first year; 1959 prices were estimated as $1.24 and 
$1.15 per bushel, respectively, under those conditions. 
If grain stocks had been made a part of the total supply, and price supports 
and production controls ended in 1956, with annual wheat exports limited to 
400 million bushels, wheat and corn prices were estimated, respectively, as $0.56 
and $0.76 in 1956, and $1.15 and $1.14 in 1959 (14). 18 Such estimates are quick-
ly out of date, but they tend to confirm the judgment that grain price support 
levels have been and remain well above the level of prices that would prevail 
if price supportS were ended. 
Effects of wheat programs on the location of wheat production. Most of 
the arable land in the United States is physically suited to wheat production . 
Wheat is produced in nearly every state, and in recent years 39 states have had 
allotments of 25,000 acres or more (table AS). That little wheat is -grown in 
17See also Foote and Weingarten (14, p. 36). 
" Output was assumed to not be affected by the lower price in the brief period considered. 
many areas with the highest yields is explained by the relatively greater pro-
ductivity of other crops in those areas, and by price relationships among wheat 
and other crops. 
By any historic comparison, wheat programs have only minor effects 
on the location of wheat production. Small shifts in location caused by 
the program have not been an important cause of our most serious wheat 
problems. 
The wheat problem of the late 1950's and early 1960's is primarily a hard 
red winter wheat problem. To a lesser degree, it is a problem of potential sur-
plus production of most classes of wheac. Major wheat problems are closely re-
lated to the wartime expansion of crop acreage which occurred almost exclusive-
ly in the Great Plains-the hard red winter and spring areas. 
Looking back, the Cornbelt and adjoining states produced two thirds of all 
wheat by 1869, having assumed production leadership from eastern states (table 
A4). By 1899, nine Great Plains and northern states produced 46 percent of all 
wheat, and four western states produced 12 percent. The broad outlines of re-
gional specialization in wheat as it exists in 1960 were established by 1918-20. 
The Cornbelt share of the wheat acreage was to decline after 1920 and the south-
ern plains and northwestern areas to expand, but the aggregate changes made in 
the 40 years (to 1959) were minor. By 1928-30, the Cornbelt, the northern and 
southern plains together, and the Northwest had reached almost the identical 
acreage shares they held in 1959 and in most intervening years (table A3). Im-
portant changes were yet to occur in acreages and shares of U.S. acreage in sev-
eral states after wheat programs were begun but not because of the wheat pro-
grams. 
It is often contended that wheat prices support and/ or acreage allotments 
produced or maintained a pattern of wheat production location different from 
that which would have developed under the free market, a matter extremely dif-
ficult to evaluate. 
Certainly no large changes in production location can be ascribed to the 
1933-38 programs. Acreage limitations scarcely operated in those years. Nor were 
wheat programs the most influential factor in wheat production during those 
years of drought and depression. Neither the 1933-36 nor the 1937-38 programs 
operated long enough to leave any lasting mark on the wheat economy. 
The wheat program established by the Agricultural Act of 1938 was the first 
which might have influenced production location. At that time, corn production 
was becoming favorable relative to wheat in the Midwest as hybrids were adopt-
ed. Corn acreage allotments were also in effect, causing pressure to put idle corn 
acreage to wheat. However, producers without wheat allotments could not harvest 
wheat at that time without penalty. This fact, and the limited period in which the 
prewar wheat program was effective, would have prevented any major acreage 
shifts among regions under the 1938 Act before World War II, had they been 
indicated by economic conditions. 
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The distribution of wheat acreage allotments, in 1938 and subsequently, 
was based directly on acreage in the previous ten years, adjusted for abnormal 
conditions which affected wheat planting. Beginning with the 1942 crop, an 
amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1938 exempted from marketing quotas 
producers planting up to 15 acres. This provision became effective at a time 
when the wheat program was virtually suspended as a major factor in market 
price determination or the allocation of farm resources, and was not widely used 
until 1954. 
Speculation concerning locational changes which might have taken place 
between 1938 and 1942 under a free market is not very useful. Extreme stability of 
the location of wheat plantings and expected production prior to federal wheat 
programs and the absence of large changes in the technological relationship of 
wheat production to other farm production in the immediate prewar period sug-
g~'st that such shifts would have been small. In the brief prewar span of wheat 
legislation (1938-42) there was too little time for major changes in production 
location from any cause. Free market wheat prices would have been far below 
the range of 49 to 82 percent of parity which prevailed, as shown above. But 
corn prices were similarly low and would have been lower had there been no 
price support. Neither technology nor prices would have exerted a marked in-
fluence on production location, then, in the immediate prewar period. The loca-
tion of wheat production, stable under the farm programs, would have been rather stable 
without farm programs. 
The greatest changes in the location of wheat production in the U.S. in many years 
took ptace from 1943 to 1953, when federal farm programs were seldom a major factor 
in the market. From 1943 to 1949, wartime demands kept wheat prices above 
support levels most of the time (tables A1 and A2); acreage controls were not 
in effect. In 1950 acreage allotments were announced but were not enforced. 
Neither acreage allotments nor marketing quotas were effective through the 
1953 crop because of increased demands arising from the Korean War. 
Large decreases in absolute acreage of wheat from 1938-40 to 1944-46 oc-
curred in Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and Minnesota (table A3). Soybean 
acreage in these states expanded as war-derived demand raised oil and meal 
prices. This pattern of decreased wheat acreage and a smaller share of U.S. acre-
age persisted in some of those states through 1948-50. More wheat was planted 
in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan in 1948-50 than a decade earlier, but only Michi-
gan increased her share of U.S. acreage. In 1954, when the wheat acreage control 
and price support program became effective for the first time in 12 years, the Cornbelt 
share of seeded acreage was only 12.9 percent, wmpared with 15.1 percent in 1938; 
Cornbelt acreage allotments were 12.3 percent of the U.S. total compared with 
15.4 percent in 1938 (table 1). Eastern wheat producing states also incurred a 
small decline iri their share of U.S. acreage from 1938 to 1954, while minor pro-
ducing areas of the South and West had gained slightly (table 1). 
While Cornbelt and Eastern states reduced wheat plantings during World 
War II, plains and western states expanded cropland and wheat acreages. By 
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TABLE !-REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. WHEAT ACREAGE, PRODUCTION, 
AND ACREAGE ALLOTMENTS. 
Crop years 
1938a 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
% of 0. S. {ofal 
Seeded acreage 
Easfern sfules 2.9 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.0 
Cornbelt 15.1 12.9 13.3 13.3 16.5 14.3 1~.4 
Northern 26.6 26.7 26.3 27.6 27.4 25.2 25.9 
Southern plains 44.0 46.1 46.0 44.0 40.1 46.0 45.6 
Northwest 7.9 8.1 8.0 8.6 8.6 8.3 8.0 
Total - major regions 96.5 96.1 95.8 95.7 94.9 95.8 95.9 
All other states 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.3 5.1 4.2 4.1 
Production 
Eastern states 4.4 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.3 2.5 
Corn belt 21.8 22,3 23.4 23.2 19.1 16.2 17.2 
Northern 22.9 19.3 27.6 23.8 27,0 22.6 19.6 
Southern plains 34.0 36.4 28.1 32.0 30.7 45.5 42.8 
Northwest 12.9 14.7 13.4 13.2 15.4 10.2 13.6 
Total - major regions 96.0 96.6 96.1 95.6 95.2 96.9 95.7 
All other states 4.0 3.4 3.9 4.4 4.8 3.1 4.3 
Allotments 
Eastern states 2.9 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 
Corn belt 15.4 12.3 12.3 12.5 12.5 12.6 12.9 12.8 
Northern 29.5 28.4 28.2 26.9 27.0 27.0 26.7 26.9 
Southern plains 41.4 45.4 45.7 46.5 46.6 46.5 46.2 46.2 
Northwest 7.2 7.9 8.2 8.1 8.0 8,1 8.0 8.0 
Total - major regions 96.4 96.2 96.6 96.2 96.3 96.4 96.1 96.1 
All other states 3.6 3.8 3.4 3.8 3.7 3,6 3.8 3.8 
Source: See tables A3, A4, A5 for composition of regions and original sources. 
a. Seeded acreage and production, 1938-40. 
1954, acreage history (which determines acreage ~llotments) had shifted to such 
an extent that five Southern Plains states, which had 41.4 percent of the national 
acreage allotment in 1938 had 45.4 percent. Nothing since the widespread adoption 
of mechanical power was more important to the location of wheat production in 
the U.S. than events of that period. Between 1938-40 to 1948-50, four Northern 
and five Central and Southern Plains states increased their wheat plantings by 
nine million acres, and their share of total U.S. plantings by 2.8 percent. Colorado 
and Texas increased plantings by two million acres each in that period, Oklahoma by 
1. 7 million acres .. Montana by 1.2 million, and Kansas and Nebraska by smaller 
amounts (table A3). 
Three factors accounted for these increases: 
1. War-derived demands and resulting higher absolute and relative prices for 
wheat, together with public appeals to producers in late war years to expand 
wheat production. 
2. The end of the drought of the 1930's, and the appearance of a long if some-
what broken period of above-average precipitation in the Great Plains. 
3. Passage of the Stabilization Act of October, 1942, which guaranteed price 
supports at 90 percent of parity beginning with the 1944 crop and continuing 
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for at least two years after January 1 following the official end of the war. 
When this legislation was passed, the price support level for basic crops was 
85 percent of parity, but during most of the history of price supports, it had 
been at the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture and much lower (table 
A1). 
Wheat prices. Sharply higher wheat prices beginning in 1942 (table A2) 
were the immediate result of war, not of price supports. When the price of any 
product rises relative to prices of materials used in production, or relative to the 
prices of other products which might have been produced with the same re· 
sources, the output of that product tends to rise. Large changes in both rela-
tionships occurred in the war and postwar years; almost without exception, they 
favored increased wheat production. 
From 1940 to 1945, the national average price received by farmers for wheat 
rose by 121 percent, while the index of prices paid by farmers for production 
items increased only 43 percent. By 1947, these two price indexes had increased 
by 240 percent and 82 percent, respectively (table 2) . Clearly, the margin be-
tween the cost of inputs and the price of wheat widened, favoring more in-
tensive use of farm resources. 
Changes in the average prices received by farmers for wheat relative to prices 
for competitive products from 1939 to 1949 (table 2) also favored greater wheat 
production. Soybean prices were increasingly favorable in the 1940's, helping to 
explain decreased wheat acreage in the Cornbelt. But sorghum grain, barley, and 
grass are the important competitive crops in the largest wheat producing areas. 
Of these, only barley was generally priced as favorably as wheat throughout the 
mid-1940's. Beef cattle prices lagged far behind wheat prices in the general rise 
of farm prices from 1939 to 1948 (table 2) . 
Weather conditions. Climate was a powerful, if unpredictable, ally of chang-
ing relative prices in altering land use in the Great Plains between 1940 and 
1950 from grass to wheat production. Rainfall is the crucial factor limiting crop 
production there; sustained heavier than average precipitation would have caused 
shifts from grass to crops even without changes in relative prices favorable to 
grain production. Jointly, the war emergency, high wheat prices relative to costs 
and to other farm products, and favorable weather provided ideal conditions 
for the expansion of cropland and wheat acreage. 
Examples of precipitation in the areas that accounted for most of the in-
creased wheat acreage in the 1940's are as follows (70): 
1. Kansas, 1940-49; locations in Seward county (southwest), Wichita county 
and Wallace county (west central), and Cheyenne county (northwest) had 
average annual net surpluses above normal precipitation of 1.6, 2.0, 4.0, and 
2.8 inches, respectively, for the 10 years. These were from 10 to 40 percent 
of average precipitation. For the same locations, precipitation was below aver-
age in three, four, three, and two years respectively; it was far above average 
in several years. 
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TABLE 2-PRICE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG FARM COMMODITIES, 1939-49. 
season average pnce rece1ved by farmers Pnces 
Sorghum paid by 
Year Wheat Corn grain Barley Soybeans Cattle farmer sa Pw /Pcb Pw/Psg Pw/Pb Pw/Psb Pw/Pca 
dollars cents per bushel 
per cwt. 
1939 69 57 57 41 81 7.14 121 121 121 168 85 .097 
1940 68 62 48 40 90 7.56 123 110 142 170 76 .090 
1941 94 75 55 53 155 8.82 130 125 171 177 61 .107 
1942 110 92 78 63 161 10.70 148 119 141 175 68 .103 
1943 136 112 114 .99 181 11.90 164 121 119 137 75 .114 
1944 141 109 91 102 205 10.80 173 129 155 138 69 .131 
1945 150 127 119 102 208 12.10 176 118 126 147 72 .124 
1946 191 156 139 136 257 14.50 191 122 137 140 74 .132 
1947 229 216 183 170 333 18.40 224 106 125 135 69 . 124 
1948 199 130 128 115 227 22.20 250 153 155 173 88 .089 
1949 188 125 112 104 216 19.80 238 150 168 180 87 .095 
Source: (55, 1945-53). 
a. Index of prices paid by farmers for commodities used in production. 
b. Pw/Pc is the price of wheat divided by the price of corn; other abbreviations are for sorghum grain, barley, soybeans, 
and cattle. 
TABLE 3-TOTAL CROPLAND ACREAGE, SELECTED KANSAS; COLORADO, TEXAS, AND OKLAHOMA CROP 
REPORTING DISTRICTS, 1940-54. 
Kansas Colorado Texas Oklahoma 
District District District District (f) ____ (4) (7) (6) (9) (1N) (1 S) (1) (4) 
Year Northwest west central southwest east central southeast northwest northwest west west 
3.8b 
(million acres) 
1940 2.9 2.5 4.6 1.4b 5.5 3.9 2.1 1.6 
1945 3.0 2.6 4.7 3.9 1.4 6.2 3.9 2.3 2.0 
1950 3.1 3.1 5.0 5,4 2.1 6.5 4.4 2.4 2.0 
1956 3.1c 3.2c 5.1c 5.6 2.2 6.6 4.7 2.4 2.0 
a. Reports and letters from state offices, U.S.D.A., A.S.C. 
b. 1938. 
c. 1954. 
2. Oklahoma, 1940-49: locations in Cimarron, Woodward, and Harmon coun-
ties (west) had average annaul net surpluses of 1.0, 2.7, and 0 inches of pre-
cipitation, respectively. In fewer than half the years at these locations was 
precipitation below normal; there were several very large annual surpluses. 
3. Colorado, 1940-49: locations in Kit Carson (east) and Baca county (south-
east) each had annual net surpluses of 1.0 inch of precipitation for the 10 
years, 1940-49; each had four below-average years and several years of very 
high precipitation. 
4. Locations in Nebraska and Montana did not have a precipitation pattern from 
1940 to 1949 as uniformly favorable as that of the Southern Plains. However, 
in Kimball county, (western) Nebraska, the average annual surplus was 2.5 
inches; only two years were below the longtime average. In Dawson county, 
(eastern) Montana, precipitation was just at the long-time average, with four 
of the 10 years below average. 
These examples are not conclusive evidence of favorable weather in the 
Great Plains in the 1940-50 era of cropland expansion. But data from most sta-
tions show a similar pattern.1 9 This was a "golden" climatic era in the Great 
Plains. Increased cultivation was an almost inevitable consequence. 
Price certainty and farm output. As noted earlier, producers of "basic" 
crops, including wheat, were assured in 1942 that for at least two years after the 
end of the war emergency, prices would be supported at 90 percent of parity. 
This guarantee has often been cited as the chief cause of the farm surplus prob-
lems of the 1950's. 
The effect of the price support guarantee on output was surely positive, but 
there is no way to estimate its effect on the location of wheat production. One 
can only guess on the basis of experience, whether or not the remote guarantee 
against future price declines was of major importance among the far more 
powerful pull of already high prices and exceptionally favorable weather work-
ing to expand Great Plains wheat acreage in the war and early postwar years. 
In my opinion, the 90 percent of parity price guarantee which eventually ran 
through 1955 was a minor factor in the early postwar expansion of wheat acre-
age and output in the U.S. From the standpoint of the war effort, it was largely 
unnecessary; other factors increased wheat output adequately. If it expanded out-
put a little, it was a fortunate policy in that era of wheat shortages. 
Cropland expansion hz the Great Plains. Nauheim (68) , reported that 
land for crops in the Great Plains (including North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Montana, Nebraska, W yoming, Kansas, Colorado, and 93 counties in Oklahoma, 
Texas, and New Mexico) increased 4.2 million acres from 1939 to 1945 and 12.4 
million acres from 1939 to 1949. Wheat seeded in the same area increased by 5.1 
and 14.6 million acres in the same two periods. Pasture acreage declined 9.2 mil-
lion from 1945 to 1949. 
Data from state offices of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation 
Services, USDA, give a somewhat more detailed picture of the wartime and post-
" Nauheim, Bailey, and Merrick (68, pp. 21-24) , report the same conclusion based on percentages of 
abandonment of seeded acreage in the hard winter and spring wheat areas over time, and on t he correlation be-
tween above average yields with above average annual precipitation in Kansas and North Dakota in most years 
between 1940 and 1950. 
war expansion of crop acreage in the Plains, especially the concentration in the 
less humid parts of each state. 
1. Three crop reporting districts in western Kansas added 1.1 million acres to 
cropland between 1940 and 1950, but largely after 1945 (table 3). 
2. Two eastern Colorado districts added 2.3 million acres to cropland from 1938 
to 1950, mostly after 1945 (table 3 ). 
3. Two northwest Texas districts increased cropland by 1.5 million acres from 
1940 to 1950 (table 3). 
4. Two districts in western Oklahoma increased cropland by . 7 million acres 
from 1940 to 1950 (table 3 ). 
5. Cropland increased 2.8 million acres in four Montana districts and 3.3 mil-
lion acres in the state from 1938 to 1950 (table 4). 
6. Comparable data from North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska were not 
available from A.S.C. records, but wheat and total crop acreage data indicate 
that much new land was put to crops in those states between 1940 and 1950. 
These data support census indications that at least 12 to 15 million acres of 
new land were taken out of range and placed under cultivation under the in-
fluence of wartime appeals, incentives, and favorable weather. Colorado, Texas, 
and Oklahoma of the hard red winter states and Montana of the hard red spring 
producing states expanded new lands and wheat acreage (tables A7 and AS) by 
the largest amounts. As a result, those states increased their shares of the na-
tional wheat acreage allotment substantially from 1942 to 1954. Washington and 
Idaho also increased their base acreage and share of the national allotment con-
siderably from 1942 to 1954 (table A5). 
Year 
1938 
1945 
1950 
1955 
TABLE 4-TOTAL CROPLAND ACREAGE, MONTANA CROP REPORTING 
DISTRICTS. a 
District 
State 
million acres 
.5 3.0 2.9 1.6 10.2 
.6 3.6 3.3 1.7 11.7 
.7 4.5 3.7 1.9 13.5 
.7 5.1 4.0 1.9 14.5 
a. Letter from Montana State Ofhce, U.S.D.A., A.s.C. Comm1ttee, 1957. 
Classes of wheat in relation to the wheat program. There were important 
changes in the seeded acreage and the location of production of major classes of 
wheat in the war and early postwar years. Like the increases in total wheat pro-
duction, they were caused chiefly by factors other than the price support pro-
gram. 
The location of lands first plowed in the 1940's explains the large increase 
in total wheat acreage and the greater share of total U.S. wheat acreage planted 
to hard red winter wheat in the war and postwar period (table 5). Colorado al· 
most tripled her acreage of wheat (all hard red winter) between 1939 and 1949, 
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. TABLE 5-ACREAGE SEEDED A.ND PRODUCTION OF CLASSES OF WHEAT, AND PE~CENTAGES OF U.S. TOTALS ·· 
1919 1929 1934 1939 1944 1949 1954 1958 
Hard red winter Acreage (million) 24,8 29.2 28.8 29.9 31.0 45.5 34.9 
%of total 32.0 43.5 44.6 47.6 46.8 54.2 55.9 
Production (mil. bu.) 330.8 372.8 207.5 315.1 467.8 541.5 489.0 838.0 
%of total 34. 7 45.2 39.4 42,5 44.1 49.3 49.7 57. 1 
Hard red spring Acreage (million) 18.7 14.8 14.9 13.1 15.9 17.5 13.4 
%of total 24.2 22.0 23.2 20.9 24.0 20.8 21.4 
Production (mil. bu.) 141.8 145.6 53.1 116.4 235.8 169.2 145.0 433.0 
%of total 14.8 17.7 10.1 15.7 22.2 15.4 14.7 15.9 
Soft red winter Acreage (million) 23,3 11.9 13.4 12,3 12.0 10.9 7.4 
N %of total 30.1 17.7 20.9 19.6 18.2 13.0 11.9 VI 
Production (mit bu.) 356.9 165.3 100.1 194.9 202.9 202.7 185.0 195.0 
%of total 37.5 20.1 35.8 26.3 19.1 18.4 18.8 13.5 
White Acreage (million) 5.7 5.0 4. 3 4.1 5.1 6.5 5;2 
%of total 7.3 7.4 6.7 6.6 7.7 7.8 8. 3 
Production (mil. bu.) 90.0 83.4 70.6 81.7 123.4 145.4 160.0 174.0 
%of total 9.5 10.1 18.4 11.0 11.6 13.2 16.3 12.0 
Durum Acreage (million) 5.0 6.3 2.9 3.3 2.2 3.5 1.6 
%of total 6.4 9.4 4.6 5.3 3,3 4.2 2.5 
Production (mil, bu.) 33,1 57.2 6.8 33.0 30.3 39,5 5,0 22.0 
%of total 3,5 6.9 1.3 4.5 2.9 3.6 0.5 1.5 
So.urce: Acreage by classes (10); seeded acz-es and production (67, 55,6!i)). 
almost doubling her share of U.S. hard red winter wheat production. Texas, 
Oklahoma, and Montana also increased their percentages of total hard red winter 
wheat acreage from 1939 to 1949 (table 6). 
At the same time, Illinois and Missouri tended roward increased acreages 
and shares of hard red winter wheat, although both states had reduced their 
acreages during the war. This transition of certain areas of the central Cornbelt 
to hard red winter from soft red winter wheat was far advanced by 1954 when 
the wheat program again became effective. It took place largely when the wheat 
program was not a major price-determining factor in the market, and when 
acreage restrictions were not in effect. 
The growing importance of hard red winter wheat in Illinois and Missouri be-
tween 1944 and 1954 was largely tbe result of the development of adapted bard winter 
wheat varieties with higher yields than soft wbeat varieties. 20 In Illinois, Pawnee 
variety is reported to have yield capabilities about one fourth above Fultz, the 
leading soft wheat until 1944, but only equal to Vigo, a soft wheat introduced 
about 1949. Pawnee yielded roughly 10 percent more per acre than leading soft 
wheats in Missouri until the introduction of Vigo. Between 1944 and 1949 in 
Missouri, Pawnee virtually replaced all other hard wheats, and all soft varieties 
except Clarkan ( 60). 
Total acreage of soft red winter wheat decreased sharply from 1939 to 1954 
(table 5 ), mostly in Cornbelt states where hard wheat acreage expanded. Soft 
wheat acreage fell 0.7 million acres in Missouri, and 1 million acres in Kansas 
from 1939 to 1949. In Illinois, it fell 0.6 million from 1949 to 1954. Only Ohio 
and Indiana of major producing states increased soft red wheat acreage from 
1939 to 1949 (table A9). 
The wheat program was not an important factor in these changes. The 
market demanded wheat, and the emphasis was on quantity. Producers met the 
demands of a market dominated not by the price support program, but by a 
world wheat shortage. The location of hard red winter and soft red winter produc-
ing areas was not significantly affected by federal wheat programs before 1954. Im-
provements in hard red winter wheats not matched by soft wheat improvements 
were at the root of the movement of hard wheats into the Cornbelt in the early 
postwar era. Improvements in soft red winter wheat yields per acre were begin-
ning to turn the tide against hard wheats in the Cornbelt by 1960. 
Wheat production and its location, 1954-60. Wheat acreage allotments 
and marketing quotas were effective in 1954 for the first time since 1942. The 
distribution of allotments was based on acreage from 1944-53 (adjusted for un-
usual weather and other circumstances). It reflected, therefore, a geographic dis-
tribution of production dictated largely by market forces under pressure of war 
demands and concurrent with technological developments in wheat breeding and 
accidents of weather which were independent of the war and the price support 
program. 
Three questions merit examination for this period: 
1. Would some areas have been withdrawn from cultivation right after the war 
'
0The rapid spread of Nebred and Pawnee, the two important hard wheats planted in the Cornbelt in the 
last decade is shown by maps of their distribution in 1949 and 1954, shortly after their release (60, 57) . 
TABLE 6-PERCENTAGES OF SEEDED ACREAGE OF U.S. HARD RED WINTER 
WHEAT IN SELECTED STATES, 1939, 1949, AND 1954. 
State 
Kansas 
Oklahoma 
Texas 
Colorado 
Montana 
lllinois 
Missouri 
Total 
All other states 
Source: 'T".3'hlo A '7 
1939 1949 
41.3 35.0 
14.6 16.4 
12.1 15.3 
3.9 7.1 
2.7 3.6 
2.7 1.8 
0.8 2.2 
78.1 81.4 
21.9 18.6 
1954 
33.5 
15.0 
13.4 
9.0 
4.5 
3.0 
2.5 
80.9 
19.1 
if price supports had not been continued at 90 percent ot panty~ Lands plow-
ed after 1940 in the Great Plains appear the best possibility here. 
2. Have federal wheat programs since 1954 resulted in a predictable schedule of 
overproduction and surplus accumulation? 
3. Have the wheat programs caused a unique geographic pattern of production 
which seriously aggravated the wheat problem of 1960? 
Wartime price supports too long continued have often been blamed for the 
wheat surplus problems of 1954-60. The implication is that if other policies had 
been followed, wheat or other farm commodity surpluses would not have existed 
or would have been less serious. 
There were prospects in 1948 that price support levels might have been 
reduced beginning with 1949 crops, according to the schedule in Title II of the 
Agricultural Act of 1948 (see page 13). Both political parties once supported this 
approach, but a congressional majority could not be mustered to start the price 
reductions. 
Had the support schedule of the 1948 Act become law, the wheat price 
support for the 1949 crop would have been about 78 percent of parity, or $1.70 
per bushel, instead of $1.95, the actual support price. This estimate is based on 
a total supply of 120 percent of normal and the assumption that acreage allot-
ments and marketing quotas would have been in effect. Roughly the same per-
centage of the (defined) normal supply was on hand the next year, so the 1950 
support would have been little changed. 
The farm price for 1949 crop wheat under those circumstances would have 
been about $1.65 per bushel, well below $1.88, the actual price (table A1) . More 
than 100 million bushels of 1949 crop wheat were added to CCC stocks at the 
higher price support of $1.95 . Nearly the same amount would have been acquir-
ed by CCC at a price support of $1.70. Wheat producers would have had in the 
lower prices of 1949, the announced price support for 1950, and the price ex-
pectations for later years, an apparent modest incentive to reduce wheat output. 
But the prospective supply of corn in 1949 was also one fourth above the 
normal supply. If the wheat support had been reduced as indicated, that for corn 
(and other grains) would have been reduced also. Therefore, conditions for any 
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.rubstantial absolute decline in wheat acreage either in the Great Plains or the Corn-
belt would not have e:x:isted. The relationship between price supports and, presum-
bly, prices of food grains and feed grains, the major alternative crops, would 
have been largely unchanged. However, for 1950 crops, wheat supports would 
have been slightly less favorable than for corn, since the 1950 supply of corn was 
less excessive than the wheat supply. 
The Korean War would have ended these modest price declines. With 
stocks reduced, the flexible formula would have brought price supports back 
near 90 percent of parity for 1953. So if the 1948 Act had been law during the 
Korean War, producers would have had slightly lower price expectations for 
immediate postwar years but not immediate lower prices. Some production ex-
pansion during that period might have been avoided. 
Paradoxically this may be an argument against the 1948 Act and in 
favor of the guarantee of 90 percent of parity price supports. Who will 
argue that farm production should have been discouraged by reduced 
price expectations when we were engaged in a war of indeterminate length 
and scope, and when U.S. food stocks were below acceptable emergency 
levels? 
It seems rather clear that neither the capacity for production nor the loca-
tion of wheat production by 1954 would have been noticeably affected had the 
Agricultural Act of 1948 been law from 1948 to 1954. There was little prospect 
for changes in relative prices of major crops under the flexible support formula 
and the conditions of 1948-50; there were few alternatives to wheat production 
in much of the wheat-producing area (discussed on pages 36 to 42), and the 
Korean War began only a year after the earliest possible effective date of the 
flexible price-support experiment. These factors help absolve the postwar wheat 
program of major blame for the emerging wheat surplus of 1953-54. 
There can be no question that wheat programs in effect since 1953 made 
excess production and carryover predictable and virtually unavoidable. When 
acreage control for wheat was re-established in 1953 (for 1954 crop wheat), Con-
gress set a national minimum allotment of 62 million acres, superceding a for-
mula which would have reduced the national allotment adequately, but would 
have left growers with little producion or income (58, p. 47) . After 1954, the 
minimum national allotment was 55 million acres. The marketing quota exemp-
tion for producers harvesting 15 or fewer acres was adding about 4 million acres 
to the effective national wheat acreage allotment by 1955 (table 7). So when 
the 1960 wheat srock-pile was being built, the effective national acreage allot-
ment (the potential harvested acreage) was near 60 million acres. At the same 
time, the expected average yield per seeded acre under the planting restrictions 
of the wheat program was moving from near 16 bushels in the 1940's to more 
than 20 bushels per acre in the late 1950's. 
Congress thus set a postwar minimum acreage allotment which was much too high 
for the U.S. wheat market at established price support levels. Expected production 
with normal weather conditions in the 1950's was roughly 1.1 billion bushels .. 
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TABLE 7-PRODUCTION ON ACREAGE IN EXCESS OF FARM ALLOTMENTS 
ON NONCOMPLYING FARMS WITH ALLOTMENTS OF 15 ACRES 
OR LESS, 1957. 
Exces·s acres 
State (000) 
New York 62.5 
New Jersey 8.0 
Pennsylvania 108.1 
N. Atlantic 178.6 
Ohio 280.7 
Indiana 363.9 
illinois 564. 7 
Michigan 273.4 
Wisconsin 21.2 
Minnesota 130.5 
Iowa 52.3 
Missouri 725.0 
North Dakota 6.2 
South Dakota 29.9 
Nebraska 107.7 
Kansas 203.7 
N. Central 2, 759.2 
Delaware 2. 5 
Maryland 18.4 
Virginia 82.1 
West Virginia 37.7 
North Carolina 163.7 
South Carolina 122.1 
Georgia 60.4 
S. Atlantic 486.9 
Kentucky 19.1 
Tennessee 82.2 
Arkansas 143.8 
Oklahoma 209.7 
Texas 77.8 
S. Central 532.6 
Montana 13. 3 
Idaho 67.5 
Wyoming 28. 3 
Colorado 49.2 
New Mexico 2.8 
Utah 17.9 
Washington 26. 3 
Oregon 39.6 
California 7.6 
West 252.5 
u.s. 4,209.8 
Source: USDA, Commodity Stabilization Service. 
Production 
2,061.8 
235.7 
2,809.6 
5,107.1 
6,174.5 
9,279.3 
11,858.5 
7,929.9 
541.8 
2,949.5 
1,396.5 
16,675.7 
117.4 
603.4 
2,898.3 
3,871.1 
64,295.9 
55.0 
395.1 
19.0 
791.8 
3,109.8 
2, 197.7 
97.3 
6,665. 7 
372.2 
1,397. 7 
2,876. 7 
2,621.6 
1,128.5 
8,396. 7 
264.0 
2,497.3 
624.7 
1,206.1 
45.0 
420.0 
960.5 
1,426.8 
168.2 
7,612.6 
92,078.0 
Number 
of farms 
12,046 
1,562 
31,148 
44,756 
62,906 
54,359 
69,783 
49,744 
4,002 
14,271 
5,549 
80,262 
840 
3,139 
13,300 
26,699 
384,854 
394 
3,927 
18,877 
1,303 
35,696 
20,829 
10,075 
91,101 
9,330 
12,617 
13,592 
21,752 
15,268 
72,559 
1,877 
10,801 
360 
1,646 
632 
3,627 
3,282 
5,230 
762 
28,217 
621,487 
per year, the average of the decade under a wide range of growing conditions. 
Four crops reached that size, despite the severe Great Plains drought (1953 to 
1957) and the soil bank (1956 to 1960). As yields rose, the expected normal 
crop from a 55 million acre allotment increased, and is about 1.2 billion bushels 
a year as the 1960's begin. 
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Disappearance of U.S. wheat was not regularly above 1 billion bushels a 
year in the late 1950's, and may not exceed that level substantially in the early 
1960's (as discussed on pages 59 to 66). Clearly, the addition of 100 to 200 million 
bushels of wheat to CCC stocks each year, despite extensive foreign aid and scattered 
land retirement, was predictable. As shown conclusively by the USDA (61), wheat 
acreage controls, like those for other crops, simply caused shifts in production 
location-a little more wheat in the traditional Cornbelt, more coarse grains in 
the wheat belt, and more of many crops in the cotton belt. Reduction of ag-
gregate output was negligible. 
A third proposition deserves examination: that program-induced changes 
in the location of wheat production have been a major cause of postwar wheat 
surpluses. Strong convictions have matured on this score, the commonest being 
that Cornbelt and eastern wheat growers have increased their acreages and allot-
ments since 1954 at the expense of other areas, chiefly the Great Plains, and 
have "caused" the surplus. As shown in table 1, acreages have increased, but 
Cornbelt and eastern allotments have increased little. 
The provision in law, effective with the 1942 crop, permitting any producer 
to plant and harvest up to 15 acres of wheat without penalty even though he 
had a smaller acreage allotment (or none at all) has contributed to a small shift 
in the location of wheat production since 1954 and to increased wheat output 
(tables 1, A3, A4). The number of producers planting under this provision in 
1954 is not available but was probably above 500,000. In 1955, there were 
723,000 and in 1956, 685,000. In 1957, 621,487 producers used this provision 
( 48, p. 66), seeding 4.2 million acres in excess of their allotments, and adding 
92 million bushels to wheat output (table 7). In 1958, 134 million bushels were 
harvested on 4.5 million nonallotment acres on about 600,000 farms with allot-
ments smaller than 15 acres (table 8). 
With the 1954-60 wheat program less the "15-acre exemption", about 4 
million fewer acres of wheat would have been planted and roughly 100 million 
bushels less wheat would have been produced each year after 1954 by farmers not 
complying with wheat allotments. The "opportunity" to plant wheat from 1954 to 
1960 would have been limited by acreage allotments, set by wheat acreage in 
the 10 years preceding any current year. 
Southern states could not have increased plantings by more than a quarter 
million acres from 1954 to 1959. Fifteen minor producing states could not have 
increased their share of total wheat seeded in the U.S. from 3.9 to 4.1 percent 
(table 1 and A6). And the very small changes in the distribution of the national 
acreage allotment since 1954 would have been still smaller (table 1). 
But there is another important aspect of this matter. Not only were large 
acreages planted without benefit of acreage allotments; a large part of the national al-
lotment also was not planted. This occurred chiefly in areas where acreage allot-
ments were exceeded under the marketing quota exemption. 
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TABLE 8-PRODUCTION OF ALL WHEAT AND SOFT RED WINTER WHEAT ON 
ACREAGE IN EXCESS OF FARM ALLOTMENTS ON NONCOMPLYING 
FARMS WITH ALLOTMENTS OF 15 ACRES OR LESS, 1958. 
Estimated Production 
Excess Soft red 
State acres A 11 wheat winter wheata 
Thousands of bushels 
New York 77.2 2,664 53 
New Jersey 12.0 408 392 
Pennsylvania 153.1 4, 592 4, 363 
N. Atlantic 242.3 7,664 4,808 
Ohio 315.4 9, 778 9,680 
Indiana 404.9 12,957 12,439 
illinois 570.4 17,968 8,625 
Michigan 359.6 13,665 2,596 
Wisconsin 33.7 1, 124 247 
Minnesota 235.9 7,408 74 
Iowa 59.4 2,051 41 
Missouri 635.6 17,796 6,940 
North Dakota 15.3 353 
South Dakota 83.5 1,995 
Nebraska 160.7 5,304 
Kansas 221.6 6,094 
N. Central 3,096.0 96,493 
Delaware 3.1 78 
Maryland 23.2 591 
Virginia 81.4 2,116 
West Virginia 4.3 119 
North Carolina 149.1 3,503 
South Carolina 83.8 1,843 
Georgia 34.9 802 
S. Atlantic 379.7 9,052 
Kentucky 48.0 1,127 
Tennesse 47.2 943 
Arkansas 72.8 1,456 
Oklahoma 195.·3 5,077 
Texas 158.5 3,486 
S. Central 521.7 12,089 
Montana 24.4 564 
Idaho 90.0 3,095 
Wyoming 5.2 140 
Colorado 24.4 577 
New Mexico 4.1 80 
Utah 25.5 508 
Washington 45.0 1,611 
Oregon 62.7 2, 138 
California 17.1 376 
11 
12 
40,665 
78 
591 
2,116 
117 
3,503 
1,843 
802 
9,050 
1,048 
915 
1,223 
15 
209 
3,410 
8 
2 
West 296.7 9,089 10 
u.s. 4,536.3 134,387 57,943 
a. Estimate based on 1954 survey of production by classes, adjusted to reflect 
subsequent shifts in production. 
Source: Grain Division, Commodity Stabilization Service, USDA, Washington 
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Producers complying with acreage allotments in nine Cornbelt states of 
table A3 had only 3.5 million acres of wheat for 1958 harvest although they 
had allotments of 5.1 million acres. Complying producers (those not exceeding 
their allotment) in four eastern states planted only about half their acreage al-
lotment in 1958. In the U.S. in 1958, 1.1 million producers who did not over-
plant their acreage allotments had only 39.2 million acres of wheat but 47.8 
million acres of the national allotment of 55 million acres (51). Much of that 
difference was the result of the acreage reserve of the soil bank program. Yet in 
1959 when the acreage reserve was inoperative, 514,000 farms with 4.3 million allot-
ment acres planted no wheat. 21 These farms were mostly in the eastern Cornbelt. 
The failure to plant wheat is explained partly by the conservation reserve. But 
much of the potential acreage was not planted by choice. Only in the specialized 
producing states of Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Washington, 
and Oregon were wheat acreages on complying farms greater than 85 percent of allot-
ment acres in 1958 (51). 
Wheat acreage on all noncomplying farms was 13.2 million in 1958, about 
twice the allotment of 6.8 million acres on those farms. Excess plantings on all 
noncomplying farms were thus a little greater than the acreage deficit on com-
plying farms in 1958. Allotments not planted and plantings in excess of allotments 
were both concentrated in the Cornbelt and southeastern states. 
The chief significance of these developments is that they affected mostly soft red 
winter eastern and white wheats, classes not seriously in surplus since 1954 (table A12). 
Had substantially less of either kind of wheat been produced, shortages would 
probably have developed. Producers not planting their allotments would have 
been encouraged to plant to meet the demand. One effect of the marketing 
quota exemption was, therefore, to maintain an adequate supply of wheats pro-
duced in the eastern Cornbelt and Northeast. The exemption may have been 
more important in changing the identity of wheat producers than in changing 
the location of wheat production or increasing output substantially. 
No dass of wheat can be set off as not related to the perennial wheat surplus. 
However, two classes-hard red winter and hard red spring-stand out in the wheat 
statistics. The growth of wheat stocks since 1952 has been in those classes with 
minor exceptions. As the wheat program reaches the latest of a long series of 
crises in 1960, supplies of only those two classes are excessive or likely to be in 
the early 1960's. 
Excess supplies are not chiefly a result of geographic effects of the farm 
program. In 1958, 43 percent of all wheat produced under the marketing quota 
exemption was soft red winter (table 8). About 15 percent was white wheat 
(60), and the remainder was hard winter and spring wheat. The pattern of acre-
age by classes has changed little since 1954, so the distribution of classes of 
wheat on nonallotment acreages in other years since 1954 must have been 
similar. Sixty percent of the wheat produced on that acreage had different char-
acteristics and uses from hard red winter and spring wheat characteristics and 
"U.S.D.A. Commodity Stabilization Service, 1959, wheat allotment compliance and diversion report. 
uses. Only 40 percent of the wheat produced under the exemption contributed 
directly to the supply of hard winter and spring wheats (51). 
Inroads made in wheat production by states outside specialized regions have also 
been relatively small, and not a major cause of the wheat surplus. There have been 
spectacular but relatively unimportant changes, such as the 50,000 percent in-
crease in Mississippi's acreage allotment between 1939 and 1960 (from 74 to 
37,000 acres). Fifteen minor wheat states had 3.5 percent of the seeded acreage 
in 1938 and 4.1 percent in 1959 (table 1 and A6). The same 15 states increased 
their share of the national acreage allotment from 3.6 to 3.8 percent between 
1938 and 1960 (table 1). Arkansas, Alabama, and Mississippi jointly increased 
their wheat plantings by 300,000 acres from 1954 ro 1958 (table A6), and their 
share of the national allotment from 0.2 percent to 0.3 percent, a negligible 
change from a national standpoint (table A5). This adds little to the argument 
that the location of wheat production in 1958-60 is significantly different from 
what it would have been had there been no exemptions to the acreage allotments 
program, 1954-60. Scattered wheat fields in the South may surprise the traveler, 
but they are not a national problem. 
There are other exceptions to the idea that wheat seeded under the market-
ing quota exemption has been largely responsible for the wheat surplus. In the 
states in which the excess acreages have been seeded, a high percentage of the 
wheat is grown to be fed (55). Also, Cornbelt and eastern states have placed 
little wheat under price support loans and have added scarcely any to CCC 
stocks, even though many producers there had access to the price support pro-
gram. Areas producing chiefly hard red winter and spring wheats have contri-
buted regularly and substantially to CCC stocks as shown in table 9. 
Finally, lacking the marketing quota exemption since 1954, wheat disap-
pearance as well as production might have been reduced. Either decreased feed-
ing or a shortage of soft red winter wheat for export could have occurred if 
producers had not planted most of their available allotments in the Cornbelt and 
East, thus reducing soft red winter wheat production below the actual ourrurn. 
Exports of soft red winter wheats have averaged nearly 50 million bushels a 
year since 1954, mostly cash sales (made possible by export subsidies) . Perhaps 
less soft wheat would have been fed or wheat from other areas might have been 
TABLE 9-PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL WHEAT PRODUCTION DELIVERED TO CCC 
IN CONNECTION WITH PRICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS, BY REGIONS. 
Regions 
Eastern states 
Cornbelt states 
Northern states 
Southern plains 
Western states 
United States 
1954 
17 
30 
21 
50 
61 
39 
1957 
3 
5 
25 
28 
10 
18 
SOurce: USDA Commodlfy Stab1hzauon SerVlce; regwns from table A3. 
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1958 
5 
8 
23 
48 
24 
31 
shipped into Cornbelt and eastern areas for feeding if wheat production had 
been smaller in those areas, thus retaining enough soft red winter for the do-
mestic and export market. A more likely outcome is that less wheat would have 
been fed and less exported each year. Other grains would have replaced much 
of the wheat formerly fed, but under the hypothetical conditions assumed here, 
needed for milling or export. 
It is not clear, therefore, that if the marketing quota exemption had not 
existed, wheat stocks would be appreciably smaller or of a substantially different 
composition from what they are in 1960. 
II. 
ECONOMIC fACTORS THAT DETERMINE PRODUCTION AND 
CONSUMPTION OF WHEAT IN THE UNITED STATES 
Comprehensive descriptions and analyses of U.S. wheat production and do-
mestic demand problems have been published recently by the U.S.D.A. (68, 
29). Also, Nerlove discussed general and geographic characteristics of wheat 
production as a prelude to statistical analysis of the relation of wheat prices and 
production (32). Those aspects of the U.S. wheat economy are only briefly re-
viewed here. 
WHEAT PRODUCTION 
Two aspects of the relationships among farm prices and farm output are 
fundamental. The first is the ratio of product prices to the prices of materials 
used in production. The second is the relationships among the prices of farm 
products. 
Farm production, barring disturbances (such as unusual weather), tends to 
increase when farm product prices rise relative to the costs of resources used in 
their production; it tends to decline when product prices decline relative to 
costs. 
This follows from an elementary principle of economics: that production is 
a process by which resources are changed into products, that production is moti-
vated by the prospect of gain, and that gain accrues from the margin between 
cost of production and selling price. Perceptive producers will note that when 
product prices. rise, the value of output attributable to any operation performed 
in production (including the least productive or most dispensable operation), 
is increased. By increasing inputs on given land, thus increasing output per acre, 
when product prices rise, producers can increase net returns. 
This is so conventional it scarcely needs to be stated. Yet a major qualifica-
tion is required to make it relevant to the sub-humid and semi-arid plains, where 
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few opportWlities exist to increase the intensity of resource use on a given land 
area in dryland production of small grains. There certain cultivations must be 
performed in a rather uniform sequence to produce a grain crop; any major 
lapse seriously jeopardizes crop prospects. Once the essential group of cultiva-
tions has been performed, no amount of additional cultivation or other inputs 
will add appreciably to yield per acre, and they may decrease it. 
Producers who have about exhausted this range of highly productive culti-
vations cannot respond to increased product prices by increasing output per 
acre. Further operations would add to costs but not to returns. In such areas, 
output can be increased significantly only by planting additional land. And since 
the yield of grain is severely jeopardized by any major decrease in cultivations, 
producers will tend to cultivate rather uniformly within a wide range of pro-
duct prices. Output can be reduced appreciably only by retiring land from wheat 
production. The nature of the climate and of wheat production preclude reduc-
ing cultivations fractionally. 
This should not be taken to mean that low product prices relative to costs 
cannot reduce farm output in these areas. Rather, output reductions will not 
come from successive small reductions in inputs as product prices become un-
favorable relative to costs. Production will persist through a long unfavorable period, 
and will decline sharply or stop when producers either can no longer produce, or when 
they find income earning opportunities more favorable than those in agriculture. 
Price relationships among farm products are important to the composition 
of farm output, but not to its aggregate level. Few economists doubt that an in-
crease in the price of one crop relative to another will tend to shift producers 
from the lower priced to the higher priced crop, other conditions unchanged. 
Again, when applied to wheat production in the U.S., the statement demands 
qualification. 
The relationship of wheat prices to the prices of other products which can 
be produced in the Great Plains, was once (1910-14, for example) very favorable 
to wheat production. That price relationship came to be widely considered as 
normal, and its maintenance became one of the goals of farm policy. Wheat 
prices have been more nearly maintained at this goal level by farm programs 
than have prices of other grains, making wheat production even more favorable 
in recent years. 
Price relationships which became price goals have been so favorable to 
wheat, given the yields of wheat and alternative crops, that wheat has been far 
more profitable than other crops. In Kansas, the 1947-56 average yield per acre 
of wheat was 90 percent of the average yield for sorghum grain; in Oklahoma it 
was 98 percent; in Colorado it was 128 percent. Wide variations existed within 
states and among years. But the national average support prices in 1958-59 were 
$1.82 per bushel of wheat and $1.02 per bushel of sorghum grain, and these 
prices are representative of relative prices for those two grains the past 20 years. 
With sorghum at $1.02 per bushel (and assuming no differences in production 
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costs), wheat prices that would have made sorghum production as profitable as wheat 
would have been $1.13 in Kansas, $1.04 in Oklahoma, and $0.79 in Colorado. 
These examples are far from conclusive but they help to point up the fact 
that the response of wheat production to lower relative wheat prices in much of the 
country would be extremely sluggish. The output of wheat in the Great Plains may, 
in fact, be relatively unaffected over a wide range of wheat prices. Collins stress-
ed this point with respect to western Kansas, stating that " ... product price 
variation may be relatively unimportant in inducing a farmer to readjust his 
operation" (5, p. 2). 
Spencer ( 40, pp. 32-38) found that at 1945-54 yields of wheat and sorghum 
in western Kansas, conditions for a general shift from wheat to grain sorghum 
would not have existed in any county in the western two-thirds of Kansas with-
out a decline of 25 to 40 percent in the price of wheat, if the price of sorghum 
grain had remained unchanged. 
This was confirmed by a sample survey conducted in the same area of 
Kansas in 1958 when the wheat price support was $2 and the sorghum grain 
price about $1 per bushel. Farmers indicated that only when the price of wheat 
fell to 50 to 60 percent of parity ($1.20 to $1.45 per bushel), other prices and 
yields constant, would they consider shifting toward other crops, chiefly sorghum 
gram. 
In four Nebraska crop reporting districts from west to east, Winkleman 
found that with wheat acreage controls ended, and prices constant at 1955 levels, 
producers would have increased wheat plantings even though they expected the 
wheat price to be $1.20 per bushel (table 10). 
The elasticity of supply22 computed from responses of Nebraska farmers to 
questions on what they would do if faced with changing wheat prices while 
other prices held at 1955 levels, was greater in eastern districts in nearly all cases. 
In the western district, a distinctly Great Plains area, acreage response was minor. 
(table 11 ). 
Most producers questioned by Winkleman indicated that if the price of 
wheat had fallen to $1.25 while other prices remained at 1955 levels and allot-
ments were ended, they would have planted as many acres of wheat as they had 
planted before allotments (table 12) . Inter-area differences show that producers 
faced with lower prices would have shifted from wheat most readily in humid 
areas. 
From 12 to 40 percent (east to west) of the Nebraska producers indicated 
that they would have tried to increase wheat acreage by buying or renting more 
land if the wheat price were reduced sharply. However, total acreage in the 
Nebraska areas studied might not have been greater at a price of $1.25 than at 
the 1955 price near $2 per bushel, since most producers could have expanded 
only if someone else were to reduce acreage. 
Results of two Ohio surveys confirm the Kansas and Nebraska conclusions. 
Of 147 farmers in Ohio wheat areas questioned between the 1954 and 1955 har-
"Defined as the indicated percentage change in production (acreage) divided by the percentage change in 
the price of wheat. 
TABLE 10-ACRES OF WHEAT PLANTED IN 1955 AND ACRES OF WHEAT THE 
SAME FARMERS WOULD PLANT AT FIVE DIFFERENT WHEAT PRICE 
LEVELS, NEBRASKA CROP REPORTING DISTRICTS. 
D1stncts Acres 
(west to planted 
east) in 1955 
2 34,910 
4 11,569 
5 9, 755 
7 5,627 
SOurce: (73). 
$2.00 per 
bushel 
39,455 
18,437 
14,364 
8,174 
$1.80 per 
bushel 
39.449 
17,872 
13,581 
7,613 
$1.60 .per 
bushel 
38.254 
16,745 
12,414 
6,893 
$1.40 per 
bushel 
35,704 
14,772 
10,291 
5, 793 
$1.20 per 
buspel 
33,059 
12,781 
9,052 
4,478 
TABLE 11-AVERAGE ELASTICITIES OF SUPPLY AT INDICATED RANGES OF 
THE PRICE OF WHEAT, NEBRASKA CROP REPORTING DISTRICTS. 
Districts 
· (west to east) 
2 
4 
6 
7 
Source: (73). 
$2.00-1.80 
.00 
.29 
.53 
.68 
$1.80-1.60 
.26 
.55 
.76 
.86 
$1.60-1.40 
.47 
,82 
1.41 
1.21 
$1.40-1.20 
.49 
.93 
.83 
1.66 
TABLE 12-PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING THAT THEY WOULD 
TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION IN CASE THE PRICE OF WHEAT FELL TO 
$1.25 PER BUSHEL WHILE ALL OTHER PRICES AND COSTS REMAINED 
THE SAME (NEBRASKA), 1955. 
Plant the same Jricrease wheat 
amount of wheat acres by buying Decrease acres in 
Districts as without or renting more wheat and increase 
(west to east) allotments land acres in other crops 
4 
5 
7 
Source: (73). 
72 
60 
70 
23 
11 
12 
33 
55 
47 
vests, only 8 percent indicated they would plant a smaller acreage than in 1955 
(when acreage controls were in effect) if the price had fallen to $1.50 (by 25 
percent), other prices unchanged; 23 percent would have planted a larger acreage 
under such circumstances. This should not be taken to mean they would have 
seeded a larger acreage at $1.50 per bushel than at $2 per bushel. The acreage 
they would have seeded in 1955, had there been no allotments, was- not ascer· 
rained (38, p. 15) . 
A sample of Ohio farmers was also questioned in 1956; again most pro· 
ducers said they would not have reduced wheat acreage in response to large 
hypothetical wheat price changes. Producers interviewed were asked how many 
acres of wheat would be seeded if the expected price ( 1) decreased from $1.80 to 
$1.20 per bushel; (2) increased from $1.80 to $2.50 per bushel, assuming in both 
cases that other farm prices were unchanged and that production controls would 
not be in effect. 
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The results of a year earlier were confirmed; 71 percent would have planted 
as much wheat at $1.20 per bushel as at $1.80. Only 22 percent of farmers ques-
tioned would have cut acreage below the 1955 level because of the lower price. 
Total acreage of wheat would have been reduced 13 percent by the price cur of 
33 percent (39, p. 11). 
Wheat producers in North Dakota were asked similar questions in 1955. 
Hemphill and Anderson (20), found that 61 percent of producers questioned 
would have planted an acreage as large or larger than the restricted acreage 
planted in 1955 if the price had been reduced about one fourth, other prices un-
changed. One third of the producers would have planted less than they had 
planted in 1955, a larger group than in any state studied (table 13). 
Kansas producers indicated the smallest shifts to other crops in response to 
a hypothetical reduction of one fourth in the wheat price (from $2 to $1.50 per 
bushel). At the lower price, 55 percent would have planted a larger acreage 
than they were permitted to plant under the 1955 allotment program. Only 10 
percent would have reduced acreage below the 1955 level, while 32 percent 
would have planted their 1955 acreage. The distribution of replies of Kansas 
farmers confirms the idea previously expressed that the drier areas would change 
from wheat production most slowly if wheat prices became relatively lower 
(table 14). 
These results suggest that declines in the wheat price of roughly 25 to 50 
percent from 1954-60 levels (other prices constant) might start a small shift 
from wheat to alternative crops over a wide area of the Plains and Cornbelt. 
However, in choosing to specialize in one crop or another, producers weigh not 
only yields and prices of alternative crops, but the certainty with which they 
are expected. Producers intuitively consider yield certainty as a partial substitute 
for yield level. Yield expectations of less certain crops are discounted, therefore. 
In western Kansas and Oklahoma and probably in adjoining areas, price 
and yield uncertainty have made grain sorghum production less attractive, further 
increasing the wheat price decline required to achieve substantial shifts to grain 
sorghum. In only two counties of 54 in the western half of Kansas is the ratio 
of the standard deviation to the mean of the annual yields of wheat (a measure 
of uncertainty) greater than for grain sorghum over a long time span. In most 
counties, this ratio, and implicitly yield uncertainty, is sharply lower for wheat. 
Second, of producers questioned in western Kansas and Oklahoma in 1958, 
75 percent said that their best alternative crop, chiefly grain sorghum, was less 
certain than wheat. Eighty percent indicated that they considered the price of 
sorghum grain more uncertain than the wheat price. 
These indicators add evidence that in the Great Plains, where 60 to 70 per-
cent of the hard red winter wheat and nearly half of all wheat is produced in 
most years, significant changes in wheat acreage are unlikely without large changes in 
relative prices or yields. 
Yield changes are under way, and wheat surplus problems may shift slowly 
to feed grains as a result. Hybrid sorghum production is promising. In dryland 
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TABLE 13-CHANGES IN 1955 SEEDED WHEAT ACREAGE WITH NO PRODUCTION 
CONTROLS AND WHEAT PRICE AT ABOUT $1.50 PER BUSHEL WHILE OTHER 
FARM PRICES REMAIN THE SAME (NORTH DAKOTA). 
Number of Red General 
sample River Durum wheat Sample 
Response farmers Valley area area average 
Percentages 
More 50 32 11 21 21 
Less 80 18 30 38 33 
Same 97 45 57 35 40 
Don't know 13 5 2 6 6 
Total 240 100 100 100 100 
Source: (20). 
TABLE 14-CHANGES IN 1955 SEEDED WHEAT ACREAGE WITH NO PRODUCTION 
CONTROLS AND WHEAT PRICE AT $1.50 PER BUSHEL WHILE OTHER FARM 
PRICES REMAIN THE SAME (KANSAS). 
Change in 
'acreage 
Higher 
Lower 
The same 
Don't know 
Eastern 
(40 farmers) 
28 
17 
48 
7 
o/o of farmers 
Central Western 
(80 farmers) (80 farmers) 
72 52 
3 13 
25 31 
0 4 
Total 
(200 farmers) 
55 
10 
32 
3 
yield tests at Kansas State University in 1957, hybrid yields were from 10 to 50 
percent above other grain sorghums (3.1). The increase in grain sorghum yields 
would have to be 25 to 40 percent to overcome the present disadvantage, mostly 
a matter of price. But if future grain sorghum prices were to be about equal to 
wheat prices, and if technological improvements in wheat do not keep pace, 
grain sorghum may compete seriously with wheat in the central plains. 
Similar advantages for wheat production exist in much of the hard red 
spring wheat area. Rainfall is an important limitation, making production prob-
lems similar. Output cannot be increased much through additional cultivation or 
fFrtilizer. In the driest part of this area, largely in Montana, conditions that would 
induce a considerable change in the crop balance are about like those required in 
the southern plains. In a recent U.S. D .A. study, net income per acre of barley in 
north central Montana, was placed at 48 percent of income from wheat, (195 5 
prices); barley yields would have to double or wheat prices be halved, to make barley as 
attractive as wheat (68). 
The Northwest wheat area also has characteristics that give a slow output 
response to lower prices in the Great Plains. Net income per acre from barley 
and peas in the Washington Palouse area has been estimated, respectively, at 
only 36 percent and 59 percent of net income from wheat (68). 
These data offer little support to the notion that small reductions in wheat prices, 
would induce a shift from wheat, especially in the Great Plains and Northwest-
even if other prices did not fall similarly. 
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WHEAT UTILIZATION 
World political and economic conditions are major factors determining 
total disappearance of wheat from the United Stares. This becomes clear when 
the data of table Al3 are viewed in the context of recent history. The extreme 
range of exports is in sharp contrast to the monotony of the quantities in the 
food and seed columns. 
The world-wide depression is evident in wheat exports. Had the small crops 
of 1932-36 been accompanied by even the annual prewar export level of near 
100 million bushels, the price problems of that era would have been significant-
ly reduced. Exports again rose sharply after World War II, largely because of 
grants to aid war-torn countries. If there are prospects for major increases or de-
clines in the utilization of U.S. wheat for food in the next decade, they are like-
ly to be found in the export market, not in the U.S. (except at feed grain prices). 
Greater U.S. wheat disappearance depends heavily, therefore, on trends in world 
wheat production and consumption, and even more on world-wide political re-
lationships. 
Although the population of the United States increased from 90 million to 
178 million between 1909 and 1959, total wheat processed for domestic food 
consumption was virtually unchanged (table A13). This stable consumption 
pattern resulted from a decline in per capita consumption just proportional to 
the population increase (table A14). Deviations from trend were small and 
brief. From 1909 to 1956, the computed consumption trend was -1.78 pounds 
flour per person per year; for the same period, the trend in total disappearance 
of wheat as human food in the U.S. was -2.71 pounds per year. 
Per capita consumption of wheat as food in the U.S. is falling at a rate 
slower than a generation ago. A curved line fitted to the consumption trend and 
projected to show future per capita consumption if the 1909 to 1956 trend were 
to continue, puts flour consumption at 106 pounds per person and falling about 
1.5 pounds per year by 1970. Total per capita disappearance of wheat as food 
would be about 147 pounds and falling by fewer than 2 pounds a year by 1970. 
With per capita consumption of wheat foods at those levels by 1970, total dis-
appearance of wheat as food in the 1960's would rise if population growth con-
tinues at the present rate. By 1970, with a population of 210 to 220 million, 
wheat milled for food in the U.S. would be near 550 million bushels, up 10 
percent in a decade. 
Wheat Consumption and Per Capita Income 
High and increasing per capita disposable income is a principal mark of 
the Western world; it is a major determinant of per capita wheat consumption. 
Bennett (1, p. 380) suggested that: 
The normal curve of per capita food use of wheat, in countries where living stand-
ards rise continuously, where wheat is a strongly preferred cereal, and where the 
level of food use of wheat and living standards is initially low, is an advance fol-
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lowed by a decline. The level to which the decline may extend in such a country 
is problematical, but may even be as low as 2 bushels (per person per year). 
Gray et al. (18, pp. 16-21) show that by 1870 the U.S. had moved into a stage 
of food consumption in which neither potatoes nor wheat were of overriding im-
portance in the diet. The close substitution relationship between potatoes and 
wheat in diets in very poor countries has never existed in the U.S. The part of 
Bennett's hypohesis applicable to the U.S. is the link between living standards 
and declining wheat consumption. 
The link between per capita income and consumption is quantified in the 
concept of income elasticity, defined as the percentage change in the quantity 
of a product purchased for consumption concurrent with a 1 percent change in 
the income of the person or group studied. A negative income elasticity means 
lower consumption with higher income. 
Malenbaum concluded that a world-wide negative income elasticity for 
cereals was apparent by 1940 (28). Meinken estimated a positive income elasticity 
for the U.S. of 0.20 for 1921-29 and 1931-38 (29). Jureen examined the role of 
income in determining consumption levels for various classes of food, and con-
cluded that income levels were the crucial factor explaining differing consump-
tion habits (25 ). His estimates of income elasticities for cereal foods are shown 
in table 15. 
TABLE 15-PREWAR AND POSTWAR INCOME ELASTICITIES FOR CEREALS AT 
VARYING INCOME LEVELS. a 
Iricome level 
per capita in 
U.S. dollars 
80 
110 
160 
240 
320 
400 
480 
640 
800 
960 
1,280 
1,920 
Source: (25), table V. 
Prewar 
( .15) 
( .03) 
-.10 
-.23 
-.31 
-.37 
-.40 
- .45 
-.47 
-.48 
(-.49) 
(-.46) 
Postwar 
( .21) 
.08 
-.05 
-.18 
-.25 
-.29 
-.32 
-.34 
-.35 
-.35 
-.33 
(-.29) 
a. Numbers in parentheses are estimates outside the interval covered by consump-
tion data. Income data were per capita national income in current U.S. dollars. 
Jureen reiterated Bennett's point with respect to cereal consumption. "Here 
consumption shows . . . three phases : (a) rising demand in countries with very 
low levels of living; (b) constant demand in countries with still rather low 
levels; and (c) falling demand in countries with medium or high levels . . . 
Thus-assuming constant real food prices-the peak in cereal consumption is 
reached at a rather low income level." Jureen's estimates are related to world 
per capita income levels in 1953 in later pages, and show only two countries, 
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India and Egypt (of those with per capita wheat consumption and income data 
available\ which have per capita incomes so low that income elasticities for wheat 
ar~" positive. 
When per capita consumption of wheat flour was related to per capita in-
come in the U.S. from 1929-53, the income elasticity was -0.27, interpreted to 
mean th;Jt a 1 percent rise in income was associated with a 0.27 percent decline in 
per capita consumption of wheat flour in that period. This estimate is consistent 
with j ureen's figure of -0.29 for countries (like the U.S.) with average per capita 
incomes near $2,000 per year. 
The 1955 Food Consumption Survey (63.1) of the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture provides the most recent evidence of a continued negative relationship 
between per capita income and per capi ta cereal consumption in the U.S. Wet-
more et a!. (72, p. 58) estimated ti·om the U.S.D.A. data that if the per capita 
incomes of all persons in the U.S. in 1955 had been raised co at least $500, cereal 
consumption would have declined by 3.6 percent; had per capita incomes been 
raised to at least $1,000, cereal consumption \vould have been 4.6 percent less . 
From the same data, Lavell (27, p. 3'0) attributed nearly half the decline in 
total cereal consumption per person ti·om 1942 to 1955 to higher incomes, espe-
cially the sharp decline in the proportion of families with incomes of less than 
$2,000 per year.~ :; Another major factor was the change from farm to urban resi-
dence. Both these changes are expected to continue. Real per capita incomes in 
the U.S. may be 50 percent higher in 1975 than in 1955 (6); by 1975 farm popu-
lation may be only 7 to 8 percent of a total population of nearly 240 million, 
compared with 12 percent of the 1959 population (2). Continued downward pres-
sure on per capita cereal consumption may be expected. 
\'V'heat has no t been giving way to other cereals in the U.S. diet, but to 
animal products; per capita consumption of all grains has declined (table 16) . 
TABLE 16-U.S. PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF CORN AND CEREALS OTHER 
THAN WHEAT, 1910-56. 
Period 
1910-14 
1915-19 
1920-24 
1925-29 
1930-34 
Source: (65) 
Corn 
products 
(lbs.) 
55 
50 
41 
35 
32 
Other 
productsb 
(lbs.) 
19 
21 
18 
19 
18 
Period 
1935-39 
1940-44 
1945-49 
1950-54 
1955-56 
a. Does not include sugar and syrup from corn. 
b. Rye, buckwheat, rice, oats, and barley. 
Wheat Consumption and Price Changes 
Corn 
products 
(1 bs.) 
27 
26 
22 
16 
14 
Other 
products 
(lbs.) 
14 
14 
12 
12 
11 
Economic theory views consumers as trying to get maximum personal satis-
faction from limited outlays for consumption, by considering relacive prices of 
various products in a framework of their own preferences for goods and services. 
As one food product becomes relatively cheaper, (either because its price falls or 
'"Other analyses based on the survey appear in U.S.D .A. publications such as The National Food Situation 
and The Wheat Situation. 
others rise), consumers shift toward the cheaper food. This is a basic economic 
principle-the substitution effect of changing relative prices. If one price de-
clines while others remain constant, consumers can buy as high a living standard 
as they formerly enjoyed with a smaller outlay, or a higher living standard at 
no greater cost. 
Cereal foods have become slightly more costly relative to other foods the 
past 20 years largely as a result of increased costs of processing and distribution 
(table A15). But estimates of the effect of price changes on cereal consumption 
lend little support to the idea that slightly higher prices are a major reason for 
declining cereal consumption, or that cereal consumption would rise (or fall 
more slowly) if relative prices of cereals were to fall. 
There remains almost no disagreement about the response of wheat con-
sumption to changing relative prices. Schultz estimated an elasticity coefficient 
between -0.17 and -0.25 for total domestic demand with respect to the deflated 
farm price of wheat in the United States, 1921-34 (36, p. 397). Fox estimated 
-0.07 to be the price elasticity of demand for flour (15, p. 69). Montgomery, 
using the same variables as Schultz but more recent data, found a lower coef-
ficient of elasticity, -0.12 (30). Meinken estimated a coefficient of -0.04 (29, p. 
43). Malenbaum summarized by saying that an elasticity of demand of zero, or 
no response of wheat consumption to price changes, is the best conclusion for 
the United States in recent pre-World War II years, the period covered by most 
of the studies cited (28, p. 72). 
-- Wetmore et al. estimated that if prices of all foods except cereals, potatoes, 
and fats and oils, fell 20 percent, consumption of that group would fall only 2 
percent (72, p. 72). The practical conclusion to be drawn is that wide swings in 
the prices of other foods, while wheat and bread prices are stable, cannot be ex-
pected to cause consumers to change cereal product purchases measurably, with 
existing pattern of tastes in the United States. 
Only negligible increases in domestic per capita wheat consumption would 
occur at extremely low wheat prices, and negligible declines in domestic 
per capita wheat consumption would occur at prices much above historic levels. 
T here i.r no reason to a.uume. therefore. that change.r in price.r ~(bread or flour result-
ing from changes in the price of wheat have had or will have any measurable effect on 
per capita or total wheat mnsumption in the U.S. The cost of wheat in a loaf of 
bread at 1958 prices was only 16 percent of the cost of the loaf ( 64, p. 5). A 20 
percent increase in the price of wheat would indicate only a 3 percent increase 
in the price of bread (six-tenths of a cent on a 20-cent loaf). 
If bread consumption were responsive to price, wheat producers would have 
a clear interest in minimizing bread price increases not related to wheat price 
increases. Such increases (labor costs, for example) would have a marked nega-
tive effect on bread sales. But bread consumption does not respond to price; it 
is not seriously reduced by moderate price increases from any source. This low 
price elasticity for bread and other final forms of wheat makes it possible for 
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wheat producers to profit from higher wheat prices which are passed on in the 
price of bread, just as others who contribute goods or services toward the pro-
duction of a loaf of bread can and do pass on increased charges to the consumer 
without important reductions in the amounts of their goods and services (trans-
portation, wrappers, etc.) purchased. 
Wheat as Animal Feed 
While relative prices of wheat and other foods appear to be minor factors 
in human consumption, relative prices of wheat and other grains are major fac-
tors in livestock feeding. Meinken (29) showed the importance of another varia-
ble, poultry numbers, in determining the amount of wheat fed. However, .with 
poultry numbers, especially laying hens, relatively constant, the wheat-corn price 
relationship remains as the significant factor related to use of wheat as feed. Un-
der recent and current government support programs, this relationship also has 
been fairly constant. As seen in table A13, large quantities of wheat have been 
fed only during war years, when wheat prices were made competitive with corn 
prices. 
No major changes in the technical substitution rates between wheat and 
other feed grains appear imminent. A pound of wheat is about 5 percent more 
nutritious than a pound of corn for hogs, beef cattle and poultry, equal to corn 
for dairy cattle, but about 15 percent less nutritious than corn for sheep (35). 
Lowering the wheat price to coarse grain prices appears to be the only way to 
increase wheat feeding, since technical substitution rates are most inflexible. 
Wheat as an Industrial Raw Material 
Data in table A13 show the discouraging history of wheat utilization in in-
dustrial processes. Only under pressure of war, when the motivation and, con-
sequently, the choice indicators (price ratios) differed from usual patterns, has 
wheat found significant industrial outputs. Estimates of the value of alcohol and 
by-products which can be derived from a bushel of grain vary, but tend robe 
about one half ro one third 1959 grain prices ( 47, p. 106), probably below the 
cost of producing wheat. 
Widespread support for expanded research in this area should not be taken as 
an indication that important advances are near at hand. At best, such research may 
benefit future generations, although the Presidential Commission studying the 
problem in 1957 took a shorter range view of the situation and visualized an 
end to farm surpluses if enough money were invested in research (47, p. 13). 
The nature of basic research suggests that research in industrial uses for wheat 
is nor likely to be relevant to the wheat problems of the 1960's, but to the basic 
raw material demands of a more distant future. 
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Ill. 
WORLD WHEAT TRADE, PRODUCTION, AND CONSUMPTION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. EXPORTS 
Any major increase in the use of U.S. wheat for food in the next decade is 
likely to be from increased exports. However, other nations competing for the 
world wheat trade are under much pressure to export large quantities of wheat 
each year, and would try to do so even at extremely low prices because they 
need the foreign exchange earned selling wheat to buy imports. U.S. exports in 
the years ahead do not depend chiefly on world wheat prices, bur on trends in 
wheat consumption and production in other countries and on world political 
relationships. 
DIVISION OF THE WORLD WHEAT MARKET 
National claims to rights in the total world wheat trade, like farmers' claims 
to production rights, are not to be taken lightly. Shares in the world wheat 
trade depend heavily on the base period, as shown in table 17. During the 1930's 
the U.S. averaged only 11 percent of a reduced world wheat trade, down sharply 
from one fourth of the trade in each of three preceding decades. Canada averaged 
nearly one third of the world wheat trade from 1920 to 1940, from 1945 to 1949 
and from 1950 to 1954. Major exceptions were immediately after World \'V'adi, 
when the world wheat trade was expanded sharply by U.S. foreign aid, and after 
1954, when U.S. wheat exports were swelled by shipments under Public Law 
48024 (table 17). 
With noncash sales by the U.S. subtracted from U.S. exports and the world 
wheat trade, the U.S. share is down sharply and the Canadian share up (table 
18). This alternative view of the world wheat market is shown for two rea-
sons. First, U.S. cash wheat exports made possible by our export subsi.dy 
program are competitive chiefly with Canadian exports managed by the Canadian 
Wheat Board. Second, there are virtually no wheat exports in the world com-
petitive with U.S. shipments under the Marshall Plan and P.L. 480 (table 19) . 
The U.S. takes precautions to avoid any but the most scrupulous encroachment 
on the cash market of other countries, as required by the language of P.L. 480. 
If P. L. 480 were ended and no mbstitute provided in the 1960's, there is little 
doubt that U.S. wheat exports would fall sharply. If sales under special programs 
are not displacing our own cash sales or those of foreign competitors, the world 
and the U.S. wheat trade might be expected to fall by nearly the amount of 
special program sales and grants. As the 1960's begin, two thirds of U.S. wheat ex-
ports depend direct/)' on continuation of those programs (table 19) . There is little like-
lihood that this situation will soon change. 
'·'The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended; 83rd Cong .. 68 Sw. 454 . 
For a concise review of laws pertaining to exports and surplus removal see (58). 
45 
TABLE 17-WHEAT AND FLOUR: EXPORTS AND SHARES OF WORLD EXPORTS BY INDICATED COUNTRIES AND 
WORLD TOTALS. 
Other 
u.s.A. Canada Australia Argentina countriesa World 
Period million million million million million million 
(July-June) bushels (%) bushels (%) bushels (%) bushels (%) bushels (%) bushels 
1930-39 75 11 201 28 114 16 130 18 190 27 710 
1945-49 415 47 252 29 83 9 76 9 52 6 878 
1950-54 330 34 300 31 98 10 81 8 159 16 960 
1954 274 28 253 26 93 10 132 14 219 23 971 
1955 346 33 289 27 102 10 115 11 213 20 1,065 
1956 549 41 282 21 126 10 98 7 273 21 1,328 
1957 403 34 316 27 61 5 77 7 333 28 1,190 
1958b 443 34 300 23 75 6 103 8 387 30 1,308 
Source: (69, August 1959); qualifications and explanations appear there. 
a, Includes U.S.S.R. 
""' 
b. Preliminary 
0. 
TABLE 18-AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD WHEAT MARKET. 
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
million bushels 
World wheat trade 992 830 937 1,066 987 879 971 1,065 1,328 1,190 1,308 
Less U.S. noncash 
sales 376 257 173 159 30 101 158 241 375 2_52 301 
Remainder 616 574 764 907 957 778 813 824 953 938 1,007 
United States cash 
exports 
Quantity 127 42 193 315 288 116 116 105 174 150 141 
% of adjusted 
world trade 21 7 25 35 30 15 14 13 18 16 14 
Canadian exports 
Quantity 222 236 221 347 392 288 253 289 282 316 300 
% of adjusted 
world trade 36 41 29 38 41 37 31 35 30 34 30 
Source: (69) 
..._ 
'-l 
TABLE 19-WHEAT, INCLUDING FLOUR (GRAIN EQUIVALENT): TOTAL EXPORTS AND GOVERNMENT EXPORTS BY 
PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES, 1948- 58. 
Year beginning July 
Item 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958a 
1,000 bushels 
Total exports: 502,559 298,470 365,573 474,715 317,190 216,512 27.8,634 345,564 548,558 403,000 443,000 Under government 
programs: 
Quantity 
%of total 
For dollars: 
Quantity 
%of total 
Government exports 
by programs: 
Public Law 480b 
Title I 
Title II 
Barter 
376,011 
75 
126,548 
25 
Donations 
(Sec. 416)c 
Marshall Plan d 208,503 
Army -civilian 
supplye 167,508 
256,790 172,968 
86 47 
41,680 192,605 
14 53 
2,619 
137,945 138,856 
118,845 31,493 
159,341 
34 
315,374 
66 
16,924 
137,163 
5,254 
29,605 100,544 158,025 240,700 375,000 252,091 301,331 
9 46 58 70 68 63 68 
287,585 115,968 115,609 104,864 173,558 149,671 140,475 
91 54 42 30 32 37 32 
23,801 94,300 200,500 179,069 230,023 
15,991 11,900 12,200 14,300 10,861 
3,938 9,964 46,458 66,700 86,900 9,501 20,154 
2,788 11,735 17,993 20,231 
22,965 89,063 70,811 65,000 63,600 31,228 20,062 
2,702 1,517 963 
Total 376,011 256,790 172,968 159,341 29,605 100,544 158,025 240,700 375,000 252,091 301,331 
Source: (69, Feb. 1960). 
a. Preliminary. 
b. Public Law 480, 83rd Congress, as amended, 
c. Shipments by U.S. charity and relief agencies as authorized under Title III of P. L. 480. 
d. P. L. 472 (4/3/48), Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Original Act establishing Economic Cooperation Administration (now known as International Cooperation Administration). Includes, in part, exports under Greek-Turkish Aid, China Aid, Yugoslav, India and Pakistan Relief programs, In most years data represent procurement authorizations, and are not 
strictly comparable in time to actual exports of wheat and wheat flour. 
e. Shipments for civilian feeding in occupied areas. 
PRINCIPAL IMPORTERS OF UNITED STATES' WHEAT 
Historic continental destinations of United States' wheat are shown in table 
20 for 1952 to 1959. The Asian market is seen to have grown rapidly, almost 
TABLE 20-WHEAT AND FLOUR: CONTINENTAL DESTINATIONS OF 
U.S. EXPORTS. 
Destmation 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 
Millions of bushels 
Europe 87 146 154 245 118 117 
Asia 91 82 101 223 221 221 
Western Hemisphere 27 38 58 63 52 57 
Africa 14 9 32 15 10 26 
Others 1 20 
Source: (66); also current U.S.D.A. reports. 
equaling the European market in 1956-57, and exceeding it since then. Countries 
taking more than 2 percent of United States' wheat exports are shown in table 
21. Reasons for the striking change in the destinations of wheat exports appear 
with the identity of Asian countries, which could increase wheat imports in late 
years only under the U.S. aid program. 
TABLE 21-COUNTRIES IMPORTING MORE THAN 2 PERCENT OF 
TOTAL U. S. WHEAT EXPORTS.a 
Country 1953-54 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 
Percentages 
Europe 
Umted Kingdom 7. 2 7.3 5.6 5.8 
Netherlands 5.3 6.8 3.9 2. 9 
Belgium- Luxembourg 2.1 3. 3 
France 2.3 5.7 
West Germany 10.7 4.9 6.5 5.2 3.6 
Italy 2.1 2.4 2.3 
Yugoslavia 6.5 11.0 6.9 5.2 6.9 
Greece 2.2 3.8 3.6 
Spain 9.2 
Poland 5.0 2.1 
Asia 
~ey 2.6 4.0 2.7 
Israel 2.5 2.3 
India 2.6 12.2 19.2 27.4 
Pakistan 10.4 4.1 6.1 4.2 
Korea 3.0 4.4 
Taiwan 5.4 2.2 2.2 
Japan 21.3 11.9 9.1 12.8 7.7 
Philippine Republic 2.3 
Other 
~il 5.1 2.5 2.7 4.0 
Cuba 2.1 
Mexico 3.1 
Egypt 4.1 3.2 
a. (69, Oct. 1955, Oct. 1957, and Aug. 1959). 
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The incentive for this change was the combination of foreign policy and 
farm policy implemented in P.L. 480. Although this country had such export 
programs previously, nothing like the program of the late 1950's had ever been 
tried except directly in the wake of war. Asian imports of wheat in 1956-57 were 
almost three times the 1954-55 total. Through mid-1959, wheat made up 43 per-
cent of the export market value of all products shipped under Title I, as shown 
in table 22. 
TABLE 22-COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF ALL TITLE I AGREEMENTS SIGNED 
THROUGH JUNE 30, 1959. 
Export 
Approximate 
quantity 
market Estimated 
Commodity Unit value CCC cost 
Wheat and wheat flour 
Feed grains 
Rice 
Cotton 
Cotton linters 
Meat products 
Tobacco 
Dairy products 
Fats and Oils 
Poultry 
Dry edible beans 
Fruits and vegetables 
Seeds 
Total 
Ocean transportation 
bushel 
bushel 
cwt. 
bale 
bale 
pound 
pound 
pound 
pound 
pound 
cwt. 
pound 
cwt. 
842,635,000 
210,054,000 
33,465,000 
3,978,800 
7,000 
120,872,000 
250,100,000 
285,526,000 
3,631.270,000 
17,410,000 
591,000 
176,159,000 
10,000 
Total, including ocean transportation 
Sourve: (46). 
WORLD WHEAT CONSUMPTION 
Million 
$1,410.3 $2,268.8 
237.3 388. 6 
213.2 338.9 
616.0 824.5 
.3 .3 
39.2 39.2 
181.3 181.3 
48.2 84.3 
526.2 533.4 
5.4 5.4 
4.4 4.4 
15.3 15.3 
.4 .4 
3,307.5 4,684.8 
393.7 393.7 
$3,701.2 $5,078.5 
Future demands on the U.S. wheat supply depend heavily on trends in 
world wheat consumption. These, in turn, depend on the growth of the world's 
population and on the trend of per capita income. Projections of either are 
hazardous. Disagreement is intense on the present state of world food consump-
tion. According to Lord John Boyd-Orr "A lifetime of malnutrition and actual 
hunger is the lot of at least two thirds of mankind" (3, p. 11 ). The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the U.N. has reported that "Taking a daily food 
intake of 2,200 calories as an approximate yardstick of the minimum energy 
requirements .. . about one half of the world population fell below or barely 
reached this level" ( 42, p. 5) . 
On the other hand, Jureen (25, p. 19) stated that "An improvement in 
food standards no longer calls for appreciable increase in calorie supply (i.e. 
total calorie supply need not rise much more than is required to keep pace with 
population growth)." According to Mrs. Farnsworth (12 , p. 57), food supply 
and consumption estimates now in existence are inadequate for judging the nutri-
tional status of many countries of the world, and may seriously understate food 
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supplies, especially of underdeveloped countries, of which India is the best exam-
ple. If Mrs. Farnsworth is correct, the shortage of calories is less serious than 
often pictured. According to most recent FAO reports, surplus food supplies 
now exist not only in the U.S. but in much of the world (71). World food 
production on ape~ capita basis increased by 7 percent from 1948-52 to 1955-57, 
according to the U.S. State Department (71). 
As shown in table 23, only India, Pakistan, Japan, the Philippines and 
Peru (of countries for which per capita consumption data are available) had 
diets with fewer than 2,200 calories in mid-1950's. Of these, only India and 
Pakistan typically are cited as countries where near-famine conditions sometimes 
prevail; the Japanese diet of 2,110 calories in 1955 was nor considered seriously 
inadequate in Japan. 
Viewed against the standard of the National Research Council (144), whose 
recommended minimum calorie allowance is about 2,750 per day for all ages and 
both sexes, the diets shown in table 23 arc much less satisfactory. But only 
Chile, Venezuela, Brazil, and Honduras , plus the countries just cited, are dis-
tinctly below the NRC standard (table 22) . If food supplies are underestimated, 
as Mrs. Farnsworth argues, these countries are not proper! y a parr of the group 
with diets clearly below the NRC standard, and India and Pakistan may be 
somewhat closer to those standards than is indicated in table 23. 
Whatever the number of hungry people and the intensity of their need, no 
onP can deny the existence of widespread hunger and malnutrition in the world, 
conditions which can be alleviated either by increased food production or by in-
creased imports. Neither can be accomplishecl"soon without help from the de-
veloped countries of the world. It is extreme!)' importcmt to U.S. farm producers 
that U.S. food exports be increa.red; it is al.ro extreme~y important to zmderdet;e/oped 
countries to increase their own food production and decmt.re food imports. U.S. policy 
ro assist underdeveloped nations to achieve their food production objectives is, 
implicitly, policy to reduce our exports of staples such as wheat and rice. If we 
are ".rttcmsfu!" in increasing our grain exp01-ts the next decade it ma_y be the result of 
failztre of foreign countries to meet their production goals and . ther~fore, of our own 
failure to meet important foreign policy objectives. 
PROJECTION OF WORLD WHEAT CONSUMPTION 
The long-time trend in per capita consumption of both coarse grains and 
wheat is downward in the world and in most countries of the world for which 
data are available. This is a fairly recent development. Malenbaum (28, appendix 
tables 4, 5, and 6) showed that from 1885 to 1935-39, world per capita wheat 
consumption was fairly stable at an average of 2.5 to 2. 75 bushels per year for 
36 countries for which data were available. He grouped 36 countries of the 
world according to consumption patterns in 1935-39 (table 24). Only 10 coun-
tries showed clear downward per capita consumption trends at that time. In a 
second group, per capita wheat consumption was erratic; a third group was in 
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TABLE 23-NET CEREAL AND TOTAL FOOD SUPPLY PER PERSON IN CALORIES. 
Calories per person per Clay 
Prewar 1956-57 
Country Cereals Total Cereals Total 
Europe 
Austria 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany (West) 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Yugoslavia 
North America 
Canada 
United States 
Latin America 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Honduras 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Far East 
India 
Pakistan 
Japan 
Philippines 
Africa and Near East 
Egypt 
Israel 
Fed. S. Rhodesia 
Turkey 
Union S. Africa 
Oceania 
1,252 
1,106 
912 
1,238 
1, 186 
1,083 
1,567 
1,316 
1,571 
1,014 
1,172 
907 
1,050 
925 
923 
893 
1,057 
1,233 
1,527 
1, 752 
1,855 
1,518 
2,930 
2,820 
3,420 
2,990 
2,870 
3,040 
2,600 
3,400 
2,520 
2,840 
3,210 
2,100 
3,120 
3,140 
3,110 
3,020 
3,010 
3,220 
2,730 
2,240 
1,970 
1,970 
2,180 
2,450 
2,450 
2,340 
1,126 
996 
878 
1,157 
1,041 
953 
1,421 
1,267 
1,425 
879 
942 
1,046 
766 
964 
859 
1,825 
756 
699 
984 
875 
1,343 
1,200 
1,001 
979 
850 
1,229 
1,672 
1,421 
1,287 
1,842 
1,463 
1,948 
1,939 
1,460 
2,950 
2.990 
3,360 
3,190 
2,920 
3,000 
2,600 
3,560 
2,570 
2,950 
3,310 
2,550 
2,970 
3, 150 
3,270 
2,710 
3,140 
3,150 
2,980 
2,350 
2,420 
2,250 
2,080 
2,990 
2,270 
1,880 
1,990 
2, 110 
1,940 
2,590 
2,860 
2,630 
2,670 
2,650 
Australia 1,010 3,300 898 3,190 
New Zealand 867 3,260 863 3,350 
a. F'mland, 1955-56; Ireland, 1956; Portugal, 1956; Yugoslav1a, 195::3-54; u.s., 
1956; Argentina, 1955; Brazil, 1952; Honduras, 1954-55; Peru, 1952; Uruguay, 
1955; Venezuela, 1951; India, 1954-55; Pakistan, 1954-55; Japan, 1955; Philippines, 
1954-55; Egypt, 1955-56; Israel, 1954-55; Rhodesia, 1953; S. Africa, 1956; 
Australia, 1955; New Zealand, 1956. 
Source: (45, tables 90-91). 
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TABLE 24-PER CAPITA WHEAT CONSUMPTION, SELECTED COUNTRIES AND 
YEARS. 
Countries 
Annual per capita consumption 
1935-39 1951-52a 
A. Declining consumption pattern 
Austraha 
Belgium and Luxembourg 
Canada 
France 
New Zealand 
Spain 
Switzerland 
U. K. and Ireland 
United States 
Group A (8 countries, 1951-52) 
B. Intermediate consumption pattern 
4.62 
5.80 
3.98 
6.50 
4.11 
4.95 
4.80 
4.90 
3.62 
(4.60) 
Denmark 2.57 
Finland 2.13 
Germany 2.51 
Netherlands 3.86 
Norway 3.11 
Sweden 2.55 
Group B (5 countries, 1951-52) (2. 70) 
C. Increasing consumption pattern, wheat a preferred cereal 
Argentina 5.57 
Bulgaria 6.41 
Chile 5. 78 
Greece 5.34 
Hungary 5.42 
Italy 5.95 
Rumania 3.42 
Uruguay 4. 73 
Yugoslavia 4. 39 
Group C (6 countries, 1951-52) (5.20) 
D. Increasing consumption pattern, wheat not a preferred cereal 
French Morocco 2.59 
Tunis 2.59 
Poland 1. 75 
Portugal 2.08 
Egypt 2.45 
India 0. 79 
Japan 0.60 
Group D (3 countries, 1951-52) (0.93) 
Other 
--xtlstria 2. 70 
Turkey 5.12 
Union of South Africa 1. 66 
SOurce: Country groupmg and 1935-39 data from Malenbaum, (28); 
(23). 
3.50 
3.53 
2.62 
4.14 
2.88 
3.42 
3.44 
2.22 
(2.85) 
1. 70 
2.29 
3.01 
2.93 
2.92 
(2.44) 
3.80 
4.36 
4.98 
4.85 
3.05 
3.85 
(4.40) 
2.69 
0.69 
0.91 
(0.82) 
3.81 
5.01 
1. 75 
1951-52 data 
a. Consumption figures are net; that is, they represent only that extracted portion 
of wheat milled, or about 70 percent of total wheat milled for human consump-
tion. They are comparable to the U.S. flour consumption data, table A14. 
the stage in which diets were improved by substituting wheat for other grains 
and potatoes. A fourth group was made up mainly of countries with low per 
capita rates of wheat consumption based on preferences for other cereals (table 
24, column 1). Only five countries (Sweden , Egypt, Japan, Austria, South 
Africa), of 25 for which 1951-52 data are available, had higher per capita wheat 
consumption rates in the postwar period than in 1935-39 (table 24). 
Goreux (16) estimated for Sweden that per capita cereal consumption in 
1965 would drop to 81 percent of 1955 consumption with an annual per capita 
income increase of 2 percent or to 72 percent of 1955 with a 3 percent per capita 
income increase. This appears to be an exceptionally sharp decline in a country 
where cereal consumption is not now high. 
Daly estimated annual per capita consumption of wheat in the U.S. by 1975 
as 89 percent of 1953 of 161 pounds, assuming that per capita income increases 
by 2.5 percent yearly. This is well above the projection of 147 pounds by 1970, 
based on the trend of per capita consumption from 1910 to 1953 (p. 58) . But it 
is consistent with the slower rate of decline in per capita wheat consumption in 
the U.S. in the latter parr of that period. 
Hanau and Krohn (19) estimated that per capita wheat consumption in 
Germany in 1964-65 will be almost unchanged from 1954-55, whether per capita 
income increases are as low as 2.3 percent, or as high as 3.8 percent per year. 
This implies a zero income elasticity, and is not consistent with Jureen's analysis 
(25), with the recent trend in German wheat consumption (table 24), or with 
an F.A.O. report on grain consumption (43). 
Dayal (9, pp. 468-88) estimated that a 10 percent increase in per capita pur-
chasing power in India would result in an increase of 4 to 6.5 percent in per 
capita wheat use, implying an income elasticity for wheat of about 0.5, much 
above the results of an F.A.O . study, which indicated that the income elasticity 
for food was about 0.5, but for wheat only about 0.2 (44, p. 52). The lower 
figure is near Jureen's estimate for countries (like India) with per capita income 
below $100. 
Projections of per capita and total wheat consumption are shown in table 
26 for countries for which data are available. The 25 countries listed have re-
cently imported 70 to 80 percent of all U.S. wheat exports (24). Brazil, Spain, 
Cuba, and Mexico, which have taken considerable U.S. wheat recently, are the 
important omissions. 
All steps in these projections are open to criticism. Population projections 
(table 25) are notably inexact. Use of the same income elasticity for countries 
as different as Japan and Yugoslavia, for example, may be questioned, even 
though per capita incomes are similar. Although consumers in different countries 
with varying levels of per capita wheat consumption may tend to react similarly 
to increases irt income as argued by Jureen, wide variations in national cultures 
and in income distributions are not considered in the projections of table 26. 
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TABLE 25-ESTI.MATED POPULATION, AND PER CAPITA INCOME, SELECTED 
COUNTRIES. 
Population Per cap1ta income 
(millions) (dollars) 
Country 1955 1975 1953 
Europe 289.1 330.5 
Austria 7.0 7.5 290 
Belgium-Luxembourg 9.2 10.4 1,417 
Denmark 4.5 5.1 740 
France 43.3 49.1 600 
Germany 71.0 80.5 482 
Greece 8.0 9.7 174 
Italv 48.0 56.1 307 
Netherlands 10.8 12.8 600 
Norway 3.4 4.0 717 
Sweden 7.3 8.3 910 
Switzerland 5.0 5.9 995 
U. K. and Ireland 53.9 58.5 903 
Yugoslavia 17.7 22.6 200 
North America 181.9 239.3 
United States 166.0 217.0 1,908 
Canada 15.9 22.3 1,318 
South America 28.5 39.5 
Argentina 19.3 27.2 366 
Chile 6.6 8.8 250 
Uruguay 2.6 3.5 425 
Asia 499.1 719.0 
I'ildia 386.0 563.0 60 
Japan 89.1 116.0 197 
Turkey 24.0 40.0 221 
Other 48.2 76.2 
1\Ustralia 9.3 13.0 921 
New Zealand 2.2 3.0 968 
Egypt 23.0 38.3 112 
Union of South Africa 13.7 21.9 283 
Total (listed countries) 1,046.8 1,404.5 
Source: Population; medium growth assumption from U. N. studies (41); hlcome, 
Kindl.eberger (26). 
Finally, the benchmark per capita consumption data of table 24, from which pro-
jections were computed, may be very uneven. 
Income elasticities applicable to the per capita annual incomes shown for 
all countries in table 25 are in table 26, column 1. Also shown are the percen-
tage changes estimated for wheat consumption by 1975 under alternative assump-
tions of annual per capita income increases of 1 and 2 percent. The higher an-
nual income increase (2 percent) involves the greater decrease in per capita con-
sumption in most countries, since income elasticity is negative in most countries 
shown. 
Total wheat consumption projected for 1975 in the countries listed is 400 
to 500 million bushels higher (20 to 25 percent) than in 1955 (columns 7-8, 
table 26) . The projected downward trend in per capita consumption under either 
of the income increases assumed is too small to offset the projected population 
increases, which on the basis of experience, may be too low. 
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TABLE 26-ESTIMATED PER CAPITA WHEAT CONSUMPTION IN 1975 FOR TWO INCOME SITUATIONS, AND TOTAL FOOD 
WHEAT REQUIREMENTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES IN 1975, BASED ON PROJECTED INCOME AND POPULATION 
INCREASES. 
%change 
per capita wheat Bushels Wheat for foodd 
consumption per capita (million bushels) 
Income 1953-75b 1975C 1955 Hl75 
Country elasticitya (*) (**) ( *) (* *) (actual) { *) {**} {***} 
Europe 1,014 1,092 1,007 1,155 
Austria -.25 -6 -12 3.6 3.4 27 27 25 29 
VI Belg.-Lux. -.33 -7 -14 3.3 3.0 32 34 32 37 VI 
Denmark -.35 -8 -16 1.6 1.4 8 8 7 9 
France -.34 -7 -14 3.9 3.6 179 189 175 203 
Germany (all) -.32 -7 -14 2.1 2.0 163 171 159 184 
Greece -.05 -1 - 2 4.9 4.9 40 48 47 48 
Italy -.25 -6 -12 4.6 4.3 231 256 240 272 
Netherlands -.34 -7 -14 2.8 2.6 33 36 33 39 
Norway -.35 -8 -16 2.7 2.5 10 11 10 12 
Sweden -.35 -8 -16 2.7 2.4 21 22 20 24 
Switzerland -.35 -8 -16 3.2 2.9 17 19 17 20 
U.K. and Ireland -.35 -8 -16 3.2 2.9 185 185 169 201 
Yugoslavia -.05 -1 - 2 3.8 3.2 68 86 73 87 
--
TABLE 26-CONTINUED 
%change 
Wheat for foodd per capita wheat Bushels 
consumption per capita (million bushels) 
fucome 1953-75b 1975C 1955 19'15 
Countr~ elasticitya ( *) ( **) (*) (* *) (actual) (*) (**) (***) 
North America 410 508 473 540 
United States - .29 -6 -12 2.1 2.0 368 454 423 482 
Canada -.33 -7 -14 2.4 2,2 42 54 50 58 
South America 110 144 135 152 
Argentina -.29 -6 -12 3,6 3.3 73 97 91 103 
Chile 
-.18 -4 -18 4.2 4.0 29 37 35 38 
Uruguay -.29 -6 -12 2.9 2.7 8 10 9 11 
Asia 467 701 715 694 
-rnaia .21 +5 +10 0.7 0.8 266 405 428 388 
VI Japan -.05 -1 - 2 0.9 0.9 81 104 103 106 0\ Turkey -.18 -4 
- 8 4.8 4.6 120 192 184 200 
Other 125 191 188 196 
--xllStralia -.35 -8 -16 3.2 2.9 33 42 38 46 
New Zealand -.35 -8 -16 2.7 2.4 6 8 7 9 
Egypt .08 +2 + 4 2.7 2.8 62 105 107 103 
U. of S. Africa -.25 -6 -12 1.6 1.6 24 36 36 38 
Total, listed countries 2,126 2,636 2,518 2,747 
a. rom tab e 5. 
b. Computed from 1953 income (table 25) and income elasticity (column 1), under two assumptions for income change: (*) 
1 percent per year increase in per capita income; (**) 2 percent per year increase in per capita income. 
c. Computed from 1951-52 per capita consumption (table 24) and projected per capita consumption changes (columns 2 and 3). 
d. Per capita consumption times population (table 25); column headed(***) represents projected wheat food use with 1975 
population but 1951-52 per capita consumption rates. Computations made with unrounded per capita projections. 
Failure to achieve gains in per capita incomes by 1975 would tend to hold 
per capita wheat consumption at 1951-52 levels. Total wheat consumption 
might increase by one third if population growth were as projected. Another 
possibility is that wheat consumption will no longer fall as incomes rise, mak-
ing the historical income elasticity estimates inapplicable-an event not ex-
pected. 
Major increases in wheat consumption among countries now active in the 
world wheat trade appear likely to occur in Asia (India, Japan, Turkey). These 
countries have positive or barely negative income elasticities, and high projected 
rates of population growth. Estimates for Europe range from a little more to a 
little less wheat consumption in 1975 compared with 1955, depending on gains 
in income. A similar pattern prevails for North America and South America, al-
though South America is poorly represented in table 26 because of lack of con-
sumption data. 
ANOTHER VIEW OF WORLD GRAIN CONSUMPTION TRENDS 
United Nations economists grouped 23 countries (for which individual con-
sumption projections were shown in table A20) on the basis of food habits, in-
come levels, rates of income growth, export-import balance and other factors co 
make a 10-year projection of bread grain consumption ( 43) . Population, income, 
and wheat consumption history in the countries studied are in table A16. In-
come elasticities applicable to groups of countries and estimated population and 
income growth are in table A17. 
According to these estimates, bread grain consumption in 1965 in 23 coun-
tries listed would be 210 million bushels or 8 percent larger in 1965 than in 
1954-55. Their population increases are estimated at 11 percent, and a 5 percent 
annual rate of per capita income growth is assumed for group (E) made up of 
countries with a positive income elasticity of demand for bread grains (Egypt, 
India, Japan, and the Union of South Africa). 
Virtually all the increased demand would arise from group (E), while popu-
lation increase would about offset declining per capita consumption in the more 
developed countries of groups A to D. 
This estimate, done independently of the 1975 projection reported in the 
preceding section, but including most of the same countries, confirms the lack 
of prospects for large increases in total world consumption of wheat. Unex-
pected population changes or failure to achieve substantial per capita income 
gains, especially in Asia, would make the projections less applicable. 
WORLD GRAIN PRODUCTION TRENDS 
It is technologically possible in both developed areas such as western Europe 
and less developed areas like Asia to get the production of food grains up to 
consumption levels projected for 1965 or 1975. 
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A U.N. study cited earlier concluded that " ... while demand for wheat 
and coarse grains in 23 countries is expected to increased by 29 million tons in 
the next 10 years, production of wheat, rice, and coarse grains would increase by 
as much as 36 million tons in the same countries by 1965 (43). Given con-
tinued peace, population and income growth, and technological gains, prospects 
for an increased world trade in bread grains in 1965 did not appear to be bright. 
A 1959 report of the U.S. State Department concluded that "Despite the pro-
jected population explosion, reasoned projections of1975 wheat and rice production pro-
vided little basis for expecting export markets to absorb significantly larger amounts of 
U.S. produced wheat and rice, unless it is assumed that efforts for balanced economic 
development in the underdeveloped areas will be largely ineffective" (71). 
Nine western European countries have taken nearly one half U.S. wheat ex-
ports until recent years (table 20). Most of them have national policies protect-
ing agriculture and encouraging internal wheat production as shown below (54, 
except as noted). Even a modest level of achievement of their production goals 
is discouraging news for U.S. wheat producers and exporters, hopeful of a larger 
wheat export market. 
United Kingdom: Until recently, the main emphasis here was on expand-
ing output from domestic resources, to 60 percent above prewar, a goal almost 
achieved last season, according to official estimates (1956) . This goal has been 
modified, but the emphasis is still on minimizing food imporrs, and especially 
on the use of home grown feedstuffs to lessen the pressure on the balance of 
payments (42.1). 
Netherlands: No major production targets, but a modest expansionary 
policy and research aids for grain production. 
Belgium: Increased farm productivity is a major policy goal. 
France: "French agriculture and trade policy gives high protection to home 
agriculture first and French overseas agriculture second. The aim is to expand 
production, decrease imports, and increase exports .... " 
West Germany:" . . . the most important policy goal is to increase and 
maintain the income derived from agricultural pursuits ... " 
Italy: "Italy's agricultural policy lays emphasis on increasing productivity 
. . . in order to increase farm income, reduce underemployment in the farm 
sector, expand exports, and reduce imports of agricultural commodities." (33, 
p. 145) 
Greece: Reducing imports of food products is a major goal. Wheat from 
the United States has made up 35 percent of all Greek food imports, in recent 
years averaging near 20 million bushels annually. Measures recently taken appear 
likely to lead to an overproduction of wheat in Greece (33, p. 130). 
Yugoslavia: Most of the U.S. food products sent to Yugoslavia recently 
have gone under aid programs. Despite reclamation, credit and other programs, 
output is not expected to increase greatly. 
Spain: An intermittent customer for U.S. wheat, Spain has a goal of self-
sufficiency in grain which has now been largely achieved. 
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In Asia, four countries (Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Japan) stand out as 
importers of U.S. wheat (table 21). Production policies and prospects include: 
Turkey: Historically a food exporter, Turkey has required some food grain 
imports because of recent droughts and increases in domestic consumption. Her 
goal of improving her trade balance and her efforts to improve production make 
Turkey a poor prospect as a dollar customer for wheat. She may, instead become 
a net exporter of wheat (54) . 
India: India has taken the largest share of U.S. wheat exports in recent 
years, almost exclusively under P.L. 480 programs. She may need similar or 
larger quantities for many years even to maintain her per capita calorie supply. 
A 33 percent increase by 1965-66 over expected maximum food grain produc-
tion in 1960-61, would provide only a slight increase in calorie supply per per-
son, given current population estimates (17, p. 12). If this goal (table 27) is not 
approached, the alternatives are larger shipments of U.S. food grains to India or 
a decline in the nutritional level of the Indian people. 
TABLE 27-PRODUCTION OF FOOD GRAINS, INDIA {MILLDN METRIC TONS) 
Year 
1949-50 
1950-51 
1951-51 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1960-61 
1965-66 
1965-66 
Rice 
23.8 
21.0 
21.5 
23.1 
28.3 
25.1 
26.9 
28.1 
24.8 
29.7 
a. Prehminary estimate. 
b. Anticipated. 
c. Target. 
d. Proposed target. 
Source: (17, p. 14). 
Wheat 
6.6 
6.6 
6.2 
7.4 
7.9 
8.8 
8.6 
9.1 
7.7 
10.0 
Other 
cereals 
18.0 
16.1 
16.6 
19.0 
22.1 
22.2 
19.0 
20.1 
20.3 
Total 
cereals 
48.4 
43.7 
44.3 
49.5 
58.3 
56.1 
54.5 
57.3 
52.8 
Total 
pulses 
9.5 
8.7 
8.6 
9.3 
10.6 
11.0 
10.8 
11.4 
9.2 
otal 
food 
grains 
57.9 
52.4 
52.9 
58.8 
68.9 
67.1 
65.3 
68.7 
62.0 
7o.oa 
75.ob 
80.5c 
11o.od 
The required increase in output is probably technologically possible. The 
average yield per acre of wheat was only 10.4 bushels from 1950 to 1958. Her 
rice yield is among the lowest of the major rice producers. A recent report by a 
Ford Foundation team studying the prospects for improving India's dietary level 
concurrent with a sharp population increase, is cautiously optimistic about the 
possibilities for reaching the output goal, but only if a higher priority is given 
to chemical fertilizers and their distribution ( 17, pp. 170-179) . 
That report gave no estimates of the amount of additional grain production 
to be expected in India per unit of fertilizer, but it implies that the figure is 
high. In the U.S., additional returns per ton of nitrogen on wheat above pres-
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ent levels of application remain high despite relatively heavy fertilizer use in 
some areas. Each ton of nitrogen shipped to India from the U.S. might represent 
many tons of added wheat or rice production. 
If aid to underdeveloped countries in the form of food reduces other po-
tential aid, such as fertilizer and fertilizer plants, the short-range U.S. goal of sur-
plus disposal may conflict with the long-range goal of fostering economi,· development in 
those countries. The urgent need for current food supplies in such countries 
and the desire to reduce our own commodity stockpile should not obscure the 
extreme need for rapid technological improvement in grain production, if gratui-
tous shipments of U.S. foods are not to be permanent. 
Pakistan is an important potential buyer of U.S. wheat, but plans increased 
production. A 17 percent increase in wheat production and a 13 percent increase 
in total food grains was programmed for 1959-60 compared with 1948-55, to be 
met by increased yields. If the goal is met, slight increases in per capita con-
sumption will be possible with present population trends and imports. Accord-
ing to Pike" ... it is doubtful if any of the major goals will be reached within 
the period of the Five-Year Plans" (56). Wheat goals are more likely to fail 
than are rice goals, since much wheat land is being lost because of wetness. Yet 
self-sufficiency in food grains is possible a few years ahead·; yields in Pakistan are 
also extremely low, and should respond to increased fertilizer and other tech-
nical improvements. 
Japan alone of the four major Asian importers of wheat does not have a 
goal of self-sufficiency. She has exploited her productive potential far more than 
the others, and further yield gains may be slow. However, her policy continues 
to be to produce 80 percent of her food requirements at home by increasing out-
put as population grows. By reclamation, increased inputs, and other measures, 
Japan may hold the line.on the percentage of food imported. Total food im-
ports may increase slowly with population. Since Japan is in a reasonably strong 
dollar position, she may continue to be one of the best buyers of U. S. wheat. 
<50 
IV. 
ALTERNATIVE WHEAT POLICIES 
AND PROGRAMS 
Crop production potential in the U.S. in the 1960's stands out in bold con-
trast to utilization prospects. Few crops have better technical production pros-
pects or poorer utilization prospects in traditional markets than wheat. If pro-
ducers were to react to a termination of production controls as they indicated 
they would in 1955 (tables 10 to 14), wheat acreage and output would be increased 
sharply at prices substantially below the late 1950's. If the domestic demand for 
wheat as food is as inelastic as represented, no measurable increase in U.S. wheat 
food consumption would occur at 'any price. Population growth, coupled with 
the approach of a long-term minimum per capita wheat consumption offers the 
best hope for increased total wheat use in the U.S. 
This was the wheat situation after the 1960 harvest: 
1. The national acreage allotment under the wheat program effective for the 
1961 crop was 55 million acres; about 4 million additional acres are harvested 
each year under a marketing quota exemption, while several million allot-
ment acres are not planted. The expected harvest is 53 to 55 million 
acres each year. 
2. This acreage at national average yields now expected (roughly 18 to 25 bush-
els per acre), will produce from 1.0 billion to 1.4 billion bushels of wheat 
each year. 
3. The demand for U.S. wheat at 1959-60 prices and at prices up to one fourth 
below the 1959-60 level (to $1.30 pc:.r bushel) is about 500 million bushels 
for food, 150 to 200 million cash exports, 60 million bushels for seed, 50 to 
100 million bushels for feed, plus shipments for foreign aid. 
Total domestic and cash foreign demand in the price range of $1.30 to 
$240 per bushel (at the farm) is thus 750 to 850 million bushels per year. 
In addition, there is a demand for from 250 to 400 million bushels for 
P.L. 480 each year. The highest prospective total annual disappearance is about 
equal to the lowest probable annual output under the wheat program of 1954-61 . 
4. An average of 10 to 20 percent of yearly wheat production (100 million to 
250 million bushels) should be expected to be added to government owned 
stocks each year the 1954-61 wheat program is continued. 
5. Wheat stocks at the 1961 harvest are expected to be about 1.5 billions bush-
els, nearly 1 billion bushels above the widely accepted reserve require-
ment. of 500 million bushels. Stocks of soft red winter, durum, and white 
wheat were exceptionally low, and stocks of hard red winter and hard red 
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spring very high relative to annual production and disappearance. The po-
tential output of hard red winter wheat remains most seriously out of harmony 
with utilization prospects (table A12). 
Feed grains and wheat are inseparable from the standpoint of public policy; 
they are the major alternative crops on most of the land in crops (other than 
hay) in the U.S. With respect to feed grains: 
1. Stocks at the start of 1960 harvests were near 80 million tons, 55 million 
tons (the equivalent of 2 billion bushels of corn) in excess of an adequate 
carryover. 
2. Feed grain stocks have been accumulated since 1952 by excesses of produc-
tion over disappearance of from 5 to 10 million tons annually. 
3. Since 1953, from 10 to 15 million acres have been diverted from wheat to 
coarse grains each year by enforcement of wheat acreage allotments and mark-
eting quotas (61 ). Annual production from these acres has been about equal 
to the average annual additions to feed grain stocks. 
4. There have been two periods of relatively low prices for meat animals , espe-
cially hogs, concurrent w_ith the recent buildup of feed grain and wheat stocks. 
Had the stocks been fed, meat animal prices would have been somewhat 
lower the past six years. Estimates of those prices if all grains had been fed 
vary somewhat. Shepherd estimated hog prices nearly 20 percent below the 
1952-58 level if higher feed grain stocks had been avoided ; gross income from 
all livestock and livestock products was estimated at 6 percent below the 
actual , even though production would have been about 4 percent higher 
(37.1). Halcrow and Hieronymus estimated that all the coarse grains added 
to stocks from 1952 to 1956 could have been fed to hogs with only a 5 to 10 
percent decline in hog prices and virtually no decline in gross income from 
sales (18.1). 
TWO ALTERNATIVES FOR WHEAT PRICE POLICY 
There are two basic alternatives for public farm policy in the 1960's. One is 
to reduce farm marketings to levels consistent with publicly-chosen price policies, 
primarily through government action. The other is to end effort to control market-
ings, and to permit prices to fall to long-run equilibrium levels. In each case, public 
storage programs might be ended, or used to stabilize prices by spreading the 
supply of commodities over short periods, and to maintain necessary reserves 
for public emergencies. 
Limiting the alternatives to two implies that it will become politically im-
possible in the 1960's to continue a farm policy which adds regularly to govern-
ment stocks as in the 1950's. There is surely some upper limit to the expendi-
tures the American people will make to support farm prices. Some level of 
physical stocks of farm commodities would finally produce a genuine revolt at 
the futility of the farm output policy followed during the 1950's. 
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Price policy is the heart of public policy toward commercial agriculture in 
the 1960's; choices with respect to it will be made at two levels. The question 
of whether to choose, as policy, to keep farm prices at levels higher than they 
would be without such policy must be answered first. Basically, this reduces to : 
shall the U.S. continue extensive government intervention in the farm economy? 
If the answer is "No," the ·price policy is given: we shall accept farm prices, not 
choose them. In that case, problems of equity among groups of people in the 
U.S. may require action by Congress, and may be as difficult as the choice of 
price policies. 
However, if the people in the U.S. in the 1960's choose to raise farm prices 
above the levels of the late 1950's (as both political parties promised in 1960) 
or to maintain them above levels to which they might fall in the absence of a 
positive price policy, two further choices arise. The first is the price level itself 
-for farm products generally and for wheat. Choices there will be guided not 
only by the demands of wheat growers for income, but also by opinions of other 
groups about the proper level of prices to be administered by the government. 
These choices will have important ethical undertones, but will be made partly on the 
basis of political power. 
Choice of a farm price level cannot be neatly separated from the second 
problem-the means by which it is to be achir.ved. With indefinite public acquisi-
tions of farm wmmodity stocks ruled out, a positive price policy must be implemented by 
a conscious output policy. Specific arrangements such as two-price plans or forms of 
land retirement are not the main issue in output policy, although the choice of 
adminisurative framework is important. The quantity of wheat to be produced or 
marketed each year from current production is the critical issue. In the early 
1960's, this quantity must be less than the quantity which can be used for all 
purposes, if wheat stocks are to be reduced. 
If the price policy for other farm commodities, especially feed grains, is not 
to be disrupted by the expected shift of resources from wheat, resources which 
have been producing surplus wheat must be turned to nonuse, to less intensive 
uses, or to nonfarm production. The means by which output policy for wheat and farm 
production generally may be implemented are either to adopt direct marketing restrictions, 
or to retire enough resources to redm·e farm output to levels which would give the desired 
prices. Clearly, the two could be used jointly-selective marketing quotas, and 
land retirement keyed to commodities or regions. 
Differences between these two approaches to output policy are not fundamental. One 
would limit marketings; the other, production. Each would aim at achievement of farm 
price goals without accumulating stocks. Results from the use of either, although 
broadly predictable, will remain unknown until tested. Both c·an be carried on in 
a framework of traditional freedom of managerial decision and a minimum of federal 
regulation. . 
Cochrane has estimated that direct control of about two thirds of all farm 
marketings-some 20 to 30 farm commodities-would be sufficient to imple-
ment a consistent price policy ( 4). 
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Bottum estimated that if 40 to 60 million crop acres were taken from culti-
vation, the price level of the late 1950's could be maintained without chronic 
excess output (22) . The 1960 farm program proposals of the President called for 
a land retirement program of 60 million acres by 1963, implicitly to keep farm 
prices from falling, or to raise them. 
The problem of the early 1960's, however, is not the choice of the ideal ar-
rangement to control all farm output. It is rather to discover politically feasible 
ways to begin effective control. 
A WHEAT SUPPLY CONTROL PROGRAM 
The major flaw of the wheat program of the 1950's was the open-end com-
mitment by the federal government to support the price of all wheat which 
could be produced on a specified acreage at a pre-announced level. An equally 
important flaw was the failure to reduce total farm resource use, insuring in-
creased feed grain production. If prices are ro be maintained bur stocks not ac-
cumulated, the wheat supply must be limited to the quantity which can be sold 
in the market near the support price. If other commodity supply and price 
problems are not to be worsened by improvement in the wheat program, wheat 
resources must be retired from use with the change in the wheat program. 
The Marketing Quota 
For wheat prices from $1.30 to $2.40 per bushel (55 ro 100 percent of 
parity) , the expected demand is no greater than 700 million bushels a year for 
U.S. food and cash exports. It may be less. This quantity of wheat can be pro-
duced on 33 million harvested acres at the 1954-58 national average yield (21.3 
bu. per acre). Only the public acting through Congress can determine what the 
national acreage and marketings should be if a supply control program is adopt-
ed. A bill introduced in the second session of the 86th Congress specified a 
a marketing quota of 150 million bushels less than totai domestic used and ex-
ports (S.3159) . This appeared to be near 800 to 850 million bushels for the early 
1960's, and would have permitted the disposal of surplus stocks in about five 
years. 
A marketing quota distributed according to the 1958 acreage allotment and 
1954-58 averaged yields by states is shown in table 28. Producers would be per-
mitted to market 800 million bushels for milling and export, 73 percent of 
average yearly production from 1955 to 1959. In addition, about 100 million 
bushels would be used for seed and feed if the wheat price were somewhat above 
feed value. The expected U.S. wheat acreage would be near 42 million; 
about 38 million acres would be needed to produce the annual sales quota at 
1954-58 yields (table 28). 
On several counts, wheat is an ideal commodity with which to start an ex-
perimental supply control program in the early 1960's. Congress has debated 
bills including bushel quotas for several years . The total wheat supply may be 
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TABLE 28-WHEAT: HYPOTHETICAL ACREAGE ALLOTMENTS AND MARKETING 
QUOTAS, IF QUOTAS WERE DISTRIBUTED TO STATES ACCORDING TO THE 
1958 DISTRIBUTION OF ACREAGE ALLOTMENTS AND AVERAGE WHEAT 
YIELDS, 1954-58. 
Acreage allotments 
1958a 196lb 
Marketing quota Potential 
diversiond 
thousand thousand %of u:s. thousand 
acres acres allotment Million bu. c % acres 
Calif. 445 300 .8 6.5 .8 145 
Colo. 2,705 1,840 4.9 32.1 4.0 865 
Idaho 1,153 795 2.1 26.8 3.4 358 
m. 1,387 939 2.5 29.2 3.7 448 
Ind. 1,137 783 2.1 23.6 3.0 354 
Kansas 10,638 7,249 19.3 140.5 17.6 3,389 
Mich. 965 676 1.8 21.5 2.7 289 
Minn. 730 488 1.3 11.0 1.4 242 
Mo. 1,274 864 2.3 25.3 3.2 410 
Mont. 4,058 2,779 7.4 57.8 7.2 1,279 
Nebr. 3,228 2,216 5.9 56.1 7.0 1,012 
New Mex. 474 338 .9 4.3 .5 136 
N.Y. 316 225 .6 7.4 .9 91 
N.C. 283 192 .5 4.3 .5 91 
N.Dak. 7,310 4,995 13.3 85.1 10.6 2,315 
Ohio 1,553 1,052 2.8 29.1 3.6 501 
Okla. 4,860 3,305 8.8 52.6 6.6 1,555 
Oregon 816 563 1.5 18.0 2.3 253 
Penn. 588 413 1.1 11.5 1.4 175 
S.Dak. 2,736 1,878 5.0 28.9 3.6 858 
Texas 4,164 2,854 7.6 39.6 5.0 1,310 
Utah 316 225 .6 4.7 .6 91 
Va. 259 175 .5 4.3 .5 84 
Wash. 2,014 1,390 3.7 46.2 5.8 624 
Wyo. 292 197 .5 3.9 .5 95 
Other 
states 1,283 827 2.2 29.7 3.6 456 
Total, 
u.s. 54,984 37,558 100.0 800.0 100.0 17,426 
a. Table A5; states with less than one half of one percent of national allotment 
omitted. 
b. For illustration only; percentages in column 3, times implicit national acreage 
allotment of 37,558,000 harvested acres required to produce the sales quota at 
1954-58 average yield of 21.3 bushels. 
c. Acreage allotment, column 2, times 1954-58 average yields by states. 
d. Column 1 minus column 2. About 4 million acres of this ~and would be used to 
produce wheat for seed and feed (at 1954-58 average level of wheat feeding), 
leaving 13 to 14 million acres to be taken from production. 
three times needed carryover by the time a new program could begin, since the 
1962 crop is the earliest which can be limited. High public costs of acquisition 
and storage add to the urgency of effective supply control. In addition, much 
land producing wheat in the Great Plains was first cultivated under the pull of 
wartime demands, as shown earlit>r. There is public support to return much of 
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that land to less intensive uses for conservation purposes, as well as to cut 
wheat production. 
Since wheat harvested was near 55 million acres in the late 1950's, about 14 
million acres recently producing wheat would be available for other uses after 
all market demands for wheat were met and 150 million bushels sold out of 
stocks (table 28, column 4 less 3 to 4 million acres for feed and seed). This 
acreage to be retired from cultivation would be located roughly as shown in 
table 28 (column 6), if marketing quotas were distributed on the basis of historic 
acreage or production. It would be concentrated in Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, 
Montana, Nebraska, and Colorado, the states in which much new land was 
plowed in the 1940's. But the retired acreage would be located in long-established 
wheat areas such as central Kansas, as well as in new producing areas, unless special 
methods were prescribed to concentrate the land diverted from wheat in the western-most 
areas of the Great Plains-those first cultivated in the last 20 years. Studies have in-
dicated the desirability (for economic efficiency) of concentrating retired land in those 
areas (21). There are also important objections, from the standpoint of community 
problems arising out of changing land use. 
Farm Income 
If the aggregate income from wheat production were to be maintained or 
increased by a program such as detailed in table 28, either a higher wheat price 
or payments for land retirement would be required to offset reduced marketings. 
Without substantial direct treasury payments, either for land retirement or as 
outright income supplements, the price of wheat would have to be increased to 
near 100 percent of parity or $2.40 per bushel if the aggregate gross income 
from wheat production were not to decline under the program outlined in table 
28. 
Yearly gross income from wheat other than seed, based on 1954-58 produc-
tion and 1958-60 prices (table A1), has been about $1,800 million. At the same 
price ($1.75), gross income from an 800 million bushel marketing quota would 
be $1,400 million, 78 percent of the recent average. Land excluded from produc-
ing wheat for sale would add to gross income through 50 to 70 million bushels 
fed annually ($75 to $100 million). About 14 million acres retired from cultiva-
tion for an average payment of $15 per acre (for example) for a specified period 
would add $210 million yearly to gross farm income. 
Total gross income from wheat would thus be about $1,700 million, 94 
percent of the average in the late 1950's. If Congrt"ss did not authorize price 
increases to offset reduced marketings, wheat producers would absorb a small 
decrease in gross income and net income. With an 800 million bushel quota and 
land retirement at $15 per acre, a wheat price of about $1 .90 per bushel (80 percent of 
parity) would maintain aggregate incomes of wheat produ,·ers at about the level of the 
late 1950's. If income from wheat production were to be increased, either larger 
treasury payments for land retirement, a substantially higher price for wheat, a 
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larger annual marketing quota, or some combination of tht>se methods would 
be required. 
Disposition of Stocks 
With a marketing quota of 800 million bushels, about half the annual de-
mand to be shipped under Public Law 480, would be met from government-
owned stocks. In five years stocks could be reduced to 500 million bushels if 
current rates of P.L. 480 shipments were continued. A larger marketing quota 
would lengthen the period of carryover reduction and increase the cost of its 
maintenance. 
The Price Level 
The choice of a price level to go with the marketing quota described would 
rest with Congress, representing producers and consumers. It cannot be decided 
chiefly by formula, but a formula can be written to describe a price level negoti-
ated politically which represents a compromise between divergent interests and 
includes a presumption of fairness in income distribution. 
These points are relevant to the choice of a price level. 
1. Wheat producers and their representatives will be reluctant to accept a cut 
in gross income from wheat, and will prefer a price support increase to offset 
the cut in marketings. 
2. Consumers may expect that any substantial price increase will result in higher 
prices for cereal products at least equal tO the increased cost of wheat to pro-
cessors. This is confirmed by the 1933-35 experience and is not now seriously 
questioned. Consumer representatives may be expected, on the basis of ex-
perience, to oppose large and general farm price increases. An increase of one 
fourth in all farm prices (to 100 percent of parity as now defined) would cause 
food prices to rise about 10 percent and the consumer price index, a fairly sensi-
tive indicator of consumer real income, to go up 2 or 3 percent. 
There are far more significant forces producing inflation in the economy than 
farm prices, long deflationary. Yet, a public which lacks the ability to prevent 
most price increases, may be expected to try to exercise some of tht" authority 
it has over farm prices in order to hold food prices down. 
3. A higher price for wheat with an excess supply equal to one year's needs is a 
major but not unprecedented contradiction. Clearly, higher wheat prices 
would be more defensible if the wheat surplus were gone. 
4. Low-income people would pay a disproportionate share of tht" small added 
food cost resulting from a higher wheat price, since they eat more cereal 
foods (63.1). A few wheat producers with relatively large acreages (and pos-
sibly with relatively high incomes) would receive a large share of the pro-
ceeds. Yet the increased cost per consumer per year would amount to less than $2 
even if the wheat price were raised one third (to 100 percent of parity). And only a 
small percentage of U.S. wheat is produced on what are commonly classed as "very 
large" farms. 
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An Alternative Allocation of Marketing Quotas 
To allocate marketing quotas on the basis of past allotments (table 28) , 
and without regard to the df'mand for wheat produced in different locations is 
an unsatisfactory procedure, but one now established. Marketings of soft red and 
white wheats would be cut at least as much as other classes even though they are 
not in surplus supply. 
An alternative method of :lllocating the national marketing quota among 
states (and producers) would be on the basis of production hiscory, not acreage 
allotments. Producers who did not use their acreagl" allotments under the pro-
gram of the 1950's would not receive marketing quotas, for they would lack 
production history. Producers planting under the marketing quota exemption of 
the 1950's would receive marketing quotas based on credit for production under 
the exemption. This method of quota allocation shown in table 29 appears to 
TABLE 29-WHEAT: HISTORIC PRODUCTION AND PROJECTED MARKETING 
QUOTAS IF QUOTAS WERE DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO UNADJUSTED 
PRODUCTION HISTORY; STATES WITH MORE THAN 0.5 PERCENT OF 
1958 WHEAT ACREAGE ALLOTMENT. 
Average 
production Percent Marketing 
1950-59a of quota 
(thousand bu.) production (million bu.)b 
California 9,793 .8 6.4 
Colorado 37,818 3.5 28.0 
Idaho 41,404 3.8 30.4 
nlinois 45,025 4.1 32.8 
Indiana 35,461 3.3 26.4 
Kansas 180,356 16.6 133.0 
Michigan 33,498 3.1 24.8 
Minnesota 17,223 1.6 12.8 
Missouri 35,951 3,3 26.4 
Montana 92,709 8.5 68.0 
Nebraska 80,380 7.4 59.2 
New Mexico 1,758 .2 1.6 
New York 10,305 .9 7.2 
North Carolina 7,833 .7 5.6 
North Dakota 112,717 10.3 82.4 
Ohio 44,502 4.1 32.8 
Oklahoma 66,618 6.1 48.8 
Oregon 27,643 2.5 20.0 
Pennsylvania 17,337 1.6 12.8 
South Dakota 33,970 3.1 24.8 
Texas 32,697 3.0 24.0 
Utah 6,988 .6 4.8 
Virginia 6,954 ,6 4.8 
Washington 71,521 6.6 52.8 
Wyoming 5,979 .6 4.8 
Other states 33,200 3.1 24.8 
Total U.s. 1,089,640 100.0 800.0 
a. (55) and (69); see also footnotes to table 28. 
b. Column 3 times 800 million bushels. 
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cut Texas marketings by 40 percent (from the hypothetical quota of table 28), 
Colorado by 13 peru·nt. anrl Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota and North 
Dakota by smaller amounts. Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Oregon, and 
Washington, chiefly soft red and white wheat states, would have larger shares of 
the marketing quota (t8bles 28 and 29 compared). Adjustments for abnormal 
conditions in the base years would change these results numerically, especially 
for Texas which had a sustained drought in the base period. 
Negotiable Marketing Certificates 
The marketing quota distribution of table 29, however, would not key the 
location of marketing permits to demand. It would permit roughly the foilow-
ing wheat sales by classes (according to the 1954 distribution of production by 
classes): 
1. Hard red winter: 400 million bu.; twice domestic food use, and far above 
food us<"' plus cash exports. 
2. Hard red spring: 155 million bu.; 125 percent of domestic food use. 
3. Soft red winter: 110 million bu.; about 10 million bushels greater than domes-
tic use but less than domestic use and cash exports . 
4. White: 115 million bushels; more than double recent domestic food use, and 
enough for domestic use plus cash exports. 
5. Durum: 15 million bushels; about 60 percent of usual domestic use. 
Clearly, with an 800 million bushel marketing quota not transferable among 
farms and regions, a considerable acreage shift to soft red winter wheat, or sub-
stitution in use of other classes for soft red and durum, would be necessary. But 
if marketing certificates were made negotiable among producers and regions, the 
system could quickly adjust to the demand for wheat, even though the initial 
distribution did not conform to it. A wide array of suggestions for doing this 
have appeared, ranging from complete negotiability of privately-owned market-
ing rights at a price, to a requirement that the government own and assign such 
rights from year to year (21). 
It i.r important that some ~f the jlexibilit;• inherent in negotiable marketing rights be 
written into wheat leJ;i.rlation. if Conyress chooses the supply control method. Local and 
regional interests may find this difficult to accept, but safeguards to prevent im-
mediate large-scale transfer of marketing rights among communities and states 
could be provided. 
Multiple Price Plans 
Multiple-pricing plans for wheat, long proposed by several farm organiza-
tions, originally included unlimited production and marketing, and an admini-
stered price only on wheat used for food in the U.S. (13). In theory, the U.S. 
price would fall to the world price, and wheat produced in excess of domestic 
needs would be exported or fed. In practice, neither the world nor the feed market 
can absorb appreciable quantities of wheat without stress. To avoid extremely low prices 
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and possible underselling of the International Wheat Agreement, any multiple-pricing 
plan for wheat in the early 1960's would have control of market supplies as its key 
feature. This was recognized in the revised versions of the domestic parity (multi-
ple-price) plan for wheat proposed to the 86th Congress as the Wheat Stabiliza-
tion Plan (S.1484). 
This version of the two-price plan for wheat included an 840 million bush-
el wheat marketing quota to be sold in the market at a price administered near 
$1.55 per bushel. Five hundred million bushels would have been processed as 
food, and processors would have paid an additional $0.80 per bushel to a govern-
ment agency, which would have sent it to producers with domestic marketing 
quotas; producers would have received 100 percent of parity on about 60 percent 
of their marketings-65 percent of parity as the market price at the point of 
sale and 35 percent from processors via government. The average price for all 
sales under the marketing quota would have been about 85 percent of parity. 
Producers would have been paid to retire 10 to 12 million acres from produc-
tion; they would have netted more from the reduced sales plus cash payments than 
from larger sales at lower prices in the late 1950's. Stocks would haVf• been reduced 
by an expected 100 million bushels per year, since the proposed marketing quota 
was large enough to provide only parr of the annual requirements of P.L. 480. 
The benefits claimed for this program can be gained without reference to 
multiple pricing of the kind proposed and with only a small increase in the 
cost of wheat for milling. A single price support of85 percent of parity ($2.00) 
on marketing quota wheat, up only 20 cents per bushel or about 10 percent of 
parity from the 1958-60 price support, would yield about the same gross income 
as the two-price arrangement without the administrative complications of multi-
ple pricing. This was recognized in S.3159 (86th Congress, second session), 
drafted by major farm groups which had formerly advocated other approaches. 
A major objection to earlier multiple-pricing proposals, the size of the in-
crease in the price of flour and bread, would have been only partly overcome by 
S.3159 since price increases would be passed on to consumers in any case. Also, 
the export subsidy for wheat, which would have continued and increased under 
S.3159, would be more costly under th~" single price proposal described here than 
under the 1954-60 wheat program. 
Direct Treasury Payments to Wheat Producers 
Control of market supplies would also be the essential feature of any ad-
ministrative arrangement built around direct payments to producers. If such pay-
ments were not to be a record burden on the treasury, marketings would need 
to be limited to prevent large price declines. Otherwise, the per unit payment 
required to bring returns to producers up to goals set by congress would be 
large and the total cost high. With marketings limited and prices maintained 
near goal levels, the role of treasury payments would be to compensate for large 
errors in setting marketing quotas resulting in large deviations from the goal 
70 
price. Treasury payments would be occasional and minor in such a program; supply 
control would be the key factor. 
An alternative approach would be to control marketings only to the extent 
needed to hold prices near world levels -near $1.20 per bushel on midwestern 
farms. The subsidy required now on cash exports would be ended, and the cost 
ofwheat for food reduced by one third. Treasury payments would be used as 
major incomt> supplements, and could be very costly. To provide an average re-
turn of about $2 per bushel to farmers would require payments of about $0.80 
per bushel or from $800 to $900 million per year. Savings of $100 million yearly 
on the export subsidy, $200 to $400 million per year on CCC aquisitions, and 
over $300 million per year on wheat storage and handling, would partly oflset 
the cost of direct payments. 
A FREE MARKET FOR AGRICULTURE 
If the wheat program were ended, it would probably be as part of a general 
retreat from government activity in U.S. agriculture, not an isolated case of dis-
illusionment with a commodity program. So many variations in procedure can 
be foreseen, it is useless to project a specific timetable of returning farm price 
setting to the market. Instead, a report prepared in 1960 for the Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry of the U.S. Senate under a set of stated assumptions is 
summarized (50) . 
Major assumptions included both a stable general price level, no rise in 
prices paid by farmers and continued increases in population and personal in-
come at rates of the late 1950's. 
Important agricultural assumptions were that price supports would be re-
duced to levels which would permit stock reductions in 7 to 10 years, that 
foreign aid using farm products would continue at recent levels, and that 30 
million acres would be in the conservation reserve. Both the conservation re-
serve and foreign aid tend to hold farm prices up, while reducing stocks (through 
sales) would reduce prices. 
Effects on wheat production and prices were estimated as follows: 
"Under the assumption of no acreage controls, the acreage seeded to wheat is 
projected to increase to 64 million acres in 1960 and then gradually decline to 61 
million by 1965. The 61 million acres would be 8 percent above 1955-57 and 4 
percent above 1959. These figure are not greatly different from those of other peri-
ods when acreage controls were not in effect, such as the 10-year period 1923-32 
which preceded the inauguration of production-adjustment and price support pro-
grams or those of 1939, 1940, and 1943-45, years in which no marketing quotas 
were in effect and before the postwar increase in export demand. Harvested acre-
age is projected at 89 percent of seeded acreage and ranges from 57 million acres 
in 1960 to 54.3 acres in 1965. Projected yields per harvested acre increase from 21 
bushels in 1960 to 23 in 1965. The. resulting production figure for 1965 is 1,250 
million bushels, compared with 963 million bushels in 1955-57. 
age and ranges from 57 million acres in 1960 to 54.3 acres in 1965. Projected 
yields per harvested acre increase from 21 bushels in 1960 to 23 in 1965. The re-
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suiting production figure for 1965 is 1,250 million bushels, compared with 963 
million bushels in 1955-57. 
"Including projected importS of 8 million bushels in 1960 and 2 million per 
year thereafter, total supply reaches a peak of 2,668 million bushels in the 1961 
crop marketing year and then declines to 1,988 for the 1965 marketing year. 
"Projected ·exportS increase from 450 million bushels in 1960 to 550 million 
bushels in 1964 and 1965. This latter figure is 27 percent higher than 1955-57. 
These export projections assume that at competitive prices, the United States 
would capture most of the increase in the world export trade in wheat during the 
1960-65 period. Total world trade in wheat and flour has been expanding at a rate 
of about 3 percent annually. 
"Per capita food use is projected at present levels and total food use increases 
in line with the increase in population. 
"Projected use of wheat as livestock feed increases sharply from current levels 
of 60 million bushels to 385 million bushels in 1965. The increase stems from 
the projected prices which are based on the price of wheat for export without sub-
sidy. Producer prices at 90 cents per bushel during the 1961-65 period would be 
competitive with corn and would encourage large-scale feeding of wheat. The pro-
jected prices would be less than one half of the average for 1955-57. 
"Projected cash receipts from wheat at $976 million for 1965 would be about 
56 percent of the 1955-57 average." 
Applied to individual farm situations, those conditions would have the fol-
lowing results: 
"Specialized wheat producers would be affected most adversely. A southern 
plains winter wheat farm with 335 acres of cropland which in 1955-57 produced 
200 acres of wheat, SO acres of sorghum grain, and 55 acres of other crops, under 
the conditions outlined above, would be expected to increase its wheat acreage 30 
percent and reduce its acreage of other crops. Because of the lower prices, how-
ever, gross cash receipts would drop by one third and net cash rel'f!ipts ~y about 60 per-
cent. 
"A wheat-fallow farm in the Pacific Northwest with 935 acres of cropland in 
1955-57 producing 300 acres of wheat and 150 acres of feed crops, under the 1960-
65 conditions outlined above would increase wheat production to about 400 acres 
and decrease feed grain production. However, the lower prices would cause a 40-
percent drop in gross cash receipts and a drop in net cash receipts of abollt 75 per-
cent." 
Other studies done in 1959-60 support these conclusions for wheat and farm 
products in general. No known studies dissent from them. Lacking recent ex-
perience with the free market situation assumed, we must rely on .expert testi-
mony of the type presented or choose public policy in the dark. 
72 
REFERENCES 
1. Bennett, M. K., "World wheat utilization since 1885-86," Food Research Instirute, 
Wheat studies, Stanford University, California, Vol. 12, 1935-36. 
2. Bogue, Donald J. editor "Farm population and the agricultural labor force in 
1975," The popzdation .rituation in the U.S. in 1975. Scripps Foundation for Research 
on Population Problems (Miami, 0. University) and Population Research and 
Training Center (University of Chicago), 1957. 
3. Boyn-Orr, Lord John, "The food problem," Scientiju· Ame1·ican, August, 1950. 
3.1. Casady, A.]., "New prospects in sorghum hybrids tor Kansas," Department of 
Agronomy, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas. 1957, (mimeo). 
4. Cochrane, Willard W. , "Further reHccrions on supply control," journal of Farm 
Economics, February. l96Q. 
5. Collins, Norman R., Income advantage to the specialized grain producing firm from 
flexible compared with inflexible use of resources, Kansas Agricultural Experiment Sta-
tion Technical Bulletin 87, September 1956. 
6. Daly, Rex F., " Projections of United States demand for food and fiber in 1975," 
Policy for commercial agriculture, Joint Economic Committee, 85th Cong; 1st Ses-
sion, 1957, p. 108-118. 
7. Davis, Joseph S., "AAA as a force in recovery," joumal of Farm Economics, Vol. 14, 
February, 1935. 
8. Davis, Joseph S., Wheat and the AAA, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 
1935. 
9. Dayal, R., "Demand tor food in tht> second five year plan," The agricultural situa-
tion in India, Ocrober 1956. 
10. Dose, Jeanne E., An interregional analysis of the three major wheat producing regions 
in the United States, unpublished Ph.D. thesis Harvard University, 1958. 
11. Ezekial, Mordecai and Louis H. Bean, Economic bases for the agricultural adjustment 
act, WashingtOn, United Stares Government Printing Office, 1933. 
12. Farnsworth, Helen C., "The role of wheat in improving nutritional status and 
labor productivity in lesser developed countries," Proceedings of the international 
wheat surplus utilization conference. South Dakota State College, 1958. 
13. farnsworth, Helen C., Multiple pricing of American wheat, Food Research Institute, 
Stanford University, California, 1958. 
14. Foote, Richard J. and Hyman Weingarten, "How research results can be used to 
analyze alternative governmental policies," Agrimltural economics research, Vol. 
VIII, No. 2, April 1956. 
15. Fox, Karl A., The ana~ysis of demand for farm products, USDA tech. bul. No. 1081 , 
1953. 
16. Goreux, L., " Long-range projections of food consumption," Monthly bulletin of 
agricultural economics and statistics. Vol. 6, 1957. U.N., FAO, Rome. 
17. Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Ministry of Com-
munity Development and Cooperation. Report on India's food crisis and steps to meet 
it, April, 1959. 
18. Gray, Roger, Vernon L. Sorenson and Willard W. Cochrane, An economic analysis 
of the impact of govemment programs on the potato industry of the United States, North 
central regional publication No. 42, University of Minnesota agr. exp. sta. techn. 
bul. 211, 1954. 
18.1 H alcrow, H. G. and T. A. Hieronymus, "Parity prices in their economic con-
text," j ournal of Farm Economics, Dec. 1959, p. 1289-1306. 
19. Hanau, Arthur and H. B. Krohn, The long run demand outlook for West German agri-
culture, Arthur Strothe, Hanover, Germany. 
73 
20. Hemphill, •Perry V. and Donald E. Anderson, The effects of wheat support programs 
on North Dakota agriculture, North Dakota agr. exp. sta., 1958. 
21. Iowa State University, Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment, Dy-
namics of land use: needed adjustment, Proceedings of a conference, May 1960. 
22. Iowa State University, Proceedings of feed-livestock workshop, 1959. Ames, Iowa. 
23 . International Wheat Council, World wheat statistics, London, Haymarket House, 
1956. 
24. International Wheat Council, World wheat statistics, London, Haymarket House, 
1959. 
25. Jureen, L., "Long-term trends in food consumption: a multi-country study," Eco-
nometrica, 24:1-21, 1958. 
26. Kindleberger, Charles P., Economi,· development, McGraw-Hill, N. Y., 1958. 
27. Lavell, Robert J., "The household market for grain products," The national food 
situation . July 1958. 
28. Malenbaum, Wilfred, The world wheat economy, 1885-1939, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953. 
29. Meinken, Kenneth W ., The demand and price structure for wheat, USDA tech. bul. 
1136, Washington, 1955. 
30. Montgomery, George, Wheat price policy in the United States, 1954. Kansas State 
College Dept. of Economics and Sociology, 1954. (Mimeo) 
31. National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Recommended dietary 
allowances, Washington, 1953. 
32. Nerlove, Marc, The dynamics of supply, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. 
33. Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Third report on agricultural 
policies in Europe and North America, October 1958, Paris. 
34. Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agriculturctf discontent in the Middle- West, 
1900-39., University of Wisconsin Press, 1951. 
35. Schruben, L. W . and Mrs. R. E. Clifton, How to save when buying feed grains, Kansas 
Agr. Exp. Sta. Cir. 299, 1956. 
36. Schultz, Henry, The theory and measurement of demand, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1938. 
37: Shepherd, G. S., Agricultural price policy, Iowa State College Press, Ames, 1947. 
37.1 Shepherd, G. S., unpublished research paper, October 1959, Iowa State University. 
38. Smith, M. G., Francis B. McCormick and Donald D . Steward, An analysis of 
Ohio farmers views and responses to the wheat price support and control program, Ohio 
State University Department of agr. econ. and rural sociology mimeo bul. No. A. 
E. 258, 1955. 
39. Smith, M. G., Francis B. McCormick and Robert J. McCoy, An analysis of Ohio 
wheat grower's views and responses in 1956 to federal agriculture policies, Ohio State 
University Dept. of agr. econ. and rural sociology mimeo bul. No. A. E. 270, 1956. 
40. Spencer, Carroll, D ., The impact of acreage allotments and marketing quotas on central 
and western Kansas farm.r, unpublished M.S. thesis, Kansas State University, 1957. 
41. United Nations, The future growth of world population, Population studies no. 28, 
New York, 1958. 
42. United Nations, Functions of a world food reserve, FAO commodity policy studies, 
no. 10, Rome, 1956. 
42.1 United Nations, F.A.O. National grain policies, Rome 1959. 
43. United Nations, F.A.O. Produ,"tion and use of cereals, major trends and outlook, Rome, 
1957, Mimeograph FA0/57/2/1006. 
44. United Nations, F.A.O., Uses of agricultural surpluses to finance economic develop-
ment in underdeveloped countries, a pilot study in India, F.A.O. commodity policy 
st~dies no. 6, Rome, 1956. 
74 
45. United Nations, FAO, Yearbook of food and agriculture statistics, Vol. XI, part 1. 
New York. 
46. U.S. Congress, House document no. 206, Tenth semiannual report on activities 
carried on under Public Law 480, 83rd Congress, as amended. 86th Congress, 1st 
session, 1959. 
47. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives hearings, Increased industrial uses of agri-
cultural commodities, 86th Congress, 1st session, 1959. 
48. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives hearings, Wheat, part 1, serial pp. 85th 
Congress, 2d session, 1958. 
49. U.S. Congress, Senate document no. 18, Possible methods of improving the parity 
formula, 85th Congress, 1st Session; 1957. 
50. U.S. Congress, Senate document no. 77, Farm price and im·ome projections under 
conditions approximating free production and marketing of agricultural commodities, 
86th Congress, 2d session, 1960. 
51. U.S. Senate hearings, Wheat programs, 86th Congress, 1st session, 1959. 
52. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural adjustment, U.S. Govt. Printing Of-
fice, Washington, 1934. 
53. U.S.D.A., Agricultural adjustment, 1937-38, 1939. 
54. U.S.D . .t\,, Agricultural policies of foreign governments, Agr. handbook no. 132, 1957. 
55. U.S.D.A., Agricultural statistics, (annual). 
56. U.S.D.A., Asian agricultural po!ides, 1956. 
57. U.S.D.A., Classification of wheat 11arieties grown in the United States in 1949, Tech. 
Bul. No. 1083, Washington, 1953. 
58. U.S.D.A., Compilation oj statutes, Agriculture handbook No. 158, 1959. 
59. U.S.D.A. , Crop production, (monthly and annual summary). 
60. U.S.D.A., Distribution of varieties and classes of wheat in the United States in 1954, 
Agr. handbook no. 108, 1957. 
61. U.S.D.A., Effects of acreage-allotment programs, 1954 and 1955, Production research 
report no. 3, 1956. 
62. U.S.D.A., Field and seed crops by states, 1949-54, Stat. bul. no. 208, 1957. 
63. U.S.D.A., Grain production and marketing, Misc. pub. no. 692, 1949. 
63.1 U.S.D.A., Household food consumption survey, 1955, reports 1-10, Washington, D.C. , 
1956. 
64. U.S.D.A., Marketing margins for white bread, Misc. pub. no. 712, 1959. 
65. U.S.D.A., Supplement for 1956 to Consumption of food in the United States, 1909-52, 
Agricultural handbook no. 62, Washington, 1957. 
66. U.S.D.A., The problem of maintaining high level agricultural exports, Washington, 
1957. 
67. U.S.D.A., Wheat: acreage, yield, production by states, 1866-1943, Stat. bul. No. 158, 
1955. 
68. U.S.D.A., Wheat production, Agr. inf. bul. no. 179, Washington, 1958. 
69. U.S.D.A., Wheat situation, (periodical). 
70. United States Department of Commerce, Climatic summary of the United States, 
Supplement for 1931 through 1952 (by states) U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, 1956. 
71. U. S. Department of State, World food production and requirements, Intelligence re-
port no. 8148, 1959. 
72. Wetmore, John M., Marrin E. Abel, Elmer W. Learn and Willard W. Cochrane, 
Policies for expanding the demand for farm food products in the United States; Univer-
sity of Minnesota agr. exp. sta. tech. bul. 231, April1959. 
73. Winkleman, Donald L. Some factors affecting the wheat supply in Nebraska, unpub-
lished M.S. Thesis, University of Nebraska, 1957. 
75 
TABLE AI-PRICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS, 
N ahonal average Nat, av, pnce reed. by 
Price support operation price support level farmers comp, w/par, 
Parity Support Support Season Price reed. 
YE!ar Owned by Under price support for rate rate as av. price by farmers 
begin- Production CCC on Purchase % of Deliveries price per %or reed. by as% of 
ning lall wheat) Jull1 Loans agreements Total crJ>p to CCC suworta bushel parity farmersb panty July 1 1 3 4 5 7 9 10 11 
(1000 bu.) (1000 bu.) (1000 bU.) (1000 bU.) (1000 bU.) (%) (1000 bu.) ($) ($) (%) ($) (%) 
1932-33 756.307 1.10 ,375 34 
1933-34 552,215 .911 .736 81 
1934-35 526,052 1.08 ,839 78 
1935-36 628,227 1.12 
.827 74 
193t:~37 629,880 1.10 1.02 93 
1937-38 873,914 1.21 
.959 79 
1938- 39 919,913 65,745 65,745 9.3 15,723 1. 14 .59 52 .556 49 
1939-40 741,210 6,043 167,702 167,702 22,6 7,700 1.12 .63 56 .686 61 
1940-41 814,646 1,605 278,430 278,430 34.2 173,661 1.13 .64 57 ,674 60 
1941-42 941,970 169,159 366,326 366,326 38.9 269,807 1,15 .98 65 ,939 82 )> 
1942-43 969,381 319, 689c 408,136 408,136 42.1 184,031 1.34 1.14 85 1.09 81 ., .._. 
1943-44 643,813 259,604c 130,170 130,170 15.4 267 1.45 1.23 65 1.35 93 
., 
0'-
"' 1944-45 1,060,111 99,075 180,413 180,413 17.0 72,858 1.50 1.35 90 1.41 94 z
1945-46 1,107,623 103,728 59,680 59,680 5.4 166 1.53 1.38 90 1.49 97 5! 
1946-47 1,152,118 21,967 21,987 1.9 1.65 1.49 90 1.90 115 >< 
1947-48 1,358,911 31,239 31,239 2.3 4 2.03 1.84 90 2.29 113 
1948-49 1,294,911 1 254,027 111,996 366,023 28.3 290,865 2.22 2.00 90 1.98 89 
1949-50 1,098,415 227,178 335,343 45,467 360,810 34,7 247,524 2.17 1.95 90 1.88 87 
1950-51 1,019,344 327,654 188,372 8,575 196,947 19.3 41,891 2.21 1.99 90 2.00 90 
1951-52 988,161 196,427 199,538 13,371 212,909 21.5 91,298 2.42 2.18 90 2,11 87 
1952-53 1,306,440 143,333 398,639 61,305 459,944 35.2 397,731 2.45 2.20 90 2,09 85 
1953-54 1,173,071 470,021 493,955 61,115 555,070 47,5 486,120 2,46 2,21 90 2.04 63 
1954-55 983,900 774,613 401,173 28,856 430,029 43.8 391,617 2.49 2.24 90 2.12 65 
1955-56 934,731 975,948 277,142 43,107 320,249 34.3 276,677 2.52 2.08 62.5 1.99 79 
1956-57 1,004,272 950,723 234,866 18,344 253,232 25.2 146,000e 2.42 2.00 82.6 1.97 81 
1957-58 950,662 823,946 223,561 32,770 d 256,331 27.0 193,000e 2.51 2.00 79.7 1.93 77 
1958 -59 1,461, 714 834,921 564, 127d 44,897 609,499d 41.7 515,oooe 2.43 1,82 75 1.72d 71d 
1959-60 1,128,151d 1,146,576 297,127d 19,904d 317,03ld 28.1 235,000e 2,41 1.81 75 1.75d 73 
(a) Generally m1d-June panty pnces. (b) State average pnces we1ghted by sales to obtam nahonal average. Pnces for years m wh1ch 
there was substantial volume of deliveries to CCC from loans and purchase agreements include an allowance for such deliveries valued at 
average loan rates, (c) Mostly supply-program inventory. Records do not show price support and supply inventories separately. 
(d) Preliminary. (e) Estimated. SOURCE: U.S.D,A., CSS, Washington, June, 1959. 
TABLE A2 -AVERAGE PRICE PER BUSHEL RECEIVED BY FARMERS AND SUPPORT PRICE OF WHEAT, 19 39-59.~ 
Year Price r eceiveo by farmers 
beginning 12 month Support July July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May July average price (dollars) 
1939 .56 .54 .73 .70 .73 .82 .84 .84 .85 .89 .81 .67 .69 .63 1940 .61 .60 .63 .68 .72 .72 .73 .68 .72 .76 .79 .83 .67 .64 1941 .86 .88 .96 .91 .93 1.02 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.00 1.00 .96 .94 .98 1942 .95 .95 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.10 1.18 1.20 1.23 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.09 1.14 1943 1.26 1.27 1.30 1.35 1.37 1.43 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.47 1.47 1.43 1. 35 1.23 1944 1.39 1.35 1.35 1.42 1.43 1.45 1.46 1.47 1.48 1.49 1.49 1.50 1.41 1.35 
1945 1.46 1.45 1.45 1.51 1.53 1.54 1.54 1.55 1.58 1.58 1. 7ob 1. 74 1.49 1.38 1946 1.87 1. 78 1. 79 1.88 1.89 1.93 1.91 1.99 2.44 2.40 2.39 2.18 1.90 1.49 1947 2.14 2.10 2.43 2.66 2.74 2.79 2.81 2.12 2.21 2.29 2.22 2.11 2.29 1.84 1948 2.03 1.96 1.97 1.98 2.04 2.05 2.02 1.94 1.98 2.00 2.00 1.86 1.98 2.00 
---1 1949 1.82 1. 79 1.87 1.89 1.90 1.93 1.92 1.93 1.98 2.01 2.04 1.93 1.88 1.95 
---1 1950 1.99 1.97 1.94 1.90 1.94 2.02 2.09 2.21 2. 12 2. 14 2.11 2.08 2.00 1.99 1951 2,05 2.05 2.07 2.10 2,19 2.22 2.20 2.18 2.20 2.18 2.13 2.06 2.11 2. 18 1952 1.98 2.04 2.09 2.07 2.13 2.12 2.10 2,04 2.10 2,08 2.06 1.88 2.09 2.20 1953 1.87 1.86 1.92 1.94 2.00 2.01 2.03 2.06 2.09 2.05 2.00 1.91 2.04 2.21 1954 2.00 2.03 2.07 2.08 2.12 2.12 2.14 2.13 2. 12 2.09 2.13 2,06 2.12 2.24 
1955 1.97 1.90 1.92 1.94 1.94 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.97 2,03 2,00 1,93 1.99 2.08 1956 1.90 1.93 1.95 1.98 2.05 2.07 2.09 2.07 2.07 2.05 1.98 1.91 1.97 2.00 1957 1.91 1.90 1.90 1.92 1.93 1.94 1.90 1.92 1.96 1.95 1.93 1. 70 1.93 2.00 1958 1.64 1.64 1.69 1. 73 1. 74 1. 73 1. 71 1. 74 1. 76 1. 77 1. 77 1.69 1. 75 1.82 1959 1. 70 1. 75 1. 72 1.76 1. 79 1. 79 1. 78 1.80 
Source: U.S.D.A. 
a. U.S. monthly price s are the result of weighting monthly State prices by production through May 1957. Beginning June 1957, 
monthly. State prices are weighted by estimated sales for the month. U.S. mar keting-year prices are the r esult of (1) 
weighting; State monthly prices by monthly sales to obtain State marketing-year ave r ages and (2) weighting the State 
marketing-year average by total sales for each State. Include s an allowance for unredeemed loans at average loan values. b. Does not include bonus payment of 30 cents per bushel delivered under the Government purchase program. 
TABLE A3-THE DISTRIBUTION OF SEEDED ACREAGE OF WHEAT IN THE UNITED STATES 
AMONG STATES AND REGIONS. 
1918-20 1928-30 1938-40 1944-46 1948-50 1954 
Acres %of Acres %of Acres %of Acres %of Acres %of Acres %of 
State and region (000) u.s. (000) u.s. (000) u.s. (000) u.s. (000) u.s. (000) u.s. Virginia and W. Va. 1,226 1.7 756 1.1 731 1.1 632 0.9 568 0. 7 364 0.6 
New York 463 0,6 275 0.4 304 0.4 312 0.5 436 0,6 361 0,6 
Pennsylvania 1,401 1,9 1,038 1.5 960 1.4 937 1.4 937 1.2 725 1.1 
Eastern states 3,090 4.2 2,069 3.0 1,995 2.9 1,881 2,7 1,941 2,5 1,450 2.3 
Ohio 2,819 3.9 1,973 2.9 2,134 3.1 2,019 2.9 2,309 3.0 1,759 2,8 
Indiana 2,624 3.6 1,908 2.8 1,650 2.4 2,436 2,1 1. 730 2,2 1,332 2.1 lllinois 3,806 5,2 2,666 3.9 2,030 3,0 1,341 2.0 1,753 2.3 1,608 2.6 
Michigan 1,026 1.4 806 1.2 827 1.2 955 1.4 1,297 1.7 1,036 1.7 Wisconsin 444 0.6 104 0.1 101 0,1 75 0,1 111 0,1 66 0,1 
Missouri 3,950 5,4 1,754 2,6 2,169 3,2 1,443 2,1 1,900 2,5 1,583 2.5 
Iowa 1,042 1.4 486 0.7 471 0.7 170 0,2 338 0.4 132 0.2 
Kentucky 732 1.0 271 0.4 512 0.8 473 0.7 400 0.5 316 0,5 
-...J · Tennessee 614 0.8 315 0,4 435 0,6 395 0.6 327 0.4 261 0,4 
00 Cornbelt s tates 17,057 23.3 10,283 15.0 10,329 15.1 8,307 12,1 10, 165 13.0 8,093 12,9 
Minnesota 3,260 4.5 1,521 22.2 1,932 2.8 1.283 1.9 1.124 1.5 754 1.2 
North Dakota 10,108 13.9 10,594 15.4 8,588 12.7 10,204 14.9 10,056 13.0 8,201 13.1 
South Dakota 3,760 5,2 3,813 5,6 3,258 4,8 3,455 5.0 3,990 5.1 2,812 4.5 
Montana 3,677 5,1 4,663 6,8 4,215 6.3 4,310 6.3 5,463 7.0 4,935 7.9 Northern states 20,805 28.7 20,591 30.0 17,993 26.6 19,252 28,0 20,633 26.6 16,702 26,7 
Nebraska 3,774 5,2 4,095 6.0 4,159 6,1 3,840 5,6 4,510 5,8 3,750 6.0 
Kansas 11,115 15.3 13,198 19,2 14,335 21.1 13,752 20,0 14,895 19,2 11,738 18.8 
Oklahoma 4,332 6.0 4,135 6.0 5,269 7.8 6,085 8.9 6,931 8.9 5,294 8,5 
Texas 2,017 2.8 3,448 5.0 4,576 6.8 5,685 8.3 6,616 8,5 4,840 7.7 
Colorado 1,000 1.4 2,047 3,0 1,493 2.2 1,818 2.6 3,420 4.4 3,204 5.1 
S. Plains states 22,238 30.7 26,923 39,2 29,832 44.0 31,180 45.4 36, 372 46.8 28,826 46.1 
Idaho 1,157 1.6 1,319 1.9 1,094 1.6 1,174 1.7 1,501 1.9 1,305 2,1 
Washington 2,556 3,5 2,975 4,3 2,279 3,4 2,647 3.9 2,969 3.8 2,313 3.7 
Oregon 1,082 1,5 1,113 1.7 959 1.4 999 1.5 1,101 1.4 928 1.5 California 957 1.3 781 1.1 1,030 1,5 649 0,9 78 0.1 488 0,8 
Western states 5,752 7,9 6,188 9,0 5,262 7.9 5,468 8.0 5,649 7.2 5,034 8.1 
All other states 3, 766 5.2 2,575 3.8 2,357 3,5 2,613 3.8 2,891 3,8 2,434 3.9 
United States 72,708 100 68,629 100 67,868 100 68,702 100 77,651 100 62,539 100 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Acres %of Acres %of Acres o/o of Acres %of Acres %of 
State and region (000) u.s. (000) u.s. (000) u.s. (000) u.s. (000) u.s. 
Virginia and W. Va. 328 0.5 335 0.6 302 0.6 289 0.5 324 0.5 
New York 332 0.6 329 0.6 260 0.5 283 0.5 291 0.5 
Pennsylvania 645 1.1 619 1.0 563 1.2 580 1.0 563 1.0 
Eastern states 1,305 2.2 1,283 2.2 1,125 2.3 1,152 2.0 1,178 2.0 
Ohio 1,513 2.6 1,604 2.6 1,524 3.1 1,532 2.7 1,578 2.7 
Indiana 1,199 2.1 1,211 2.0 1,308 2.6 1,321 2.3 1,361 2.4 
illinois 1,592 2.7 1,639 2.7 1,787 3.6 1,742 3.1 1, 777 3.0 
Michigan 953 1.6 1,058 1.7 1,005 2.0 1,106 2.0 1,206 2,1 
Wisconsin 57 0,1 57 0.1 57 0.1 64 0.1 68 0.1 
Missouri 1,805 3. 1 1,895 3.1 1,876 3.8 1,688 3.0 1, 705 2,9 
Iowa 111 0.2 141 0.2 148 0, 3 162 0.3 169 0.3 
Kentucky 291 0.5 297 0.5 294 0.6 250 0.4 275 0.5 
Tennessee 243 0.4 243 0. 4 243 0.5 160 0.3 206 0.4 
Cornbelt states 7,764 13.3 8,145 13.3 8,242 16.5 8,025 14.3 8,345 14.4 
-...J Minnesota 645 1.1 755 1.2 727 1.5 816 1.4 1,018 1.8 
\0 North Dakota 7,350 12.6 7,551 12,4 6,545 13.1 6,512 11.6 6, 751 11.6 
South Dakota 2,542 4.4 2,737 4.5 2,047 4.1 2,425 4.3 2,686 4.6 
Montana 44,774 8.2 5,757 9.5 4,341 8.7 4,497 8.0 4,586 7.9 
Northern states 15, 311 26.3 16,800 27.6 13,660 27.4 14,250 25.3 15,041 25.9 
Nebraska 3,484 6.0 3,549 5.9 3,294 6.6 3,620 6.4 3,444 5.9 
Kansas 10,799 18.5 10,907 18.0 7,199 14.4 10,870 19.3 10,870 18.7 
Oklahoma 4,923 8.5 4,972 8.2 4,276 8.6 4,661 8.3 5,034 8.7 
Texas 4,308 7.4 4,050 6.7 3,159 6.3 3,696 6.5 4,287 7.4 
Colorado 3,266 5.6 3,139 5.2 2,054 4.1 3,006 5.4 2,842 4.9 
S. Plains states 26,780 46.0 26,617 44.0 19,982 40.1 25,853 46.9 26,477 45.6 
Idaho 1,267 2.2 1,343 2.2 1,223 2.4 1,333 2,4 1,247 2. 2 
Washington 2,076 3.6 2, 550 4.2 1,964 3.9 2,065 3.7 2,115 3.6 
Oregon 876 1.5 919 1.5 786 1.6 861 1.5 853 1.5 
California 439 0.8 413 0.7 301 0,6 391 0.7 407 0. 7 
Western states 4,658 8.0 5,225 8.6 4,274 8.6 4,650 8.3 4,622 8.0 
All other states 2,423 4.2 2,588 4.3 2,569 5.1 2,339 4.2 2, 380 4.1 
United States 58,241 100 60,658 100 49,852 100 56,269 100 58,043 100 
Sources: (67, 55, 59). 
TABLE A4-THE DISTRIBUTION OF WHEAT PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES AMONG STATES AND REGIONS. 
1869 1899 1918-20 1928-30 1938-40 1944-46 1948-50 1954 
Million %of Million %of Million %of Million %of 
· State and region Percentage of U.S. bushels u.s. bushels u.s. bushels u.s. bushels U.S. 
Virginia and W.Va. 3.4 2.0 1.6 1.3 9.9 1.2 10.7 l.O 9.7 0.8 8.2 0.8 
New York 4.2 1.6 0.9 0.5 7.4 0.9 7.8 0.7 11.9 1.0 10.7 1.1 
Pennsylvania 6.8 3.1 2.5 2.4 19.1 2.3 20.1 1.8 19.5 1. 7 19.3 2.0 
Eastern states 14.5 6.7 5.0 4.3 36.4 4.4 38.6 3.5 41.0 3.5 38.2 3.9 
Ohio 9.7 7.6 5.1 2.7 42.2 5.1 50.9 4.6 54.7 4.7 47.0 4.8 
Indiana 9.6 5.3 4.5 2.6 27.6 3,3 30.3 2.7 36.5 3.2 40.2 4.1 
lllinois 10.5 3.0 6.5 3.9 40.0 4.8 22.8 2.1 38.5 3.3 47.8 4.9 
Michigan 5.7 3.1 1.8 2.0 17.9 2.2 24.5 2.2 33.7 2.9 29.9 3.0 
Wisconsin 8.9 1.4 0.9 0.3 1.6 0.2 1.7 0.2 2.5 0.2 1.6 0.2 
l'r'iissouri 5.0 3.5 5.9 2.2 32.4 3.9 19.5 1.8 32.7 2.8 41.2 4.2 
Iowa 10.2 3.5 {.9 1.0 8.0 1.0 3.0 0.3 6.7 0.6 2.1 0.2 
Kentucky 2.0 2.2 1.0 0.3 5.9 0.7 5.7 0.5 4.7 0.4 5.4 0.5 
Tennessee 2,2 1.8 0.6 0.4 4.7 0.6 5,1 0.4 4.3 0.4 4,1 0.4 
00 Cornbelt states 63.8 31,4 28.2 15.4 180,3 21.8 163,5 14.8 214,3 18.5 219.3 22.3 0 Minnesota 6.6 14. 5 4.9 2.5 30.1 3.7 23.0 2.1 18.0 1.6 10.4 1,1 
North Dakota -- 9.1 9.4 13.7 80.4 9.7 152.0 13.7 126.0 10.9 69.2 7.0 
South Dakota 
--
6.4 4.3 4.2 24.2 2.9 47.2 4.2 39.4 3.4 27.1 2.8 
Montana 0.1 0.3 3.6 5.9 54.2 6.6 64,9 5.8 83.1 7.2 82.9 8.4 
Northern states 6.7 30.3 22.2 26.3 188.9 22.9 287.1 25.8 266.5 23,1 189.6 19, 3 
Nebraska 0.7 3.8 6.0 7.8 41.8 5.1 69.7 6.3 75.3 6.5 60.1 6.1 
Kansas 0.8 5.9 14,2 18.4 131.3 15,9 204.2 18.4 191,2 16,5 176.2 17.9 
Oklahoma 
--
3.1 5.9 5.3 60.1 7.3 82.7 7.4 76.7 6.6 70.8 7.2 
Texas 0.1 1.9 2.4 3.4 32,2 3,9 60.9 5. 5 59.5 5.1 32.8 3.3 
Colorado 0. 1 0.8 2,3 2.3 14.5 1.8 30.4 2.7 50.4 4.4 18.6 1.9 
s. plains states 1.7 15.5 30.8 37.2 279.9 34,0 447.9 40.3 453.1 39.1 358,5 36.4 
Idaho 
--
0.8 2,2 3,2 27.5 3.3 32.6 2.9 37.0 3.2 37.3 3.8 
Washington 0.1 3.2 4.1 5.2 47.7 5.8 67.6 6.1 68.8 6.0 72.0 7.3 
Oregon 0,8 2.2 2.2 2.7 18,4 2.2 23.4 2,1 25.6 2,2 26.2 2.7 
California 5.8 5.5 1.4 1.6 12,8 1.6 11.2 1,0 11.9 1.0 9.2 0.9 
Western states 6.7 11.7 9.9 12.7 106.4 12.9 134.8 12.1 143.3 12.4 144.7 14.7 
All other states 6.6 4.4 3.9 4.1 33.2 4.0 39.2 3.5 40.0 3.4 33.9 3.4 
United States 100 100 100 100 825.3 100 1,111.1 100 1,158.0 100 983.9 100 
\) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Million % of Million % of Million % of Million % of Million % of 
State and region bushels U.S. bushels U.S. bushels U.S. bushels U.S. bushels U.S. 
Virginia and W.Va. 7.6 0.8 8,1 0.8 5,3 0.6 6.9 0.5 7.0 0.6 
New York 10,3 1,1 9.6 1.0 8.1 0.9 9.2 0.6 7.7 0.7 
Pennsylvania 16,0 1, 7 15.6 1.6 14.2 1.5 16.9 1.2 14,0 1.2 
Eastern states 33,9 3.6 33.3 3.4 27,6 3,0 33,0 2,3 28.7 2.5 
Ohio 43,4 4.6 39.7 4,0 32,9 3.5 46.3 3.2 33,0 2.9 
Indiana 34.4 3. 7 36.2 3.6 32.7 3.5 41.0 1,8 32.6 2,9 
illinois 52.0 5.6 60,9 6,1 36.5 3.8 53,4 3.7 42.3 3,8 
Michigan 28.0 3,0 31.3 3.1 28,7 3.0 41.8 2.8 35.1 3.1 
Wisconsin 1.4 0.1 1.4 0.1 1.4 0.1 2.1 0.1 1.9 0.2 
Missouri 48,1 5,1 50.6 5,0 37.8 4.0 40.5 2.8 38.0 3.4 
Iowa 3.6 0.4 2,4 0,2 3.9 0.4 4.8 0,3 2.9 0,2 
Kentucky 4.0 0,5 5.5 0.6 4.0 0.4 3.9 0,3 4.5 0,4 
Tennessee 3.4 0.4 4. 7 0.5 3.5 0,4 2, 7 0.2 3. 7 0.3 
Cornbelt states 218.3 23.4 232.7 23.2 181.4 19.1 236.5 16.2 194.0 17.2 
Minnesota 12.2 1.3 17.2 1. 7 15.8 1. 7 25,3 1. 7 23,3 2,1 
~ North Dakota 109.3 11.7 118.8 11.8 119.2 12.5 147.4 10.1 97.2 8.6 
South Dakota 17.5 2.9 16.5 1.6 40,0 4.2 55,7 3.8 18.2 1.6 
Montana 109,4 11.7 87,0 8. 7 81.9 8.6 101.9 7.0 82,1 7,3 
Northern states 258.4 27 .. 6 239.5 23,8 256.9 27.0 330,3 22.6 220.8 19,6 
Nebraska 78.3 8.4 64,7 6,4 78.7 8.3 113,5 7.8 69.7 6.2 
Kansas 128.4 13.7 143.3 14.4 100.1 10.5 296.5 20.2 209.7 18.6 
Oklahoma 24.2 2.6 69.3 6.8 43.0 4.5 115,4 7.9 89.2 7.9 
Texas 14.3 1,5 26.4 2.6 33.7 3.5 73.0 5,0 59,9 5,3 
Colorado 17.7 1.9 17.7 1.8 36.5 3,8 67.2 4.6 54,8 4.8 
S, plains states 262.9 28,1 321.4 32.0 292.0 30.7 665.6 45.5 483.3 42.8 
Idaho 38.2 4.1 39.0 3.9 42.3 4.4 42,5 2,9 42.7 3.8 
Washington 55.8 6.0 59.8 6.0 71.0 7.5 70,0 4.8 73.3 6.5 
Oregon 21.9 2,3 25.6 2.5 26.8 2.8 28,0 1.9 28,5 2,5 
California 8.9 1.0 8.3 0.8 6.2 0. 7 8.2 0,6 8, 7 0,8 
Western state 124.8 13.4 132.7 13,2 t46.3 15.4 148,7 10.2 153.2 13.6 
All other states 36.8 3,9 44,8 4.4 46.3 4,8 47.5 3.1 48.2 4,3 
United States 934.7 100 1,004.3 100 950.7 100 1,461. 7 100 1,128,2 100 
Sources: 1869 and 1899, from Grain Production and Marketing, USDA, P.M.A., Misc. Pub. No. 692, Oct., 1949; 1918-20, to 
1956, from Agricultural Statistics, USDA; 1957-59, from Crop Production, Annual Summary, 1958 and 1959, USDA. 
TABLE A5-WHEAT ACREAGE ALLOTMENTS AND PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL ALLOTMENT IN EACH STATE, 1938-60. 
1938 1942 1954 1958 1959 1960 
Acres Acres Acres Acres 
State (000) % (000) % (000) % % % (000) % 
Alabama 5.7 * ,4.9 * 17.5 * * .1 35.2 .1 
Arizona 35.4 * 33.1 * 22.6 * * * 30.0 .1 
Arkansas 77.1 .1 57.2 . 1 56.5 * * .1 57.6 .1 
California 708.7 1.1 633.9 1.1 562.4 .9 .8 .8 429.0 .8 
Colorado 1,504.6 2.4 1,303.2 2.3 2,899.1 4.6 4.9 4.9 2,677.0 4.9 
·connecticut ** ** ** ** .9 * * * .6 * 
Delaware 77.5 .1 65.3 .1 50.5 * * .1 34.2 .1 
Florida ** ** ** ** .8 * * * 4.1 * 
Georgia 139.7 .2 139.4 .2 124.1 .2 .2 .2 109.1 .2 
Idaho 1,011.6 1.6 865.2 1.6 1,277.4 2.0 2.1 2.1 1,164.9 2.1 
lllinois 2;039.4 3.3 1,676.2 3.0 1,541.2 2.5 2,5 2.6 1,434.5 2.6 
Indiana 1,690.0 2.7 1,411.5 2.5 1,324.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 1,137.1 2.0 
00 Iowa 456.0 .7 372.7 .7 209.8 .3 .3 .3 
143.1 .3 
N Kansas 12,519.9 20,0 11,371.8 20.4 11,874.8 18.9 19.3 19.2 10,636.3 19.3 
Kentucky 382.5 .6 373.8 .7 222.4 .4 .4 .4 216.5 .4 
Louisiana ** ** ** * 3.9 * * * 14.7 * 
Maine 6.0 * 4.0 * 1.7 * * * 1.4 * 
Maryland 395.0 .6 340.9 .6 238.8 .4 .3 .3 179.2 .3 
Massachusetts ** ** ** ** .9 * * * .7 * 
Michigan 765.8 1.2 660.7 1.2 1,093.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 965.6 1.8 
Minnesota 1,609.2 2.6 1,488.9 2.7 956.0 1.5 1.3 1.3 720.4 1.3 
Mississippi .1 * ** * 27.8 * * .1 37.0 .1 
Missouri 1,938.4 3.1 1,568.3 2.8 1, 311.8 2.1 2.3 2.4 1,335.9 2.4 
Montana 3,973.9 6.4 3,346.3 6.0 4,635.3 7.4 7.4 7.3 4,009.4 7.3 
Nebraska 3,466.1 5.5 3,146.6 5.6 3,662.4 5.8 5.9 5.8 3,181.9 5.8 
Nevada 13.1 * 13.7 * 16.0 * * * 12.4 * 
New Hampshire ** ** ** ** .1 * * * .1 * 
New Jersey 53.0 * 50.2 * 63.8 .1 * .1 52.5 .1 
New Mexico 356.7 .6 316.2 .6 502.7 .8 .9 .9 478.7 .9 
New York 246.8 .4 218.7 .4 344.0 .5 .6 .6 320.6 .6 
North Carolina 413.0 .7 364.7 .7 320.4 .5 .5 .5 295.9 .5 
- ... J ~ --~ 
North Dakota 9,43-1.4 15.1 7,982.4 14.3 9,029.9 14.4 13.3 13.2 7,337.2 13.3 
Ohio 1,870.4 3.0 1,636.3 2.9 1, 758.4 2.8 2.8 2.8 1,535. 7 2.8 
Oklahoma 4,291.8 6.9 4,004.4 7.2 5,245.8 8.4 8.8 8.9 4,865.2 8.8 
Oregon 867.9 1.4 756.3 1.4 898.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 833.4 1.5 
Pennsylvania 873. 1 1.4 757.6 1.4 723.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 568.5 1.0 
Rhode Island ** ** ** ** .7 * * * .5 * South Carolina 125.6 .2 136.3 .2 157.2 .3 .2 .3 138.2 .2 
South Dakota 3,345.4 5.4 2,886.7 5.2 3,188.3 5.1 5.0 4.9 2,727.3 5.0 
Tennessee 382.0 .6 337.0 .6 212.6 .3 .4 .4 193.1 .4 
Texas 4,146.2 6.6 3, 748.1 6. 7 4,817.4 7.7 7.6 7.4 4,092.3 7.4 
Utah 239.7 .4 211.2 .4 360.0 .6 .6 .6 309.3 .6 
Vermont .1 * ** ** .4 * * * .5 * 
00 Virginia 546.7 .9 469.3 .8 318.7 .5 .5 .5 256.2 .5 1.» 
Washington 1,912.5 3.1 1,656. 7 3.0 2,264.9 3.6 3.7 3.6 1,997.5 3.6 
West Virginia 130.1 .2 119.4 .2 56.5 * * .1 37.7 .1 Wisconsin 108.0 .2 86.1 1.5 73.5 .1 * . 1 47.1 .1 
Wyoming 344.0 .6 295.9 .7 338.6 .5 .5 .5 285.0 .5 
Na tional reserve .1 -- -- -- --- -- -- .1 60.0 . 1 
United States*** 62,500.1 100.0 54,910.1 100.0 62,809.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 55,000.0 100.0 
Source: U.S.D.A. , Commodity Stabilization Service. 
*Less than . 1 percent. 
**No allotment 
***The national allotment for 1938 was 62 million acres, but certain exceptions added about half a million acres. In 1954, 
an additional allotment of 8 or 9 million acres was made for durum wheat, above the announced allotment of 55 million 
acres. 
TABLE AS-DISTRIBUTION OF SEEDED ACREAGE AND WHEAT PRODUCTION IN MINOR WHEAT- PRODUCING STATES. a 
Average 1945-54 1954 1957 1958 1959 
Acres Prod. -----rcres Prod. Acres Prod. Acres Prod. Acres Prod. 
(mill. Acr (mill. (mill. (mill. (mill. 
States (000) (%) bu.) (%) (000) bu.) (000) bu.) (000) bu.) (000) (%) bu.) (%) 
Delaware 62 .1 1.1 .1 37 .9 32 .6 31 .7 29 .1 .7 .1 
Maryland 318 .4 5.8 .6 210 5.0 172 3.4 179 4.2 179 .3 4.0 .4 
North Carolina 428 .6 7.0 . 7 370 7.4 392 6.9 337 7,2 431 • 7 9.4 .8 
South Carolina 182 .2 2.8 .3 158 2.8 204 3. 5 149 3.1 200 .3 3 .9 .4 
Georgia 154 .2 2.2 .2 127 2.2 124 1.8 77 1.6 122 .2 2.3 .2 
New Jersey 103 .1 1.8 .2 85 1. 7 62 1. 5 67 1.8 66 .1 1.6 .1 
East and Southeast 1,247 1.6 20.5 2,1 987 20.0 986 17.7 840 18.6 1, 027 1,7 21,9 1.8 
Alabama 18 ,0 .3 .0 30 ,5 162 2,3 133 2.3 80 .1 1.4 ,2 
~ Mississippi 26 .0 .4 .0 45 ,8 190 3.5 162 1,9 50 ,1 .9 .1 
Arkansas 54 .1 • 7 .1 84 1, 7 210 3,3 155 2,3 186 .3 3.6 .3 
Louisiana -- -- -- -- -- -- 132 1.3 70 ,7 84 .1 1, 2 ,1 
Southern states 98 .1 1.4 ,1 159 7,8 694 10,4 520 7.2 400 .7 7.1 .8 
Wyoming 378 ,5 6.1 .6 355 2.9 317 6,4 533 8.1 293 .5 5.5 .5 
New Mexico 615 ,8 2.9 ,3 528 .8 194 2.2 233 3.8 285 .5 3,8 ,3 
Arizona 25 ,0 5.5 .5 17 .4 69 2.3 130 3,9 109 .2 3,7 .3 
Utah 406 .6 8.0 .8 374 6.5 291 6.6 273 5.1 244 ,4 5.4 ,5 
Nevada 19 ,0 .5 .1 14 .3 18 ,6 20 .8 22 ,1 .8 .1 
Western states 1,443 1.9 23.0 2.3 1,288 10.9 889 18.1 979 21.7 953 1.6 19.2 1. 7 
All minor states 2,788 3,5 44.9 4,5 2,434 33.9 2,569 46.3 2,339 47,5 2,380 4,1 48,2 4.3 
United States 75,126 100 983.9 100 62,539 983.9 49,852 950,7 56,269 1,461.7 58,043 100 1,128.2 100 
Source: 59. 
a, Seven states (of 48) do not produce whea t, according to U,S,D,A, data. 
TABLE A7-ESTIMATED HARD RED WINTER SEEDED ACREAGE, BY STATES, 
AT FIVE-YEAR INTERVALS, 1919-1954. 
1924 1934 1944 1954 
Seeded 
acreage 
(1000 % of % of % of % of 
State acres) total Acreage total Acreage to tal Acreage total 
United States 22773 100.0 28731 100.0 30596 100.0 34959 100.0 
Arizona a b a b 5 b 5 b 
Ar kansas 2 b 7 b 1 b 10 b 
California 7 b 5 b 3 b 
Colorado 1163 5.1 1319 4.6 1405 4.6 3137 9.0 
Idaho 240 1.1 307 1.1 396 1.3 560 1.6 
illinois 1396 6.1 861 3.0 294 1.0 1034 3.0 
Indiana 232 1.0 303 1.1 195 .6 53 .2 
Iowa 402 1.8 343 1. 2 143 .5 112 . 3 
Kansas 9725 42.7 11962 41.6 12317 40.3 11714 33.5 
Kentucky a b 5 b 4 b 11 b 
Maryland 
Michigan 3 b 6 b * * 11 b 
Minnesota 103 .5 175 .6 152 .5 43 .1 
Mississippi 2 b 
Missouri 193 .8 102 .4 111 .4 863 2.5 
Montana 637 2.8 747 2.6 1246 4.1 1589 4.5 
Nebraska 2953 13.0 3059 10.7 3575 11.7 3705 10.6 
Nevada 4 b 2 b 3 b 
New Jersey 2 
New Mexico 197 .9 345 1.2 307 1.0 518 1.5 
New York a b .4 
North Dakota 17 .1 18 . 1 * * 41 .1 Ohio 10 b 6 b 6 b 7 b 
Oklahoma 3304 14.5 3687 12.8 4987 16.3 5257 15.0 
Oregon 254 1.1 234 .8 117 .4 47 .1 
Pennsylvania 1 b 1 b 3 b 12 b 
South Dakota 84 .4 173 .6 202 .7 419 1.2 
Tennessee 5 b 
Texas 1121 4.9 4185 14.6 4103 13.4 4704 13.4 
Utah 112 .5 133 .5 158 .5 250 .7 
Virginia 
Washington 543 2.4 585 2.0 666 2. 2 509 1.5 
West Virginia .4 
Wisconsin 50 .2 18 . 1 37 .1 6 b 
~yarning 19 .1 143 .5_ 158 .5 296 .8 
"" 
Indicates the class was grown but occupie dl ess than 1/ 10 of .1 perc·e~tof the states 
state's total wheat acreage. 
a Less than 500 acres. 
b Less than 1/10 of 1 percent 
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TABLE AS-ESTIMATED HARD RED SPRING SEEDED ACREAGE, BY STATES, 
AT FIVE-YEAR INTERVALS, 1919-1954. 
1924 1934 1944 1954 
Seeded 
acreage 
(1,000 % of % of % of % of 
State acres) total Acreage total Acreage total Acreage total 
United States 11875 100.0 14652 100.0 15794 100.0 13383 100.0 
Arizona 1 b 1 b 
Arkansas 
California 5 b 
Colorado 218 1.8 288 2.0 178 1.1 64 .5 
Idaho 128 1.1 58 .4 54 .3 95 .7 
filinois 35 . 3 18 .1 8 b 5 b 
Indiana 2 b * * 1 b 
Iowa 54 .5 25 .2 6 b 18 .1 
Kansas * * 25 . 2 13 .1 
Kentucky 1 b 
Michigan 2 b 3 b 2 b 1 b 
Minnesota 1477 12.4 1401 9.6 1114 7.1 692 5.2 
Missouri 2 b 
Montana 2383 20.1 2885 19.7 3045 19.3 3311 24.7 
Nebraska 92 .8 254 1.7 89 .6 38 .3 
Nevada 2 b a b 1 b 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 9 .1 15 .1 23 .1 10 b 
New York 4 b 4 b 3 b 
North Dakota 5864 49 .4 7175 49.0 8363 53.0 6692 50.0 
Ohio 2 b 4 6 2 b 
Oklahoma 21 .1 
Oregon 54 .5 36 . 2 10 b 20 .1 
Pennsylvania * * * * 1 b South Dakota 1279 10.8 2206 15.1 2757 17.5 2326 17.4 
Tennessee 1 b 
Texas 18 .2 5 b 14 .1 
Utah 7 .1 4 b 
Virginia 
Washington 75 .6 38 .2 13 b 2 b 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 60 .5 102 .7 30 .2 45 . 3 
Wyoming 104 .9 105 .7 84 .5 47 .3 
* Indicates the class was grown but occupied less than 1/ 10 of 1 percent of the 
state's total wheat acreage. 
a Less than 500 acres. 
b Less than 1/ 10 of 1 percent. 
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TABLE A9-ESTIMATED SOFT RED WINTER SEEDED ACREAGE, BY STATES, 
AT FIVE-YEAR INTERVALS, 1919 - 1954. 
1924 1934 1944 1954 
Seeded 
acreage 
(1,000 %of %of %of % of 
State acres) total Acreage total Acreage total Acreage total 
United States 12884 100.0 12874 100.0 11329 100.0 7442 100.0 
Alabama 8 b 10 b 18 2 30 4 
Arkansas 32 .2 66 .5 64 .6 74 1.0 
California 
Colorado 4 b 2 b * * * * 
Delaware 102 .8 83 .6 68 .6 37 .5 
Georgia 121 .9 177 1.4 243 2. 1 127 1.7 
Idaho 43 .3 35 .3 14 .1 * * 
lllinois 1279 9.9 1216 9.4 1024 9.0 555 7.5 
Indiana 1624 12.6 1580 12.3 1141 10.1 1268 17.0 
Iowa 7 b 1 b 2 b 
Kansas 491 3.8 711 5.5 773 6.8 23 .3 
Kentucky 284 2.2 435 3.4 51 .4 305 4.1 
Maryland 505 3.9 416 3.2 401 3.5 210 2.8 
Michigan 586 4.5 415 3.2 339 3.0 175 2.4 
Minnesota * * 2 b 4 b Mississippi 6 b 23 .2 45 .6 
Missouri 1703 13.2 1574 12.2 1473 13.0 709 9.5 
Montana 16 .1 26 .2 4 b * * 
Nebraska 44 .4 37 .3 37 . 3 8 .1 
New Jersey 55 .4 53 .4 74 .6 81 1.1 
New Mexico 1 b * * 
New York 31 .2 53 .4 26 .2 8 .1 
North Carolina 346 2.7 494 3.8 574 5. 1 370 5.0 
Ohio 2030 15.8 1986 15.4 2037 18.0 1734 23.3 
Oklahoma 533 4.1 630 4.9 219 1.9 16 .2 
Oregon 25 .2 33 .2 2 b 1 b 
Pennsylvania 1163 9.0 988 7.7 920 8.1 697 9.4 
South Carolina 58 .4 163 1.3 290 2.6 158 2.1 
Tennessee 360 2.8 435 3.4 491 4.3 254 3.4 
Texas 255 2.0 323 2.5 258 2.3 106 1.4 
Utah 5 b 4 b 4 b 
Virginia 632 4.9 617 4.8 574 5.1 310 4.2 
Washington 404 3.1 147 1.1 70 .6 12 .2 
West Virginia 124 1.0 160 1.2 113 1.0 54 .7 
Wisconsin 6 b 1 b 2 b 15 .2 
Wyoming 1 b 1 b 1 b .4 b 
*Indicates the class was grown, but occupied less than 1/10 of 1 percent of the 
state's total wheat acreage. 
aLess than 500 acres. 
bLess than 1/10 of 1 percent. 
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TABLE AlO-ESTIMATED WHITE SEEDED ACREAGE, BY STATES, AT FNE-
YEAR INTERVALS, 1919 - 1954. 
1924 1934 1944 1954 
Seeded 
acreage 
(1,000 %of %of % of % of 
State acres) total Acreage total Acreage total Acreage total 
United States 3798 100.0 4824 100.0 5053 100.0 5191 100. 0 
Arizona 32 .8 56 1.2 20 .4 12 .2 
Arkansas a b 
California 807 21.2 843 17.5 593 11. 7 488 9.4 
Colorado 32 .8 43 .9 8 .2 3 b 
Delaware a b 
Idaho 451 11.9 606 12.6 592 11.7 650 12.5 
nlinois * * 9 .2 14 .3 
Indiana 2 b 4 b 11 .2 
Iowa 2 b a b 
Kansas * * 
Kentucky * * 1 b 
Michigan 218 5.7 476 9.9 656 13.0 848 16.3 
Minnesota * * 14 .3 
Missouri 9 .2 
Montana 35 .9 49 1.1 30 .6 15 .3 
Nebraska 6 . 2 * * 
Nevada 8 .2 10 .2 13 .2 14 .3 
New Jersey a b 1 b 2 b 
New Mexico 18 .5 9 .2 4 b 
New York 305 8.0 228 4.7 308 6.1 353 6.8 
North Carolina 14 .4 15 .3 14 .3 a b 
North Dakota * * 18 .4 * * Ohio 21 .6 49 1.0 14 .3 16 .3 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 626 16.5 756 15.7 847 16.8 859 16. 5 
Pennsylvania 9 .2 1 b 17 . 3 15 .3 
South Dakota 5 .1 79 1.6 39 .8 
Tennessee .8 b 
Texas 1 b 4 t * * 
Utah 91 2.4 102 2.1 130 2.6 124 2.4 
Virginia a b 
Washington 1116 29.4 1455 30.2 1753 34.8 1790 34.5 
West Vir ginia a b a b 
Wisconsin a b a b 
Wyoming 1 b 4 b 3 b 11 .2 
*Indicates the class was grown but occupied les s than 1/10 of 1 percent of the 
state's total wheat acreage. 
aLess than 500 acres. 
bLess than 1/10 of 1 percent. 
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TABLE All-ESTIMATED DURUM WHEAT SEEDED ACREAGE, BY STATES, AT 
FIVE-YEAR INTERVALS, 1919 - 1954. 
1924 1934 1944 1954 
Seeded 
acreage 
(1,000 %of % of %of % of 
State acres) total Acreage total Acreage total Acreage total 
United States 4370 100.0 2866 100.0 2180 100.0 1563 100.0 
Arizona a b a b 
California 8 .2 * * Colorado 87 2.0 13 .4 
Idaho * * 
illinois * * * * 
Indiana * * 
Iowa 5 .1 3 .1 a b 
Kansas 10 .2 
Kentucky 
Michigan 
Minnesota 136 3.1 144 5.0 64 2.9 15 1.0 
Missouri 2 b 
Montana 128 2.9 30 1.0 30 1.4 20 1.3 
Nebraska 86 2.0 34 1.2 4 .2 
New Mexico 11 .2 2 b 
New York 
North Dakota 2793 63.9 1999 69.7 .1799 82.5 1468 93.9 
Oklahoma. 
South Dakota 1049 24.0 577 20.1 257 11.8 67 4.3 
Texas 30 .7 32 1.1 18 .8 14 .9 
Utah 
Washington * * 
Wisconsin 2 b 2 b a b 1 b 
Wyoming 24 .5 30 1.0 6 .3 
*Indicates the class was grown but occupied less than 1/10 of 1 per cent of the 
state's total wheat acreage. 
aLess than 500 acres. 
bLess than 1/ 10 of 1 percent. 
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TABLE A12-ESTIMATED SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION OF WHEAT, BY CLASSES, 
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, 1952-59. 
Year beginning July 
Item I952 I953 I954 I955 1956 195'7 1958 I959-a 
(million bushels) 
All wheat 
Stocks, July 1 256 606 934 1,036 1,033 909 881 1,295 
Production 1,306 1,173 984 935 1,004 951 1,462 1,128 
Imports 22 6 4 10 8 11 8 7 
SupplY. 1,584 1, 785 1,922 1,981 2,045 1,871 2,351 2,430 
Exportsb 321 220 278 350 549 406 ' 447 516 
Carryover 606 934 1,036 1,033 909 881 1,295 1,313 
Domestic disappearance 657 631 608 598 587 584 609 60i 
Hard red winter 
Stocks, July I 97 395 560 677 691 648 613 940 
Production 723 504 489 416 446 425 838 619 
Supply 820 899 1,049 1,093 1,137 1,073 1,451 1,559 
Exportsb 184 78 124 164 251 219 259 296 
Carryover 395 560 677 691 648 613 940 999. 
Domestic disappearance 241 261 248 238 238 241 252 264 
Soft r ed winter 
Stocks, July 1 16 38 70 50 17 10 6 21 
Production 193 231 185 173 187 159 195 163 
Supply 209 269 255 223 204 169 201 184 
Exportsb 40 56 62 69 60 30 43 41 
Carryover 38 70 50 17 10 6 21 11 
Domestic disappearance 131 143 143 137 134 133 137 132 
Hard red spring 
Stocks, July I 117 128 195 172 185 196 203 251 
Production 181 217 145 184 178 167 233 152 
Imports 22 6 4 10 8 11 8 7 
Supply 320 351 344 366 371 374 444 4'10 
Exportsb 17 11 28 ' 29 35 38 46 50 
Carryover 128 195 172 185 196 203 251 225 
Domestic disappea rance 175 145 144 152 140 133 147 135 
Durum 
Stocks, July 1 15 7 5 2 7 13 25 18 
Production 23 14 5 20 39 40 22 21 
Imports 
Supply 38 21 10 22 46 53 47 39 
Exportsb 3 1 11 1 1 1 
Carryover 7 5 2 7 13 25 18 13 
Domestic disappearance 28 16 8 14 22 27 28 25 
White 
--stOcks, July 1 11 38 104 135 133 42 34 65 
Production 186 207 160 142 154 160 174 173 
Supply 197 245 264 277 287 202 208 238 
Exportsb 77 75 64 87 192 117 98 128. 
Carryover 38 104 135 133 42 34 65, 65 
Domestic disappearance 82 66 
Source: (69, Aug. 1959 and Feb. I96o). 
65 57 53 50 45 45 
a. Preliminary. 
b. In addition to wheat grain, includes grain equivalent of flour made from U.S. 
wheat; also semolina and macaroni (in terms of wheat) for years beginning July, in 
million bushels, as follows: 1944, 2; 1945, 1; 1946, 3; 1947, 6; 1948, 1; 1949-5 5, less 
than 1 and 1956-58, 1. Also includes shipments to territories of the United States. 
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TABLE A13-WHEAT: SUPPLY AND DISAPPEARANCE, UNITED STATES, 1909-59. 
Supply D1sappearance 
Year Continental United States 
beginning Processed Feed or Total 
July Carryover Production Importsa Total for foodb Seed Industriala residual Total Exports disappearance 
M1Ihon bushels 
1909 55 684 4 743 483 70 - 5 543 89 633 
1910 110 625 4 739 485 73 -15 543 71 614 
1911 125 618 5 748 492 75 
- 7 557 81 638 
1912 110 730 4 841 492 73 10 574 145 719 
1913 125 751 5 882 498 76 47 618 148 767 
1914 115 897 2 1,015 501 81 30 612 336 948 
1915 67 1,009 7 1,083 503 80 27 612 246 858 
1916 225 635 25 884 510 79 29 598 206 804 
1917 80 620 31 731 453 87 19 558 133 691 
1918 40 904 11 955 455 97 25 583 288 870 
·1919 85 952 6 1,043 525 90 81 650 222 873 
\Q 1920 170 843 58 1,071 407 89 31 578 370 947 ,_. 
1921 124 819 11 954 485 88 9 582 277 858 
1922 96 847 11 953 482 86 37 605 216 821 
1923 132 759 14 906 491 74 56 622 146 769 
1924 137 842 1 979 491 80 42 615 256 871 
1925 108 669 2 779 510 79 - 3 588 94 683 
1926 97 832 929 513 83 14 613 207 820 
1927 109 875 1 985 514 90 76 680 192 873 
1928 113 914 1,027 517 84 53 656 144 801 
1929 227 824 1,051 512 83 22 619 141 760 
1930 291 887 1,178 501 81 170 754 112 866 
1931 313 942 1,254 499 80 3 172 756 123 879 
1932 375 756 1,132 510 84 12B 722 32 754 
1933 378 522 930 466 78 87 731 26 657 
1934 273 526 14 813 476 83 97 657 11 667 
1935 146 628 35 809 493 87 83 664 4 668 
1936 140 630 35 805 496 96 100 693 10 702 
1937 83 874 1 958 497 93 115 704 100 805 
1938 153 920 1,073 500 74 142 716 107 823 
TABLE Al3-CONTINUED 
SUpply D1sappearance 
Year Continental United States 
beginning Processed Feed or Total 
July Carryover Production Importsa Total for foodb Seed Industriala residual Total Exports disappearance 
1939 250 741 992 492 73 101 667 45 712 
1940 280 815 4 1,098 493 74 112 679 34 713 
1941 385 942 4 1,330 492 62 2 114 672 28 700 
1942 631 969 1 1,601 529 65 54 306 955 28 982 
1943 619 844 136 1,599 536 77 108 511 1,240 43 1,283 
1944 317 1,060 42 1,419 537 80 83 300 996 144 1,140 
1945 279 1,108 2 1,389 498 82 21 297 998 391 1,289 
1946 100 1,152 1,252 508 87 178 771 397 1,168 
1947 84 1,359 1,443 488 91 1 178 761 486 1,247 
1948 196 1,295 2 1,492 481 95 105 681 504 1,185 
1949 307 1,098 2 1,408 492 81 111 684 299 983 
'D 1950 425 1,019 12 1,456 493 88 109 690 366 1,056 
N 1951 400 988 32 1,420 496 88 1 102 688 475 1,164 
1952 256 1,306 22 1,584 489 89 82 661 317 978 
1953 606 1,173 6 1,784 487 70 77 634 217 851 
1954 934 984 4 1,922 486 65 60 611 274 885 
1955 1,036 935 10 1,981 482 68 1 51 601 346 947 
1956 1,033 1,004 8 2,046 483 58 1 47 587 550 1,137 
1957 909 951 11 1,870 484 63 39 587 403 989 
195.8 881 1,462 8 2,351 493 65 54 612 443 1,055 
1959 1,295 1,128 7 2,430 492 64 49 605 512 1,117 
Source: U.S.D.A. 
a. Less than one half million bushels imported or used by industry where no quantity shown. 
b. Includes shipments to territories and military uses but not military relief feeding. 
TABLE A14-PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF WHEAT FLOUR, AND TOTAL PER 
CAPITA WHEAT DISAPPEARANCE FOR CIVILIAN FOOD, 1910-56. 
Disappearance Disappearance 
Year 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
Flour for food Year Flour for food 
(lbs. per capita) (lbs. per capita) 
216 310 1935 159 225 
214 310 1936 164 235 
211 306 1937 159 228 
209 302 1938 161 229 
207 301 1939 159 225 
205 299 1940 156 220 
204 298 1941 156 221 
191 272 1942 157 223 
179 247 1943 164 229 
193 277 1944 150 211 
180 263 1945 162 230 
167 245 1946 157 214 
181 259 1947 140 196 
181 260 1948 138 194 
180 256 i949 137 193 
1925 181 260 1950 136 192 
1926 183 259 1951 134 190 
1927 181 260 1952 133 188 
1928 179 255 1953 129 182 
1929 178 254 1954 127 178 
1930 172 247 1955 124 174 
1931 169 240 1956 122 170 
1932 170 242 1957 120 167 
1933 164 232 1958 120 167 
1934 157 222 1959 119 166 
Sources: (65, 69) Consumptionfigures for most items are measured at the pro-
cessing level; quantities used in alcoholic beverages excluded; civilian consump-
tion only, beginning in 1941. 
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TABLE A15-CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: AVERAGE ANNUAL INDEXES FOR ALL 
FOODS, AND FOR FOOD GROUPS, 1923-56 (1923=100). 
Food for Home Use 
Meats Fruits Cereals 
All poultry, Dairy and and bakery 
Year foods and fish Eggs products vegetables products 
1923 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1924 99 101 102 96 94 102 
1925 107 110 111 99 109 110 
1926 111 116 104 98 124 110 
1927 107 114 98 101 108 107 
1928 106 122 101 101 95 104 
1929 107 125 106 101 100 102 
1930 102 118 89 93 105 99 
1931 84 100 70 79 74 87 
1932 70 78 60 66 61 78 
1933 68 68 57 64 67 80 
1934 76 78 65 70 70 93 
1935 81 99 77 75 59 96 
1936 82 98 76 78 62 95 
1937 85 104 74 81 64 98 
1938 79 98 74 77 55 95 
1939 77 95 67 74 56 90 
1940 78 94 69 78 57 92 
1941 85 106 82 87 61 93 
1942 100 124 100 97 77 100 
1943 111 132 119 104 100 102 
1944 110 128 112 103 99 103 
1945 112 130 121 103 104 103 
1946 129 159 124 128 108 118 
1947 156 214 148 144 118 147 
1948 170 243 153 158 121 162 
1949 163 230 148 144 123 161 
1950 165 240 128 143 118 164 
1951 183 269 155 159 128 179 
1952 187 266 142 166 141 183 
1953 183 252 150 163 137 187 
1954 182 248 126 158 135 191 
1955 179 233 130 158 137 194 
1956 179 223 129 162 143 197 
Source: (65, p. 58). 
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TABLE A16-POPULATION, REAL PER CAPITA INCOMES, PER CAPITA CON-
SUMPTION OF BREAD GRAINS AND TOTAL BREAD GRAIN REQUIREMENTS 
IN SELECTED COUNTRY GROUPS, PREWAR, 1950-51, AND 1954-55. 
Country groupings 
Total 23 
A B c D E countries 
Population (millions) 
Prewarb 140.9 168.5 66.5 24.6 399.9 800. 4 
1950-51 165.2 188.9 76.2 29.7 477.5 937.5 
1954-55 176.7 193.8 80.1 32.4 504.6 987.6 
Per capita incomes (1953 U.S. dollars) 
Prewarb 
1950-51 1,712 623 230 716 73 
1954-55 1, 798 717 267 650 93 
Per capita consumption bread grain (60 pound bushels per year) 
PrewarC 3. 74 4. 73 6. 17 4,84 0. 73 2. 72 
1950-51 3.23 4.55 6.20 4.95 1.06 2.68 
1954-55 3.01 4.29 6.17 4.51 1.06 2.57 
Total bread grain requirements (million bushels per year) 
Prewar 525.4 801.0 411.5 117.6 
1950-51 536.5 859;8 470.3 147.0 
1954-55 532.8 834.1 496.0 147.0 
Source: (43, p. 8). 
301.3 
514.4 
536.5 
2,156.9 
2,528.0 
2,546.4 
a. (A) Canada and the United States; (B) Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Western 
Germany; (C) Greece, Italy and Turkey; (D) Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and 
Uruguay; (E) Egypt, India, Japan and the Union of South Africa. 
b. 1937. 
c. Average 1934-38 except for Australia 1936-37 and 1938-39; Egypt 1934- 35 and 
1938-39; Greece and Western Germany 1935-38; Canada, New Zealand a.Ji:d U. South 
Africa 1935-39; and the United States 1937-41. · 
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TABLE A17-PROJECTED DEMAND FOR BREAD GRAINS AS HUMAN FOOD IN 
SELECTED COUNTRY GROUPINGS (TARGET YEAR 1965).a 
Country groupings a 
Total 23 
A B c D E countries 
1) Estimated income elasticity -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 +0.3 
2) Percent increase in real 
incomes 1955-1965 +28.0 +20.0 +20.0 +25.0 +50.0 
3) Population growth 1955-1965 
(percent) +13.0 +4.0 +8.0 +18.0 +11.0 
4) Net effect of income and 
population growth on bread 
grain consumption 1955-1965 
(percent) +7.0 -2.0 +8.0 +8.0 +26.0 
5) Total consumption of bread 
grains in 1954-55 (million 
bushels grain) 532.8 834.1 496.0 147.0 536.5 2,546.4 
6) Total consumption of bread 
grains in 1965 (million 
bushels grain) 569.5 815.7 536.5 158.0 676.1 2,756.0 
7) Population in 1965 (millions) 202.0 201.6 86.9 38.9 565.6 1,095.0 
8) Per capita consumption of 
bread grain in 1965 (bushels 
grain per year) 2.79 4.04 6.17 4.04 1.21 2.50 
a. For source and country groupings, see table A16. 
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